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Abstract
Security within the Web services technology field is a complex and very
topical issue. When considering using this technology suite to support interact-
ing e-businesses, literature has shown that the challenge of achieving security
becomes even more elusive. This is particularly true with regard to attaining a
level of security beyond just applying technologies, that is trusted, endorsed and
practiced by all parties involved. Attempting to address these problems, this re-
search proposes BOF4WSS, a Business-Oriented Framework for enhancing Web
Services Security in e-business. The novelty and importance of BOF4WSS is its
emphasis on a tool-supported development methodology, in which collaborating
e-businesses could achieve an enhanced and more comprehensive security and
trust solution for their services interactions.
This investigation began with an in-depth assessment of the literature in
Web services, e-business, and their security. The outstanding issues identified
paved the way for the creation of BOF4WSS. With appreciation of research limi-
tations and the added value of framework tool-support, emphasis was then shifted
to the provision of a novel solution model and tool to aid companies in the use and
application of BOF4WSS. This support was targeted at significantly easing the
difficulties incurred by businesses in transitioning between two crucial framework
phases.
To evaluate BOF4WSS and its supporting model and tool, a two-step
approach was adopted. First, the solution model and tool were tested for com-
patibility with existing security approaches which they would need to work with
in real-world scenarios. Second, the framework and tool were evaluated using in-
terviews with industry-based security professionals who are experts in this field.
The results of both these evaluations indicated a noteworthy degree of evidence
to affirm the suitability and strength of the framework, model and tool. Addi-
tionally, these results also act to cement this thesis’ proposals as innovative and
significant contributions to the research field.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
If you think technology can solve your security problems, then you don’t under-
stand the problems and you don’t understand the technology. — Bruce Schneier
1.1 Background and Motivation
Electronic business (hereafter, e-business) has matured into one of the most cost-
efficient and streamlined ways of conducting business today. Within this business
paradigm, one area which has been doing particularly well is the electronic col-
laboration between e-businesses [108], with service offerings such as online order
processing and electronic payments. To facilitate this collaboration, Web services
(WS) technology is playing a progressively significant role [231, 217, 74].
The novel benefit available with WS is rooted in its ability to allow for
seamless integration of business processes across disparate enterprises, due to
the use of open technologies backed by standardized protocols [29, 28]. Papa-
zoglou [157] even states that the facilitation and automation of these business
processes is the ultimate goal of WS technology. As the use of WS thrives how-
ever, ensuring adequate levels of security for these service offerings emerges as a
critical goal. Even in this arguably early stage of worldwide WS adoption, the
literature has identified numerous security challenges and issues [189, 92, 197]
which threaten the use of WS for business. Security throughout this thesis is
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defined as the degree to which harm to some object is prevented, reduced and
properly responded to [60].
In an attempt to address new security challenges accompanying WS, stan-
dards setting bodies (OASIS [153] and W3C [225]) have proposed numerous
pioneering standards. These standards aim to both solve problems caused by
common threats and also to further the WS paradigm by enabling substantially
more dynamic security interactions between services. As WS matures however,
the move from lower level security details such as standards and technologies, to
higher level considerations is imminent [189]. Security, irrespective of the con-
text, is a multilayered phenomenon constituting other aspects such as processes,
methodologies and procedures. This factor is especially true in the case of WS
which as Hartman et al. [77] note, adds significant complexity to the e-business
security landscape by making security a much broader and comprehensive con-
cern.
Considering the points made above, this research focuses on identifying
a novel, business-oriented approach to guide interacting companies in achieving
and maintaining agreed levels of security across their enterprises. The approach
envisioned is such that it could be used by companies in a collaborative manner,
to tackle and manage the comprehensive concern that security in the WS business
environment has become.
1.2 Statement of the Problem, Research Aims
and Objectives
The security of Web services technology is a complex and very topical issue [189,
218, 36, 51]. When considering the use of this technology to support interacting
e-businesses, the challenge of achieving security becomes even more elusive [158,
17, 77, 157, 197]. This is especially true with regard to reaching a level of security
beyond the technological layer, that is trusted and acceptable to all collaborating
entities for the duration of the e-business interactions.
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To address this problem, this research aims to:
– Consider security in a business context and, with regard to its various compo-
nents (policies, processes, technologies and so on), to develop a joint approach
in which collaborating e-businesses could achieve an enhanced and a more
comprehensive security solution for their Web services interactions; and
– Evaluate the suitability and strength of this approach’s proposals in aiding
businesses to reach the requisite levels of enhanced inter-organizational secu-
rity and trust.
Specifically, the objectives are to:
– Examine the field of e-business security and also to assess approaches for
achieving Web services security within the e-business context.
– Develop a business-oriented framework which companies can use to guide
them in working with business partners to achieve an enhanced and a more
comprehensive security solution for their Web services interactions. To some
extent, this solution would also aim at fostering trust across these interacting
companies.
– Identify and concentrate on a specific stage/problem within the framework
for further in-depth analysis.
– Propose a detailed approach to support businesses’ use of the framework at
the identified stage.
– Develop a prototype system which implements the aforementioned proposal.
– Evaluate the detailed approach embodied in the prototype using a mixture of
methods to determine its suitability in supporting the relevant stage.
– Conduct an evaluation of the business-oriented framework proposed using
qualitative methods to gather feedback on whether it might aid businesses to
jointly reach the desired levels of security and trust.
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– Analyse the respective evaluation’s findings from both objectives above and
use these to make conclusions as to (i) the adequacy of the detailed approach
proposed in supporting the relevant stage, and (ii) the viability of the types
of activities the framework generally purports in aiding businesses to achieve
the desired levels of enhanced inter-organizational security and trust.
1.3 Scope and Limitations
The business-oriented framework initially proposed intends to be very broad in
research focus. It aims to provide a comprehensive guide which businesses can
use from the early stages of considering WS use, to the design and development
of a trusted cross-enterprise security solution. To properly evaluate this proposal
however, ideally all components would have to be validated. This would neces-
sitate having partnering businesses willing to use the framework, a reasonable
length trial period to gather data pertaining to its functional use and lastly, a
case study analysis to determine its viability. These aspects, noting the magni-
tude of such a task and the lack of industry contacts possessed by the principal
researcher, placed serious practical restrictions on any attempt to evaluate this
proposal in its entirety during this doctoral course.
As a result of these considerations, the core of this research narrows in its
scope to concentrate on a particular, more manageable sub-problem within the
framework. By analysing that sub-problem in depth, assessing specific research-
based issues and providing critically evaluated solutions to those issues (appre-
ciating restrictions above and thus independent of any case study analysis), this
would act to do two things. First is to add a more conclusive level of research
to this thesis and second, by extension, is to support the suitability and strength
of the overarching framework’s proposals. To supplement this work and reinforce
the framework as a research contribution, a small evaluation was also sought
through the use of interviews with industry-based professionals with the aim of
gaining expert feedback on the framework and what it proposes. These interviews
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however, focused only on gathering insightful feedback, as opposed to a thorough
and detailed assessment, as this would only be possible with a full case study.
1.4 Research Methodology
To achieve the aims and objectives above in a valid research manner, defining
a clear and appropriate research methodology was crucial. In simple terms, a
research methodology is a systematic and well-structured way in which a research
problem is solved [105]. This includes the underlying research methods chosen,
questions asked, data collected and techniques used for data analysis.
The methodology adopted by this research constituted of a combination
of methods and processes, each of which was considered to be best suited for the
particular research stage and task. Generally however, the definition of problem
statements and research questions throughout this research are all based on crit-
ical analyses of the relevant literature. For the first research contribution which
deals with the creation of a business-oriented framework therefore, the necessary
literature was examined and the framework designed to address the key problems
highlighted. The creation of the framework also was guided by a standardized
development model to support its structure and process.
With appreciation of the scope and limitations (as outlined in Section 1.3),
the research focus then shifted to a more manageable research problem within the
framework’s context. This problem was drawn from the analysis of an informed
scenario and then backed up by existing literature. From this, a detailed approach
to address that problem and its related research questions was proposed. This
approach was then implemented as a prototype and evaluated in terms of its
compatibility with existing approaches and tools used in business today. This was
important as one of the key envisioned benefits of the framework was its ability
to allow companies to plug in and use their own techniques during various stages
in the overall approach. Strong compatibility would support the completeness
of key components of the proposed approach and give evidence to show that it
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could adequately fit in and work alongside currently used techniques.
Considering that both the business-oriented framework and detailed ap-
proach were intended for direct use in industry, it was important that the overall
evaluation processes considered this as much as possible. To allow for an industry-
based evaluation of the framework and complement the completed compatibility
evaluation of the detailed approach, interviews were conducted with a number of
industry-based security professionals to gain practical feedback on both proposals.
This strengthened the previous evaluation of the detailed approach (and therefore
considered a wider scope than just compatibility) and provided an evaluation of
the framework which appreciated the research limitations.
The last aspect of the research methodology was the examination of data
gathered. This involved the application of data analysis techniques such as count-
ing and measurement (in terms of testing prototype compatibility) and content
analysis and coding [12] (for processing interviewees’ feedback). These estab-
lished techniques enabled data to be systematically assessed and representative
observations made. The evaluation results that emerged were then used to com-
plete the project aims and objectives, and make appropriate conclusions on this
research.
1.5 Thesis Outline
To achieve the research objectives, the thesis structure is as follows.
Chapter 2 begins the core of the research with a literature survey into the fields
of e-business, Web services, and their security. This chapter identifies gaps within
existing research, providing motivations for the current work.
Chapter 3 targets some of the outstanding research issues identified in the pre-
vious chapter and proposes a business-oriented solution approach. Formally, the
name given to that approach is the Business-Oriented Framework for enhancing
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Web Services Security for e-business, hereafter BOF4WSS. Throughout the chap-
ter, detailed coverage is given of the framework to exhibit its uses, application
and scope. This framework constitutes one of the main thesis contributions.
The purpose of Chapter 4 is to supplement the previous chapter’s largely ab-
stract discussion by providing a comprehensive example of how BOF4WSS would
work in practice. Specifically, this consists of applying BOF4WSS to a developed
scenario. This application is expected to add to the practicality of the frame-
work’s proposals and highlight some of its uses and benefits. This scenario is also
reused in numerous discussions throughout the thesis.
With appreciation of the project limitations, Chapter 5 narrows the focus to a
more manageable research problem still within the confines of the framework’s
investigation. To aid in this task, the scenario from the previous chapter is anal-
ysed for a more suitable research area. Having determined that smaller, specific
problem, a detailed approach—called the Solution Model—is proposed to address
it and therefore support companies’ use of BOF4WSS.
Chapter 6 continues the presentation of the Solution Model by reporting on
the implementation of some of its more conceptual components. These form the
foundation for a number of later aspects and Model implementations.
Chapter 7 covers the remaining Solution Model components and presents a
system implementation of the proposed Model. For ease of reference, this imple-
mentation is called the Security Action Specification and Comparison System, or
SASaCS. The prototype of SASaCS to be developed would serve two purposes.
First is to act as a proof-of-concept to the Model’s theories and second is to allow
for the Model’s practical evaluation.
Chapter 8 is the first of two evaluation chapters. The aim in this chapter is
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to critically assess whether the system implementation (SASaCS) and the un-
derlying Solution Model to support the framework are compatible with existing
security approaches used by companies today. Testing the interplay and compat-
ibility of approaches is critical considering that BOF4WSS allows companies the
flexibility to plug in their own approaches and techniques at various framework
stages. All evaluation findings are presented and discussed.
Chapter 9 reports on the final stage of this research’s evaluation process. This
chapter provides an evaluation of BOF4WSS and the Solution Model (by way
of SASaCS) through the use of interviews with industry-based security profes-
sionals. The feedback from these persons is key to this research as it supplies
an objective third-party assessment from professionals in areas where the frame-
work and Model are ultimately to be applied (that is, industry). Throughout the
chapter, findings and conclusions regarding the proposals are also discussed.
Chapter 10 builds on the evaluated research proposals and briefly investigates
a novel approach to further develop the Solution Model. The emphasis in this
chapter is not on defining a critically evaluated approach but rather exploring its
use and looking at some of the interesting research issues that emerge. These will
flow into future work.
Chapter 11 concludes the thesis and summarizes the research project. Also
included in the chapter are the main contributions of this project to the research
field. Amongst these are BOF4WSS and the Solution Model. The final section
outlines future research directions that could both improve and further the ideas
embodied in this work.
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1.6 Summary
This chapter introduced the research which culminated in this thesis, inclusive of
the project aims and objectives, scope and limitations, and research methodology
employed. To recap the general theme, the core focus of this research was towards
two aspects. These are, the development of, and investigation into an approach
that would enable interacting e-businesses to achieve a more comprehensive and
trusted security solution for their Web services interactions.
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Chapter 2
E-Business, Web Services, and
their Security: State of the Art
While Web Services make it possible for applications to interoperate, they com-
plicate the security landscape. A new dimension is added to the security problem.
— Bret Hartman, Donald Flinn, Konstantin Beznosov and Shirley Kawamoto
2.1 Introduction
Having introduced the goals of this project in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 provides
the theoretical foundation for this research by conducting a thorough literature
survey. This survey critically assesses the state of the art in the fields of e-
business, Web services (WS), and their security, with the aim of identifying gaps
in research and practice which would motivate this research.
Considering the vast amount of literature in the fields of interest, this chap-
ter begins by presenting a review of e-business and WS, independent of security.
This enables these topics and particularly WS use for e-business to be clearly
discussed. Key aspects of emphasis include the significance of e-business and the
novel benefits of using WS to support cross-enterprise e-business interactions.
Building on this foundation, the security situation with regards to these
two fields is then explored. This consists of a detailed analysis of the current ap-
proaches, frameworks, procedures and technologies proposed to address e-business
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and WS security. Apart from being a contribution in itself, this comprehensive
literature review also leads to the identification of outstanding research issues. It
is some of these issues, specially around layered and collaborative security, which
form the motivation for this thesis.
2.2 Review of E-Business and Web Services
2.2.1 E-Business and Business-to-Business E-Commerce
In today’s globally connected world, e-business is one of the most active topics
in the business and Information and Communication Technology (ICT) fields.
With this in mind, it should come as no surprise that the term itself is not
unequivocally defined. For example, some authors [108] associate it with internal
operations, others [132, 232] with both internal and external business processes,
and yet others using it interchangeably with electronic commerce as mentioned
in [25]. The penultimate perspective is preferred in this thesis as it imparts a
more precise and complete description, and one which is supported by a wider
literature base (such as [132, 232, 95, 38]).
The definition assumed in this article for e-business therefore is, “the carry-
ing out of business activities that lead to an exchange of value, where the parties
interact electronically, using network or telecommunications technologies” [95]
(p.83). This definition is preferred because it encompasses all possible parties—
both internal and external, and because it specifies the exchange of value as
opposed to only goods and services. This is a key indicator often used to describe
the less generic term of electronic-commerce or ‘e-commerce’. With the meaning
of e-business outlined, this thesis considers its significance and the value of its
most dominant category; business-to-business e-commerce (see [107, 120, 41] for
detail on this category).
The importance of e-business has arisen due to its phenomenal growth
spanning both industry [108] and research within academia [132]. This growth,
especially within business-to-business e-commerce (hereafter B2B), has been fu-
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eled by a myriad of potential benefits for companies that adopt this business
model. These range from accelerated interactions between suppliers and ven-
dors, to fully automated processes leading to vastly improved operational effi-
ciencies [232, 39]. The use of electronic technologies however is not only being
adopted due to their benefits but in some cases with the sole objective of re-
maining competitive. Porter [165] even extends this view and highlights that the
economy is approaching a state where Internet applications will be mandatory
assets for a company’s basic survival.
The significance of B2B is best expressed by its size and remarkable sus-
tained growth. Laudon and Traver [108], commenting on market projections,
note that money spent in B2B is estimated to soar to US$6.3 trillion by 2012.
This shows a steady growth when compared to the US$3.8 trillion expected in
2008. Two disciplines in particular where researchers and industry professionals
have stressed the use and popularity of B2B-type applications are Supply Chain
Management (SCM) and e-procurement [232, 186]. In simple terms, both of these
processes focus on the optimization of activities involved in the purchasing and
selling of products. The prime lure to these two areas is the promise of boosted
internal and external process integration and automation. This would result in
greater transaction accuracy, less administrative overheads and enhanced opera-
tional efficiencies [30, 35, 79].
As Laudon and Traver aptly observe, “If even just a portion of inter-firm
trade could be automated, and parts of the procurement process assisted by the
Internet, then literally trillions of dollars might be released . . . This is the promise
of B2B e-commerce” [107] (p.682). Visions like these have perpetuated various
highly interconnected hybrid business approaches. One of the most remarkable
being the extended enterprise, which even though not distinctly defined [71],
maintains the common characteristic of a set of interacting businesses (usually
within the supply chain) that pursue repeated transactions and have relatively
strong ties at organizational and ICT levels [71, 40, 49].
To support these grand visions for business online, there is an implicit
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need for a sturdy technological infrastructure. To date, numerous B2B enabling
technologies have been proposed. Some of the most popular and relevant to this
research are Electronic Data Interchange (EDI), e-Business eXtensible Markup
Language (ebXML) [50], RosettaNet [175] and WS. In this thesis the focus is on
WS and therefore this is discussed next.
2.2.2 Web Services as a B2B Enabling Technology
Similar to e-business, there have been various definitions put forward for WS,
some [158, 223] very detailed and others [197] straight to the point. Instead of
engaging too much in this debate, this thesis adopts a simple definition and fo-
cuses on a number of the most important tenets outlined in the literature. WS
is therefore defined as a distributed systems technology suite which emphasizes
qualities such as flexibility and ease of deployment [15]. Other key and widely ac-
cepted tenets include being loosely coupled, self-contained, platform-independent,
network-accessible and based on open standards [30, 82, 167, 234]. All of these are
contributors to why WS is increasingly regarded as the de facto implementation
technology for integration projects and distributed computing paradigms such
as Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA). SOA is generally defined as a logical
way of describing systems in terms of publishable, discoverable and encapsulated
services (details in [156]).
One point which merits clarification is the slight difference between a ser-
vice in an SOA and a Web service (WS). A service (in an SOA) is assumed to take
on more of an abstract meaning and thus can be regarded simply as a distinct or
packaged unit of logic or functionality (similar to work in [51]). A Web service
(WS) however is the technology- or standards-level implementation of a service
or part thereof. A service is therefore viewed as the conceptual prerequisite to the
actual standards-based Web service implementation. Other than this difference,
a number of the tenets identified for a Web service also apply to a service. It
was important to identify this disparity for the clarity of this research, but ad-
ditionally to stress that the SOA and its inclusive services, can be implemented
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using technologies other than the WS suite. Examples, as mentioned by [155] are
Jini [93] and Open Grid Services Architecture [70].
At the basic level, WS is constituted of three core technologies, all based
on the eXtensible Markup Language (XML). They are: SOAP—a messaging
protocol for exchanging information such as documents and instructions between
Web services [22]; Web Services Description Language (WSDL)—a specification
schema for describing the publicly accessible interface of a Web service [157]; and
Universal Description, Discovery, and Integration (UDDI)—an initiative to create
(i) a registry standard for Web services description and discovery and (ii) a respec-
tive registry facility that supports the publishing and discovery processes [157].
As WS has matured, numerous other related technology specifications have
been proposed. An area in particular which has been heavily targeted is WS use
for online business and providing the technologies to support secure and reliable
business interactions and process execution between companies. This in many
ways validates the view held by some authors (such as Papazoglou [157]) that a
central aim of WS is in the facilitating and automating of internal and external
business process collaborations.
To consider WS use for business in more detail, there are two standards
specially designed to facilitate the more complex, long-running service interac-
tions that would make up business processes. These are, the Web Services Busi-
ness Process Execution Language (WS-BPEL) and Web Services Choreography
Description Language (WS-CDL). WS-BPEL (BPEL hereafter) is a language
that allows for the specification of business process behaviour based on Web ser-
vices [152]. Amongst other things, it provides an executable language that can be
run by software engines to orchestrate internal message, control and data flows.
WS-CDL addresses yet a higher WS layer, and supplies a standard mechanism
for defining WS collaborations and the choreographies of message exchanges from
a global viewpoint [224].
In simple terms, BPEL describes WS interactions from the perspective of
one endpoint and thus is ideally used internally to direct service and message
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flows. WS-CDL however focuses on the global view (not from any endpoint’s
perspective) and defining the expected behaviour of all WS participants involved
in a business collaboration. Papazoglou [157] can be referred to for a more in-
depth discussion on WS-CDL and BPEL with examples. To put the standards
discussed into context, Figure 2.1 is included.
Business
processes
Choreography - WS-CDL
Transactions
Coordination
Context
WS-SecurityWS-Reliability
Orchestration - WS-BPEL
Quality of
service
UDDI Discovery
WSDL Description
SOAP
XML
Message
HTTP, JMS, SMTP Transport
Figure 2.1: The Web services technology stack (adapted from [157])
Returning to the usage of WS, its impact has been such that Zhang [231]
strongly argues that WS is “changing the face of the Internet”, and transforming
it from the traditional image as just a data repository. As the author stresses, WS
promotes this transformation in three ways: they facilitate easier B2B; provide a
uniform framework for distributed computing; and lastly, present a cost-effective
approach to quickly develop and deploy dynamic Web applications. This listing
helps to highlight why the three main usage scenarios for WS as outlined by
Zimmermann [234] are enterprise application integration (EAI), B2B and common
services; with B2B being identified in popular texts (Alonso et al. [4]) as the
ultimate goal of WS. One real-world example of WS use in B2B is W3C’s travel
agency scenario (discussed in detail in [221]) illustrated in Figure 2.2.
This scenario features: a travel agent which offers customers the ability to
book complete vacation packages; an airline and a hotel company that provide
the flights and hotel rooms respectively; and a credit card company that provides
the guarantee for customer payments. The use and core benefit of WS in such a
B2B-type communications scenario is the vast automation it can easily enable.
Assuming a situation where each business exposes its internal systems
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Figure 2.2: Travel agency Web services scenario (adapted from [222])
as Web services, the travel agency Web service could query these services in
real-time, using preferences provided by the end consumer to access and book
complete vacation packages. There is no longer the need for faxes, phone calls
and other manual mechanisms. This is the basic concept being illustrated in
Figure 2.2. To apply the standards outlined; WSDL provides the service interface
description, SOAP is used for messaging (red arrows), WS-CDL could specify the
expected behaviour of all companies’ Web services (from a global viewpoint) for
this booking process, while BPEL would be used by companies to orchestrate
their respective internal process, service and data flows.
A noteworthy advantage of applying WS to the travel agency scenario is
the implicit ability to wrap or encapsulate existing legacy systems and provide a
standard application programming interface to allow these systems to be much
more easily accessed. This ability to ‘service-enable’ existing systems is a prime
application scenario of WS in business. Other scenarios include using a Web
service as a (i) self-contained business task, (ii) full-fledged business process, or
(iii) a simple application (or program) [157]. All of these scenarios, plus the
reality of seamless interaction at the systems level between disparate companies,
accounts for why WS use for B2B has become so prominent.
This ideal link between WS and B2B however, even though largely ac-
cepted, is not always shared by researchers. Possibly the most fascinating source
of deliberation—to be discussed in subsequent paragraphs—pertains to the suit-
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ability of WS usage for B2B [226]. The main issues here attributed to innate
qualities of WS and its perceived lack of maturity (standards-wise) in supporting
the complex business interactions and processes common to B2B.
Regardless of these opposing perspectives, WS use for intra- and inter-
enterprise integration and B2B are applications that continue to flourish. This
point is supported by industry surveys as Gutie´rrez et al. [74] report, by academic
research in [231, 29] and also by other sources such as work in [168] by Pulier and
Taylor. The driving forces behind this growth are plentiful and range from strong
industry endorsement and marginal investment costs, to the ability to integrate
and reuse legacy systems while enabling faster, more flexible integration between
trading partners with disparate systems [29, 168]. These are the types of novel
benefits offered by WS to B2B in general, and specifically to elements such as
SCM, the procurement process and a plethora of other integration projects [29,
82, 119]. It is these benefits that set WS apart from any other integration or
distributed computing technology.
Albeit a promising enabler and integrator, WS does not come without its
caveats. In the broad context, drawbacks include: performance issues—XML, a
core WS specification, is by nature a sizable data format [14]; interoperability
and standards confusion—WS is still maturing and thus standards are still in de-
velopment, this is compounded by the numerous bodies (OASIS, W3C, Liberty
Alliance) developing what are at times overlapping or non-interoperable stan-
dards [189, 61]; and lack of product support—there have been indications of a
lack of WS products which support key application features (for example, non-
functional requirements) [233].
In the context of B2B, the literature suggests three core types of limita-
tions. The first as discussed by Goethals et al. in [71] is generic and is primarily
associated with the existence of communication gaps (technical and nontechnical)
between businesses. This typically arises from the classic problems in business-
ICT alignment and critical issues such as agreeing on semantics. This issue as
it relates to WS is further supported by Alonso et al. [4] and validated to some
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extent by an empirical study by Prokein et al. [167]. In that latter study the
authors conclude that technical and economic integration problems constituted
the main challenge to WS use for intercompany cooperation.
The second limitation is specific to WS and focuses on its innate char-
acteristics and its perceived lack of maturity in supporting the complex, highly
coordinated business processes in B2B. Yan and Klein [226] analyse this maturity
problem in depth as they compare and evaluate WS and ebXML, and each tech-
nology’s suitability for e-business. From that evaluation, the authors assert that
real-life business is much more complicated than the collection of request/response
pairs approach purported by WS. Moreover, they stress for WS to be more than
a middleware technology, business standards for process orchestration, choreog-
raphy and reliable coordination will have to be established. This limitation, even
though not unanimously shared (see [234, 159] in terms of support for complex
interactions), is a worthwhile consideration when adopting WS for complex B2B.
The final limitation deals with security in WS and will be discussed in
subsequent sections. Below therefore, a brief look is taken at two other related
and popular B2B enabling technologies; ebXML and RosettaNet. Their general
aims as compared to that of Web services are shown in Table 2.1.
2.2.3 Other Related B2B Enabling Technologies
Technology Aim Suitability
RosettaNet E-marketplace business pro-
cesses
Purpose built
ebXML Universal business processes Purpose built
Web services Support business processes (In-
ternal and external)
Additional standards being de-
veloped to support processes
Table 2.1: B2B enabling technologies standards stack (partially based on [157])
E-Business XML (ebXML) aims to provide a set of specifications to enable
all types of enterprises to conduct business on the Internet [50]. As such, this
technology was designed specifically for e-business and B2B, unlike WS which
arguably has its roots in distributed messaging and integration technology [28,
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226, 187]. The core value of ebXML is in its ability to offer a complete suite of
standards for conducting business online, hence the ‘universal business processes’
aim in Table 2.1.
Whereas ebXML caters to all business types, RosettaNet is a vertical busi-
ness standards set and is thus aimed at a specific industry, namely the supply
chain. RosettaNet’s goal is in universally standardizing common e-business pro-
cesses in a particular marketplace. This would therefore enable vastly reduced
setup times for new business partners and the great ease with which companies
can switch between suppliers [175, 115].
Possibly the most intriguing fact about RosettaNet is that, because of its
vision at the high level of industry processes, it has made use of existing, estab-
lished standards for the lower level implementation-based aspects. Examples of
this include use of the Business Process Specification Schema from ebXML—used
to describe sequencing and choreography of processes, and the option of ebXML
Message Service or WS—used for the required messaging capabilities [158, 115].
Next, this chapter explores the security developments in e-business and
WS with the end goal of highlighting outstanding security issues.
2.3 Exploring the Security Situation
2.3.1 E-Business and B2B Security
Security has always been a serious consideration for businesses but with the
widespread adoption of the Internet, its significance—whether voluntarily or
not—has exponentially increased. By simply connecting internal networks to
the Internet, businesses are susceptible to a variety of attacks [135, 31] and as
recent surveys [166, 170, 171, 210, 33] exhibit, they are being exploited. Malware,
viruses and even directed attacks (such as Denial of Services (DoS)) identified as
some of the prime threats.
Within e-businesses where the aim is conducting business electronically, the
risks faced are again drastically increased [85]. Businesses have to be cognizant
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(in their planning and strategies) of the fact that the ubiquitous nature of the
Internet means that attacks can occur at any time, from anywhere. Nachtigal
and Mitchell [132] aptly stress that the openness to the environment which is the
uniqueness of e-business also acts to be its real danger. A problem compounded,
they argue, by the fact that traditional security approaches, even though no longer
adequate in the era of e-business, are still in use and being developed.
In addition to the problems faced by e-businesses individually, in the con-
nected B2B domain, the significance of security is also prevalent. One of the core
drivers behind this is purely monetary and is linked with the enormous value
(trillion-dollar market) of B2B and its continued high growth rate [108]. These
factors plus the unique challenges already facing e-business make B2B a natu-
rally alluring target for malicious parties. The second noteworthy driver is that as
businesses attempt to work together thus forming extended networks, negotiat-
ing, accommodating and managing the security desires of each partner represents
a formidable challenge [205]. This reality is highlighted by Tiller [205] when he
states, “different partners have unique access requirements, want specific security
policies in place, and have varying SLAs [Service-Level Agreements] and legal
obligations, all leading to security mayhem” (p.68).
A third driver for B2B security is rooted in one of its core benefits, that is,
the ability to facilitate very closely knit and highly automated and accelerated
processes across enterprise boundaries. This is a point argued in the specific
context of the e-supply chain in Baker et al. [6] and more generally in the extended
enterprise context by authors in [49, 48].
The problem in these cross-enterprise situations as researchers stress is that
as organizations increasingly rely on the Internet to closely join companies and
support internal and external business processes, each firm’s individual security
decisions impact the overall security infrastructure for all the businesses it inter-
acts with [48]. This perspective is validated by an independent survey in Baker et
al. [6]. The most significant finding of that survey however is the establishment of
a positive correlation between the degree of collaboration (between supply chain
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partners) and the prevalence of IT security incidents and risk. Common examples
of these incidents being unauthorized network access, data theft and malicious
code infections, all linked to business partners as the source.
The dilemma faced by businesses therefore is that in fostering the close
relationships to enable streamlined interactions, they have also made themselves
susceptible to peculiarities in their partners’ security posture. This consideration
is novel in that it emphasizes what is in essence a complex security problem as
businesses try to (i) protect themselves individually and (ii) devise a strategy
to protect collections of legally autonomous businesses, when aiming to form
closely knit hybrid organizations like the extended enterprise. The anatomy of
the extended enterprise provides just one example of how B2B itself can increase
the complexity of the security problem.
With the significance of the security problem outlined, it is worth assessing
how security has been achieved in these online systems thus far. In examining this
topic, Padmanabhuni and Adarkar [155] note that to achieve security in effect
means the satisfaction of a collection of implicit security objectives/requirements.
These requirements for online systems are stated broadly to be confidential-
ity, data integrity, authentication, authorization, non-repudiation, privacy, trust,
availability and intrusion detection.
To consider how well the requirements listed have been met in the e-
business arena, Padmanabhuni and Adarkar [155] state that the current set of
available security technologies is proven to be adequately able to handle these re-
quirements. Examples of these technologies include passwords, encryption, digital
signatures, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), traditional network-level firewalls
and Secure Sockets Layer (SSL). Boncella [17] agrees with this perspective as
he argues that SSL, PKI and firewalls are able to meet the technical-level secu-
rity requirements for conventional Web traffic over Hyper-Text Transfer Protocol
(HTTP). Work in [100] is yet another research reference that supports this view.
A salient point made by Katsikas et al. [100] which is of great relevance to
this research is that if technology exists to solve e-commerce security problems,
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why do breaches persist at such alarming rates? Their answer to this is founded
in the reality that security is not only a technical or physical concept. Specifically,
they state, “. . . while everyone recognizes the need for securing e-commerce, what
they do not know is that security is more than erecting physical and electronic bar-
riers. The strongest encryption and most robust firewall are practically worthless
without a set of organizational security measures, built around a security policy
that articulates how these tools are to be used, managed and maintained” [100]
(p.556).
The remarks above help to identify that security, even in the highly dis-
persed e-business world, is much more than just technical solutions. This reality
can also been seen in Dynes et al. [49] in terms of extended enterprise business col-
laborations. This is as companies look towards creating an appropriate security
approach (for interacting partners) consisting of strategies, processes, systems,
culture and incentives. Building on this more comprehensive view of security
(thus, not only technologies), the work of Laudon and Traver [107], displayed in
Figure 2.3 is cited. This model perfectly exemplifies the layered nature of security
both in e-commerce and also, broadly to all business security.
Data
Technology Solutions
Organizational Policies
& Procedures
Laws and Industry
Standards
Figure 2.3: The e-commerce security environment [107]
In Figure 2.3’s layered model, laws and industry standards guide companies
in security but also put regulations in place that enable security violators to be in-
vestigated and prosecuted. Secondly, organization policies and procedures mainly
attempt to have rules and processes (or generally higher-level approaches) inter-
nally that enable the fulfilment of a company’s security objectives/requirements.
Finally, technology solutions are the specific, lower-level mechanisms that imple-
ment the security objectives/requirements for the data and systems. In practical
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terms related to the previous paragraphs, organizational security measures such as
a security policy would fit in the ‘policies and procedures’ layer, whereas encryp-
tion, digital signatures, PKI, traditional network-level firewalls and SSL would
be part of the ‘technology solutions’ layer.
In the next section, the security aspects of WS as an enabling technology
for e-business are discussed. Emphasis is placed on the significance of security,
current approaches towards achieving it and its outstanding issues.
2.3.2 Securing e-Businesses that use Web Services
The substantial advantages to e-business that WS promises regrettably come at a
high cost in the area of security. In [217, 194], authors stress that WS by its very
nature creates a multitude of new security challenges. Apart from these views,
companies in industry have also identified the importance of the security problem
in the area of B2B as is seen in the study in [167]. This section identifies and
briefly discusses three of the most significant challenges.
The first challenge faced in using WS for business-to-business interactions
is that conventional mechanisms used to satisfy security requirements of normal
e-business interactions fall short when applied to WS [17, 62, 122, 10]. Typical
examples are SSL’s inability to provide end-to-end security—SSL is only point-
to-point; and the inadequacy of traditional firewalls to protect against XML-
based threats—traditional firewalls cannot scan documents for included XML-
based threats. Padmanabhuni and Adarkar [155] sum up the disparity between
mechanisms in e-business and those in WS as they emphasize that the loosely
coupled, dynamic nature of SOA (which can be also taken to apply to WS)
necessitates additional security features and mechanisms.
Secondly, with the new technologies constituting WS, an abundance of new
and adapted technical threats has surfaced, a reality worsened by the fact that
WS was conceived primarily for interoperability, speed and convenience and not
with security natively in mind. These threats endanger all aspects of the WS
paradigm and target the range of security objectives.
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Another important factor is that threats are not only targeted at the sur-
face level (that is, the application directly interacting with the Internet), but
at internal business applications as well. As organizations look to WS-enable
their legacy systems to facilitate streamlined integration, they also provide a di-
rect line and new avenue of attack into these systems [189, 197]. Publications
in [189, 92, 218, 62, 228] together provide an extensive list of now common attacks
and threats against WS. Further to this, some authors [233] even contend that
there is a lack of products to aid in providing sufficient security against these
threats.
The last challenge considers WS at somewhat of an overarching business
level. In their work on WS, Hartman et al.[77] stress that despite its numerous
benefits, WS adds significant complexity to the e-business security landscape.
Security is now a much broader and comprehensive concern which cuts across
business lines much easier and quicker than before. As such, an inadequate
security posture in one company can become a real-time increased security risk
for its partners—immediate and extended.
Due to the complexity with using WS, trust between businesses has also
been identified as a related concern. Prokein et al. [167], for example, conclude
that WS technology was primarily being used for connecting well-known transac-
tion partners due to a lack of trust in using them with unknown businesses. Trust
here and generally in this thesis is defined as the belief that a party’s promise
or word is reliable, and that a party will fulfil his/her obligations in an exchange
relationship [185]. With just three challenges outlined, it is understandable that
some industry professionals (such as Curphey [36]) have deemed WS ‘a devel-
oper’s dream and hacker’s heaven’.
As was done in discussing e-business and B2B security, this section now
examines how security is achieved when WS is used in business. Generally how-
ever, WS security techniques are the same regardless of where they are applied,
business or elsewhere. This examination starts by considering the security re-
quirements that lead towards the fulfilment of security.
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At a basic level, WS is simply another technology that enables business
online (e-business). Deductively therefore, all the security requirements for online
systems (named in Section 2.3.1) still do apply when approaching security with
WS. This point is seen in [194, 228] as they identify WS security requirements
that are similar to e-business requirements, for example, confidentiality, integrity,
authentication, authorization, auditing, and intrusion detection and prevention.
For WS specially, work by Steel et al. [194] extends the basic requirements
above with three aspects. The first is Single Sign-On (SSO) and delegation.
This is the ability to transparently handle authentication to multiple interacting
services and also decentralized access controls. The second aspect is identity
and policy management. This enables the sharing of identities and policies that
spread across disparate systems and trust boundaries. Finally, there is security
interoperability which in simple terms, ensures that the standards/protocols used
are interoperable. All of these additions specifically target the unique security
challenges accompanying the distributed, loosely coupled and highly dynamic WS
technology suite.
Apart from analysing WS security requirements only, due to WS’s close
association to SOA, SOA-related security requirements also have proved to be
applicable. In their work on SOA requirements for example, Padmanabhuni
and Adarkar [155], like Steel et al. [194], show appreciation for SSO and del-
egation requirements. Additionally, Padmanabhuni and Adarkar [155] identify
two more requirements: malicious invocations—having appropriate code inspec-
tion technologies to assess for malicious data in service invocations, and repeated
invocations—ensuring mechanisms are in place to protect against repeated WS-
specific attacks leading to denial of services. From the set of requirements covered
in this and the previous paragraph, one can begin to grasp the complexities of
providing even technical-level security to WS interactions. With these require-
ments outlined, the next step is to present how they are currently being handled
(or the proposals publicized to handle them) in the literature.
To address the new security challenges and security requirements as men-
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tioned above, consortiums such as OASIS and W3C have developed and ratified
numerous standards. These standards aim to solve problems caused by common
threats and also to further the WS paradigm by enabling substantially more dy-
namic security interactions between services. Due to the large number of these
standards and their inherent complexities, this section does not aim to discuss
them in detail. The intention instead is to provide a contextual overview.
Arguably the best and most intuitive approach to this review is to present
standards according to the challenges and requirements they address. The Na-
tional Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) article in [189] (based on
the work in [136]) is one work that provides a detailed categorization of security
standards. The security dimensions NIST identifies are secure messaging, re-
source protection, negotiation of contracts, trust management and security prop-
erties. That article was chosen as the primary resource for the following overview
mainly due to its extensive coverage and well established literature base. For clar-
ity in presentation and to put some of the standards to be identified in context,
Figure 2.4 has been included.
Security Management Identity Management
WS-Federation
SAML
Liberty AllianceWS-Trust
XKMS
Message Security Reliable Messaging Policy
WS-ReliabilityWS-Security
WS-PolicyWS-SecureConversation WS-ReliableMessaging
SOAP Foundation XACML SAML
Access Control
XML Security
Transport Layer Security
Network Layer Security
XML Encryption XML Signature
SSL/TLS
IPSec
Figure 2.4: Web Services Security Standards: Notional Reference Model [189]
One of the primary goals of WS security is secure messaging. In this dimen-
sion, security specifications include SSL and Transport Layer Security (TLS) to
secure the message at the transport layer and WS-Security (which leverages XML
security techniques such as XML Encryption and XML Signature) to secure the
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message at the SOAP level. These specifications satisfy the security requirements
of authentication, confidentiality, non-repudiation and integrity. WS-Security
specification in simple terms can also be thought of as a mechanism to support
the security credential interoperability requirement [155].
At the resource protection dimension, thus considering the service as a
resource itself, requirements for privacy are met by OASIS’s eXtensible Access
Control Markup Language (XACML), whereas ensuring only authorized use is
addressed by eXtensible rights Markup Language (XrML) and again, XACML.
The basis behind both standards is in providing a universal syntax for managing
rights and authorization decisions.
To facilitate the technical level trust and trust management capabilities
required between disparate services, various standards are proposed. These in-
clude: WS-Trust and XML Key Management Specification (XKMS) for estab-
lishing trust, Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) and WS-Trust for
trust proxying, and finally WS-Federation and Liberty Alliance ID-FF for fed-
eration, or loosely, ‘sharing’ of trust. Another way to view these standards as
shown in Figure 2.4 is to associate WS-Trust and XKMS with security manage-
ment, and SAML, WS-Federation and Liberty Alliance with federated identity
management (or simply, identity management across trust domains). Research
in [155] can supplement or at least simplify some of these descriptions as they
specifically identify that SAML addresses the security requirements of SSO, and
authentication and authorization interoperability, and XKMS addresses the need
for XML-based PKI.
Beyond the topic of trust, contract negotiation is also regarded as a key
dimension of WS security. In its requirement for registries and semantic dis-
covery, the two highlighted standards are: Universal Description, Discovery, and
Integration (UDDI), which from its inception has been considered a place to hold
description information (including contracts) on services, and the Ontology Web
Language for Services (OWL-S), a newer standard which focuses on semantic
markup for WS to enhance discovery capabilities.
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The last dimension of security is related specifically to security properties
of services and the requirements pertaining to their usage policy, security policy
and availability. The first two requirements are supported by WS-Policy and
WS-SecurityPolicy respectively, and focus on how to express capabilities, prefer-
ences and needs of a service in a standardized way. The availability requirement
is simply concerned with ensuring a level of reliability in message transmission
and this is addressed by standards WS-ReliableMessaging and WS-Reliability as
shown in Figure 2.4.
This concludes this overview of WS security standards landscape. For
detailed information on the standards mentioned above, readers are directed
to: [153] for WS-Security, WS-Trust, WS-SecurityPolicy, WS-ReliableMessaging,
WS-Reliability, XACML, SAML and UDDI, [225] for XKMS, XML-Signature,
XML Encryption, WS-Policy and OWL-S, [9] for WS-Federation, [110] for Liberty
Alliance ID-FF, [34] for XrML, and in general see [157, 189, 36, 155, 14, 68, 214].
From this overview of standards, one can appreciate that there is a large
amount of resources dedicated to the security of WS. Regardless of this progress
however, and contrary to the perspective that there are already too many stan-
dards (see Alonso et al. [4]), there still remains the view that existing proposals are
not an adequate solution to the technology level security problem. In Zhang [231]
for example, the argument is made for a new layer called WS-Trustworthy. Zhang
hypothesizes that WS-Security and related technologies at their core only address
the security issue of Web services-centred computing. Thus, overlooking the issue
of the overall service trustworthiness; trustworthiness in this regard deals with the
level of confidence that services will act as intended, and encompasses attributes
such as reliability, availability, interoperability and fault tolerance [231].
Additionally, Sidharth and Liu [187] highlight the need for their new frame-
work based on the notion that the applicability of protocols such as WS-Security,
WS-Trust and WS-Federation are in fact limited, as they only protect communi-
cations between trusted parties who share an established security context. The
following statement aptly sums up their contentions, “The pervasiveness of web
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services and SOAP API [Application Programming Interface] that can be in-
voked by anonymous consumers introduces security vulnerabilities [that] are not
addressed by the existing standards” [187] (p.23).
Aside from WS standards and the systems which implement them, appli-
cations and software play a crucial role in the technical security solution. There
are, for example, no standards available that can detect or protect against XML-
based attacks such as XML-DoS. This means that the requirements of availability,
malicious invocations and repeated invocations are not met. According to some
authors, this is where XML-aware security appliances become useful. Work by
Steel et al. [194] and Bebawy et al. [10] support this use and highlight the need for
technologies such as the XML firewall. This is a tool that is capable of inspect-
ing the XML content native to WS interactions (for example, SOAP payloads or
attachments) for potentially harmful data or other threats [10].
Before moving on, the final significant concern regarding standards in both
WS security and WS in general, is that as new standards are developed, they too
may introduce new vulnerabilities to the WS technology architecture. New vul-
nerabilities then translate into new threats, risks and challenges for companies
pertaining to their security. Yau and Rao [228] mention this reality as they discuss
future trends for WS security in e-business. To remedy this problem, they stress
that the security aspects of all new WS technologies should be carefully exam-
ined. This thesis observes however that even after that is done, it is unlikely that
all vulnerabilities will be identified before technologies are implemented and de-
ployed in businesses. Standards, technologies and software therefore, even though
important components of the WS security solution, can at times exacerbate the
security problem. This is a reality that businesses face which emphasizes the need
to view security, even with implemented technologies, as an ongoing goal.
Reflecting on the layered security model in Figure 2.3 to put the above
work into context, all of the literature reviewed thus far in this section fits within
the generic ‘technology solutions’ layer. This ranges from WS standards such as
WS-Security, SAML and XACML to the XML-aware security appliances. Next
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therefore, a look is taken at the higher-level ‘policies and procedures’ layer to
examine how security for WS is addressed there. For this research’s purposes,
this layer is simply viewed as processes for security. It therefore spans non-
technical aspects such as policies, procedures, methodologies and best practices.
Figure 2.5 is a slight modification of the conceptual model in Figure 2.3 which
reflects this perspective.
Data
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Non-technical Processes
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Figure 2.5: Business security environment (based on [107])
Beyond studying and addressing the perceived inadequacies of the current
standards base, academics and practitioners are now looking towards the higher
layers of security and approaches for achieving it (that is, the ‘Non-technical
processes for security’ layer in Figure 2.5). These actions bring to life a predic-
tion made by NIST in [189], which expressed that as WS technology matured,
methodologies and recommended practices for security would become the next
step in the goal of developing secure systems.
Some of the most noteworthy proposals in the higher layer have been in
the following articles. Gutie´rrez et al. [74, 75] aim to provide a methodical devel-
opment approach for constructing security architectures for WS-based systems.
Wang et al. [217] develop a method that uses fuzzy logic to measure the risk
associated with WS, with full appreciation of the fact that due to WS’ volatility,
information on threats is usually incomplete or imprecise. Charfi and Mezini [26]
build on existing standards and the theory of Aspect-Oriented Programming to
provide a framework for securing WS compositions (necessary in B2B) using WS-
Security and WS-Policy. Steel et al. [194] provide a concise, but essential outline
of technology-agnostic WS security best practices. Lastly, there is the Event-
driven Framework for Service Oriented Computing in van den Heuvel et al. [211].
This is a standard-agnostic, multilayered framework that aims to address the
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problem of defining and enforcing access control rules for securing services use
at the level of business processes. In their work, authors particularly focus on
dynamic authorization, independent of specific standards [211].
These proposals all address areas crucial to services, but additionally act to
stress the truism that security goes beyond just technical standards. This point
is developed more in the next section which discusses the outstanding security
issues plaguing WS and B2B.
2.3.3 Outstanding Security Issues
Security approaches geared towards WS within e-business should aim to be thor-
ough in their considerations when planning, developing, implementing and main-
taining an adequate solution. Figure 2.3 gave a general view of the layers that
are thought to lead to well-rounded security. Standard security components en-
compass technologies, but as recent literature [183] in the study of security in
general has emphasized, it also includes policies, processes, procedures, method-
ologies and best practices. Lichtenstein [111] supports this view and underlines
the importance of these non-technical aspects in achieving holistic information
security. Holism here is used to refer to the all-encompassing picture rather than
a focus on the individual components alone [111]. Security is a multifaceted, mul-
tilayered phenomenon irrespective of where it is applied and therefore, neglecting
any component, or focusing too much on another component, may lead to an
inadequate security solution.
To the detriment of WS however, the importance of holism does not appear
to be unanimously appreciated as any attention on the other aspects is being
drowned out by the proliferation of various new technology standards. It may
be very tempting therefore to regard such mechanisms as the ‘solutions’ to the
WS security problem. Undoubtedly this could also be linked to the fact that
WS is a technology itself, thus, providing technology solutions for technology-
based problems. Whilst the work of technologists is valuable in building security
and trust, alone they cannot form the entire solution. This is particularly when
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considering WS’ use in a business context. In fact, all these mechanisms address
is the technology layer of security and the threats which emanate at that level.
Thus, only providing a stepping-stone towards the goal of reliable, comprehensive,
multilayered security for e-businesses.
Singhal et al. [189] strongly support this view as they stress that standards
alone do not provide all that is necessary to develop robust, secure systems.
Processes and best practices such as effective risk management, secure software
development and defence-in-depth through security engineering, are also pivotal.
Some of these higher-level approaches and methods (such as [74, 217, 75, 194, 26,
77]) were mentioned in the section above. This research, in addition to [74, 189],
attributes the current focus on security standards to the newness of WS. This is
an understandable reality as standards and technology arguably form an initial
and basic part of a security solution. Moreover, technology solutions at this time
still have unresolved challenges [189] and therefore more work is required before
an established technical base is in place.
Companies who use WS however, must appreciate and remember that
security is not a technology, standard or product. The other components of secu-
rity previously outlined, along with methodologies and best practices are crucial
considerations [189]. This fact is especially pertinent noting the high degrees
of interconnection between businesses that WS readily and easily facilitate. To
place the research in security for e-businesses using WS into context, the model
in Figure 2.5 can be used. To date therefore, a large amount of research and
emphasis has been placed on the ‘technology solutions’ layer, with only recently
work emerging in the ‘Non-technical processes for security’ layer (some of which
were mentioned above).
An intriguing research area which has received little emphasis is at the
level of cross-enterprise interaction (that is, interactions spanning, and including
collaborating businesses and their internal systems). Specifically this refers to
providing some comprehensive approach to aid businesses in collectively handling
security as the broad, inter-organizational concern it has become. This approach
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would not solely be at the technology level but would also encompass a number
of other fundamental aspects (including security directives, policies, business risk
considerations, negotiations necessary and expectations towards reliable security)
that businesses should jointly consider when developing and engaging in B2B
interactions employing WS. This is particularly with the knowledge that in WS,
lack of security in one business can very easily mean elevated security risk for a
partnering entity, its systems and its data [77].
To briefly analyse the aforementioned research in [217, 194, 75, 26] to-
wards fulfilling the needs of the ‘Non-technical processes for security’ layer (Fig-
ure 2.5), these can all be seen to successfully complement available technologies
and provide useful security approaches. Assessed critically however, they do have
shortcomings in terms of business security at the broad level of cross-enterprise
interactions. Their main caveat is that they consider security predominantly from
one company’s internal viewpoint, that is, what a company should do internally
to secure itself. This highly isolated perspective is inadequate due to the very na-
ture of WS and the high degrees of interconnection between businesses—spanning
exposure of legacy systems to purpose-built Web applications—that WS enables.
In van den Heuvel’s article [211], even though that work allows for a lay-
ered and more comprehensive model for WS security during business process
execution, its predominant focus is towards access control and particularly for
highly dynamic environments. Both these aspects act to make it too specific a
framework. The work in [77] possesses similar shortcomings, but mainly because
as it progresses it focuses almost solely on technical implementations.
The basic notion behind security at the cross-enterprise interaction level
can been seen in the small and largely exploratory research study carried out
in [137, 91]. This work acknowledges the comprehensive security dilemma e-
businesses face and proposes a generic model to enhance security. Figure 2.6
presents that conceptual model.
This model aims to highlight how businesses secure themselves internally
(using policies, procedures and technologies) and how a similar approach (us-
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Figure 2.6: Model for enhancing Web services security ([137])
ing cross-enterprise policies) might be employed through businesses partnering
(working closely together), to secure the entire WS communications [137]. These
‘entire WS communications’ refer to the same aspects as the aforementioned
cross-enterprise interactions, therefore looking at both internal and external se-
curity. In many respects, this thesis’s general proposals form an extension of that
exploratory work, to delve into the intricacies of what would constitute such a
comprehensive security approach.
An additional aim of this thesis is a more sturdy validation of the proposed
approach, a glaring weakness of that initial study. Comparing Figure 2.6 to
previous models such as the model within Figure 2.5, Figure 2.5 can be thought
of as the security components necessary for an e-business’ internal security (for
example, e-business 1 in Figure 2.6). The similarities between the models are
clearly apparent. Comparing these two models in general also helps to explicitly
clarify the broad, inter-organizational level which motivates the research within
this thesis. A main contention of this thesis is that when WS is used for e-
business, internal security alone is insufficient because WS exposes companies
like never before. A more comprehensive approach is necessary to reach good
levels of security in these types of interactions.
Further to the previously mentioned goals, this new cross-enterprise ap-
proach would also aim to facilitate increasing the trust between business part-
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ners, their systems and the overall service interactions, as an intrinsic objective.
Trust in the context of this research was previously defined in Section 2.3.2. The
importance of trust in e-business (with or without WS) is stressed by several au-
thors [169, 101, 73, 208] and at the risk of oversimplifying its elusive nature, some
of its most salient attributes in this context are transparency, accountability, pre-
dictability, reliability and benevolence [40, 212, 181]. This approach would aim to
foster trust between partners, their systems (which will no longer be ‘black boxes’
to business partners) and the overall service interactions, by stressing these and
related factors.
Generally, the approach could be seen to facilitate a level of security and
confidence in services and partners not obtainable if businesses integrate secu-
rity merely at the technology level. Technology-level integration, even though
essential, is only part of the security solution. In discussing the general topic
of WS’ usage for B2B, Alonso et al. [4] note that WS enables “a company to
open its IT infrastructure to external partners” however it does “not help with
the many legal and contractual issues involved in B2B interactions” (p.299).
Similarly, technology-level security integration can be done, but to allow for a
more holistic security solution in B2B—and particularly in businesses which have
cross-enterprise security as a critical goal—other higher-level aspects must be
considered. These aspects go beyond the flashiness of dynamic security and trust
negotiation possible with WS standards, and deal with a business-level security
approach to risks and each organization’s needs and goals as they pertain to
security.
The close-knit, comprehensive concept suggested here is somewhat analo-
gous to that recently called for in work by Dynes et al. [49] in the domain of the
extended enterprise. The extended enterprise provides an excellent example of
the close relations now prevalent in B2B, but also the substantially enlarged scale
of the security problem in such relations. Commenting on this topic, Dynes et
al. [49] compellingly argue this point and stress that many important risk man-
agement and security challenges are exhibited in extended enterprise-type asso-
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ciations. These are challenges which unfortunately are not being addressed [49],
hence the research agenda outlined in their article.
The similarities between the envisioned solution for WS security in e-
business and the call for security approach research in the extended enterprise
are rooted one main factor. That is, as businesses view cross-enterprise security
in WS interactions as critical, this will justify them working closely together in
a joint approach analogous to how research [40, 49] suggests it could be done in
the extended enterprise. Some of the reasons for security being paramount to
businesses could be: (i) large and long-term investments, (ii) strict government
regulations, and (iii) importance of accurate, trustworthy business process execu-
tion and/or the nature of processes. Regarding point (iii) for example, this could
be processes that are mission-critical, have strict privacy requirements (such as
the health sector), or are susceptible to attack (such as the financial and banking
sectors) and so on.
Before concluding this literature survey, a brief review of security-focused
approaches, frameworks and models which are not specifically targeted towards
WS, is undertaken. This review assesses some widely used methods and draws its
relevance from the fact that at the core, the approach envisioned adds to a number
of existing ones to provide another option for companies’ security. There are four
approaches of note from the literature. These are TOGAF [202], SABSA [186],
SDL [124] and TSP-Secure [192, 191].
TOGAF [202] is a detailed method accompanied by a set of supporting
tools for developing an enterprise information systems architecture. Although
not originally directed at security, there have been initiatives put forward which
incorporate security (including risk analysis, security policies, technologies and
so on) in TOGAF’s core architecture development method. SABSA [186] on the
other hand is a framework for supplying cohesive information security solutions
to businesses. Its six-layered model ensures that security is an integral part of a
company’s IT lifecycle and management infrastructure. The SDL [124] method
is a software security assurance development process. This admittedly has its
2. E-Business, Web Services, and their Security: State of the Art 37
concentration on a lower and more technical layer than TOGAF and SABSA. SDL
specially aims at creating a trustworthy, secure computing base for applications.
TSP-Secure [192, 191] is the final approach and it focuses on a strong team-
based outlook to secure software development. As with other methods above,
typical tasks include identifying risks, security requirements engineering, defining
security designs, and security testing of the code and systems.
Broadly assessing the methods discussed above, these are all very adequate
de facto security methods. There are two key factors which differentiate them
and the envisioned approach however. First, they aim at a much more generic
systems development level—this links to the previously identified fact that they
are not aligned with WS, its challenges, tools or technologies. This has its benefits
nonetheless as their approaches are not tied to particular technologies. Second,
they do not pay special attention to cross-enterprise development and manage-
ment of those collaborative interactions. For example, key aspects of interest
such as creating an atmosphere of trust and security across parties is not a con-
sideration. Other than these two factors, there are likely to be various similarities
between these security models and the envisioned approach.
2.4 Summary
This chapter has taken an in-depth look at the field of e-business, WS, and their
security, with the aim of identifying gaps in current research and therefore paving
the way for this work. From this analysis, it was apparent that there are vari-
ous unaddressed issues as e-businesses look towards creating and maintaining a
comprehensive, trustworthy WS security solution. Primarily these stem from two
aspects. First is an overly reliant emphasis on technology, alluding to standards
and systems as the complete solution to WS security in e-business. The second
aspect notes an overly isolated or individualistic security stance. This focuses
on the process one company should follow to secure itself internally, therefore
ignoring the comprehensive security issue across collaborating entities introduced
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by WS use.
To tackle these issues an approach to security was suggested in the previ-
ous section which would focus on a number of key aspects. These centre around:
(i) the consideration of the full nature of WS and its security implications partic-
ularly when used for e-business, (ii) recognizing and appreciating the ‘live’ inter-
organizational security issue now faced by interacting e-businesses, and finally
(iii) promoting the use of a collaborative or extended enterprise-type approach to
provide enhanced levels of security and trust across interacting parties.
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Chapter 3
The BOF4WSS Approach
Security must be omnipresent throughout your infrastructure in order for you to
begin to feel your application or service is secure. In order to accomplish this,
it is imperative that you follow a structured methodology. — Christopher Steel,
Ramesh Nagappan and Ray Lai
3.1 Introduction
Having critically examined the literature on e-business, Web services (WS) and
their security in Chapter 2, this chapter presents a possible solution approach
to address some of the outstanding issues. This solution follows naturally from
the type of approach described in Sections 2.3.3 and 2.4. Specifically therefore,
it targets issues which stem from an overly reliant emphasis on technology for
security and security approaches that are too isolated and individualistic.
The core of this chapter begins with an overview of the proposed approach,
namely the Business-Oriented Framework for enhancing Web Services Security
for e-business (BOF4WSS). This includes highlighting its novelty, and indicating
and justifying design aims and goals. The chapter then moves on to a very
detailed discussion of the framework, its objectives, steps and processes. Finally,
BOF4WSS’ scope is considered to identify the intended target group of businesses.
During these discussions, the terms ‘framework’ and ‘development methodology’
are considered to be very similar and therefore are used interchangeably. Both are
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taken to portray a collection of related stages towards achieving a goal, including
inputs, processes and their outputs.
3.2 Overview
BOF4WSS, displayed in Figure 3.1, was conceived to address the outstanding
security issues identified in Chapter 2 and strengthen available security/trust
solutions. The framework consists of nine stages which, in general, semanti-
cally resemble those found in typical systems development methodologies. For-
mally these stages are Requirements Elicitation, Negotiations, Agreements, Anal-
ysis/Architectural, Agreements, Systems Design, Agreements (for Quality-of-
Services), Development and Testing, and Maintenance. Compared to typical
methodologies, the Negotiations and Agreements stages are novel. Their inclu-
sion was found to be crucial in BOF4WSS noting the cross-enterprise nature of
the development and imperative need to discuss, negotiate and agree on clear
paths forward.
Agreements (for QoS)
Requirements Elicitation
Negotiations
Agreements
Analysis/Architectural
Systems Design
Development & Testing
Agreements
Maintenance
Figure 3.1: BOF4WSS Overview
The Waterfall Model (WM) methodology [103] in particular was the main
influence for the framework’s design. This can be seen when comparing the frame-
work’s phases to those of the WM, such as system feasibility study, requirement
analysis and project planning, system design, detailed design, coding, testing and
integration, installation and maintenance [103]. Depending on the article sourced,
the stages of the WM may be named differently (for example, [177, 16, 193, 213]);
[103] is referenced because of its detailed view of typical WM tasks/stages.
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The WM was preferred to other methodologies such as prototyping [133],
spiral [16] and object-oriented [81] approaches due to the transparent, well-
organized, highly documented, and strongly disciplined process it can bring to
a large inter-organizational development project [103, 18]. Some practitioners
even view the structure possible with the WM as an ideal fit for the corporate
(somewhat bureaucratic) world and a key reason why the WM is here to stay [27].
With appreciation of the flexibility and quick turnaround benefits of ag-
ile and more lightweight methods, these were also considered at length. These
techniques were not chosen for the framework’s foundation however, because lit-
erature [193, 213] does not advise them in situations: (i) of large development
projects, (ii) where development teams might be in different places and dealing
with complicated interactions with other hardware and software, or (iii) in critical
systems development. These are all likely situations where BOF4WSS might be
used, as mentioned in previous (Section 2.3.3) and also, later sections.
Despite the benefits listed, it is accepted that the WM does have short-
comings and criticisms. For example, researchers have identified that it lacks
flexibility in the original model when traversing stages and freezes requirements
too early [103, 16]. To compensate for these concerns, BOF4WSS allows for
flexibility through bottom-up progression and feedback (shown on the right in
Figure 3.1). Additionally, even though requirements are determined early in the
framework, these are only high-level requirements (as opposed to the traditional
WM that defines all requirements) which may change (subject to agreement) at
subsequent stages closer to design.
Underlying both of the points above is the emphasis BOF4WSS places
on the involvement of key stakeholders throughout the entire process to ensure
gathering and circulation of necessary information, making of changes and so on.
The prime novelty in BOF4WSS is found in its emphasis on providing
a collaborative development methodology which focuses on WS security. This
methodology would accommodate multiple autonomous businesses working to-
gether. To address the outstanding issues from Section 2.3.3, BOF4WSS aims at:
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considering the full nature of WS and its security implications within e-business;
appreciating the real-time inter-organizational security issue now faced by inter-
acting e-businesses; and finally promoting the use of a collaborative approach
to provide enhanced levels of security and trust. These are its high-level design
goals.
As will be seen below, the framework and its phases give detailed guidance
on what should occur and how, and its relevance in attaining desired levels of
holistic security for these cross-enterprise interactions. To recap, cross-enterprise
interaction security refers to ensuring businesses are secured internally, but also
that the external interactions encompassing collaborating businesses are secure
to some level. External interactions with a company simply mean interactions
that occur in transit (that is, while they are being passed between companies),
and to some extent what occurs regarding the security of these interactions while
being processed by business partners. This internal and external focus is revisited
at various points in BOF4WSS’s presentation.
Returning to the point regarding detailed guidance given by the framework,
this will involve defining the expected inputs to stages along with their required
outputs/outcomes, but especially the recommended low-level goals, activities and
steps within those stages that can help achieve the outcomes. Where suitable,
this guidance aims to reference and reuse existing methods and practices—both
from industry and academia—thus concentrating on the compilation of these into
a coherent, well-defined process.
Another main design goal of the framework is to utilize Web services spec-
ifications and tools wherever and whenever useful. This includes validated pro-
posals from the research community as well. These choices were made to provide
companies that adopt BOF4WSS with a practical methodology that pulls to-
gether key WS specifications and tools from the plethora of technologies available.
Furthermore this shows exactly where and how they can fit into the development
of a WS solution. To date, the author is not aware of such a broad methodology as
BOF4WSS, which aims to fit together a majority of the critical pieces of the WS
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security puzzle in the context of cross-enterprise, highly structured, extensible
(allowing approaches/tools to be plugged in), business-oriented framework.
To support the largely textual description of the framework’s activities
next, a number of diagrams are included illustrating each stage and its respective
workflow. Since security issues are a central concern to BOF4WSS, the discus-
sion concentrates primarily on these aspects rather than an isolated discourse on
functional and quality related aspects. Quality aspects or requirements in this re-
gard refer to non-functional requirements excluding security, such as performance,
scalability and so on. At some stages however, in the interest of completeness,
this chapter does give some guidance on these areas. This is particularly when
they relate to useful WS standards and technologies.
Lastly, BOF4WSS assumes that businesses have previously agreed (through
feasibility studies, initial dialogue and so on) to use WS to support a generally de-
fined business scenario. In other words, the broad scenario is known. BOF4WSS’s
task therefore is to provide a methodology for its planning, development and im-
plementation. Below, the framework’s stages are presented.
3.3 Requirements Elicitation Phase
The Requirements Elicitation phase (shown in Figure 3.2) is the first stage
and within it each company works largely by itself. As with typical system de-
velopment approaches, the phase involves analysing internal business objectives,
constraints, security policies, relevant laws and regulations and so on, to deter-
mine their high-level needs for the expected WS business scenario.
The first implicit but crucial step therefore is to organize teams within
businesses to work on the project. They need not be dedicated exclusively to this
project but should be committed and have a clear idea of the goals of the envi-
sioned scenario. Ideally, these teams will consist of some top executives, domain
experts (the domain being related to the business processes involved), project
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Figure 3.2: Workflow model of the Requirements Elicitation phase
managers, business and systems analysts, system designers and developers, end
users, IT security specialists and legal counsel (preferably with experience of tech-
nology law, data protection acts and such). These teams would report to the top
executives, who will have participated in the embryonic stages of taking on the
project/scenario. Additionally, executives will provide the financial and higher-
level backing for the project throughout the company. During the application of
the framework and inclusive methods such as Demiro¨rs et al. [45] (which is pre-
sented next), the involvement of all the types of stakeholders mentioned above is
heavily stressed. As validated by studies such as that of Hartman and Ashrafi [78],
this is a critical success factor in managing and developing information systems.
Once teams have been established, this framework’s phase utilizes the
methods proposed by Demiro¨rs et al. [45], which focus on the definition and
analysis of business process models to elicit requirements (functional, quality and
security-specific). This approach is preferred due to its innate emphasis on busi-
ness processes—the culmination of WS interactions.
As illustrated in Figure 3.2, the approach in [45] consists of firstly gath-
ering relevant knowledge about the process domain and what influences it. This
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information could include business objectives, legal or system-specific constraints,
existing process models, system architectures and so on. The second task is the
analysis and modelling of current processes (particularly if existing models are
not accurate) to enable for a full appreciation of critical process flows, and their
inputs and outputs. This will primarily focus on internal and external processes
directly involved in envisioned WS interactions and those that are candidates for
redesign. Crucial stakeholders for this information will be members of the teams
already formed, and other relevant top executives, domain experts, analysts and
end users. For the modelling activity in this task, the Unified Modeling Language
(UML) [149] is suggested for use as it is a standard technique likely to be known
by both enterprises.
If companies are entering a process they have not done before (therefore,
there are no ‘current processes’ specifically related to envisioned interactions),
the task above will not be as relevant. The aim instead is considering how their
other internal processes will integrate with newly envisioned interactions.
The third task is the modelling of new processes. At this point, the needs
of new business interactions (driven by the companies and at the core, the stake-
holders) result in new processes, but often also include enhanced and updated
existing processes. Legacy systems deserve special emphasis because if they are to
be included in new processes, they can be either re-engineered (reimplemented),
repurposed (changing interface and encapsulating some business logic), or parti-
tioned and packaged into deployable functional components [158]. The choice be-
tween these methods will largely be dependent on benefit versus cost and whether
legacy systems can adequately fulfil new business goals.
Generally, these new processes are expected to be high-level, and mainly
cover internal (known) as opposed to external (envisioned) operations. This how-
ever may not always be the case. For example, if the external processes with the
other company are known due to prior transactions, businesses may be able to
develop initial medium-level process flows which encompass the external inter-
actions. In either case, occasional communications with business partners are
3. The BOF4WSS Approach 46
required to enable useful processes to be defined. Again UML is suggested for
(i) the reason previously given and particularly because these high-level models
can be used to aid in discussions in the Negotiations Phase, and (ii) the fact
that it adequately enables high- or medium-level processes to be defined. True to
the envisioned flexibility of BOF4WSS however, companies are free to use their
modelling language of preference.
The last task in Demiro¨rs et al.’s approach [45] is the actual requirements
determination. This is accomplished through analysis of the newly defined pro-
cess models, and business analyst and domain experts can direct this task. By
assessing the inputs, outputs and tasks involved, general requirements (functional
and quality-based) for each stage of the process can be defined from a high level.
For quality requirements in particular it is understood that these may
be hard to state this early and at this rather high level. Businesses however
should make an effort to give some idea of their desires for system quality (such
as in terms of extensibility, scalability, performance). To elicit security-specific
requirements, authors mainly suggest the analysis of the access restrictions of
the actors (users and applications) on processes and process inputs and outputs.
This is where the information security specialists on the team will be involved.
In these last two stages, BOF4WSS heavily involves the previously highlighted
stakeholders.
In addition to the security requirements identified, the framework strongly
suggests a scenario risk assessment to provide more extensive security documen-
tation. This assessment, as opposed to the one above which focuses primarily on
access restrictions in processes, enables a comprehensive, security-driven scenario
analysis. The assessment is strongly suggested primarily to combat the unfortu-
nate reality that if left alone, a significant number of businesses would not carry
out formal security risk assessments to identify key risks faced [210].
To aid in the assessment process, there are a range of methods that the
security specialists of companies might use. BOF4WSS suggests well-documented
and internationally validated techniques such as NIST SP 800-30: Risk Manage-
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ment Guide [195], OCTAVE (Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnera-
bility Evaluation) [24, 3], CRAMM [188, 204], CORAS [47], ISRAM (Information
Security Risk Analysis Method) [99] and the IS risk analysis based on a business
model [196].
Generally, some of the crucial factors considered in a chosen technique
should include assets, threats, vulnerabilities, risks and their priority levels (that
is, severity and impact if risks materialize), organizational security policies (poli-
cies directly convey a company’s security posture), pertinent laws and regulations
(those governing internal operations and those with respect to working with ex-
ternal parties), security budgets (balancing cost and security is paramount), and
security goals expected to be met by new business partners.
All of the factors listed above significantly aid in the determination of
the security actions and security requirements that should be factored in during
these envisioned WS communications. Throughout this report, a security action
is defined as any way (that is, setting up protective measures or not) in which
a company treats or handles a risk it faces, whereas a security requirement is a
high-to-medium level desire, expressed to protect against risk. Security actions
therefore encompass security requirements. An example of an action is, ‘the risk
of ensuring the security of a server to be outsourced’. A requirement however
could be, ‘the integrity of personal data must be maintained’.
Requirements to be carried forward should particularly address areas that
(i) need additional security internally (and relate to the overall scenario), and
(ii) relate to the interactions with the business partner. After these requirements
have been gathered, they are added to the previously identified requirements and
documented to provide the stage’s output: a high-to-medium level scenario pro-
cess (inclusive of the models defined), high-level requirements (functional, quality
and security), and any other the supporting information.
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Figure 3.3: Workflow model of the Negotiations phase
3.4 Negotiations Phase
In the Negotiations phase next, teams consisting of project managers, busi-
ness and systems analysts, domain experts and IT security professionals from the
companies meet, bringing together their requirements from the previous phase for
discussions. Figure 3.3 displays the workflow. The purpose is to use the stage in-
puts as a basis to chart an agreed path forward in terms of scenario requirements
and high-to-medium level process definitions. As compared to typical develop-
ment methods such as the WM, BOF4WSS explicitly includes negotiations as a
phase to stress its importance in the inter-organizational scenario. This is es-
pecially noting the varying expectations each company is likely to have towards
security. Expectations (and requirements) could vary with regards to whether a
process (or set of service interactions) needs to be secured, to what level it is to
be secured, how security will be applied and so on.
The two main tasks in this phase therefore are, Discussion and negotiation
on (i) functional and quality requirements, and then (ii) security requirements
and actions that arise. Depending on the preferences of businesses using the
framework, the latter of these tasks may include a joint risk analysis aimed at
identifying any risks (and subsequently, requirements) not conceived previously.
Deliberations on statutory and regulatory requirements are especially important
when discussing security, as businesses may not be in the same industry, or even
country. Where necessary, as is seen in the workflow, backward progression from
the security requirements definitions to functional/quality requirement definitions
is allowed. This is mainly to support balancing between functional/quality and
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security actions and requirements.
The Negotiations phase facilitates its purpose by accepting that each busi-
ness constitutes a different security domain (and is likely to have different desires
and obligations). It therefore explicitly stresses the need to negotiate on security
actions, rather than adopting one company’s needs, or assuming integration of
desires at this level will be seamless. Work by Tiller [205] clearly highlights that
in forming these extended networks or partnerships of companies, this integration
task is formidable. It is however a necessary and pivotal precursor to engaging in
interactions. After the identified tasks have been completed, the expected output
of this stage will be the agreed high-to-medium level requirements, high-to-medium
level envisioned processes, and any business rules/logic and constraints important
for future stages.
3.5 Agreements Phase
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Figure 3.4: Workflow model of the Agreements phase
The Agreements phase depicted in Figure 3.4 builds on the concluded
negotiations and initially advocates a legal contract to solidify the understanding
of the requirements between companies thus far. A legal agreement at this point
is not compulsory however, as it is appreciated that businesses may choose to
include the contract at another stage. The reason the contract is suggested here
is to create a safety net for both companies during these early stages of plan-
ning and negotiations. The contract would focus on two main aspects, binding
the parties to negotiations for possibly future business interactions in good faith
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(non-disclosure agreements may be used for example) and secondly, defining the
groundwork for a more comprehensive contract to follow in later stages. The ini-
tial agreement and definition of needs in the Negotiations phase makes the latter
of these tasks (that is, defining the groundwork) less arduous.
The contract is followed by the Interaction Security Strategy (ISS) which
in itself is a novel contribution. As opposed to the legal document above, the
ISS is a less rigid management structure that defines high-level, cross-enterprise
security directives to guide the interactions and relevant security decisions internal
to companies. These directives are typically in the form of security strategies,
policies, procedures, best practices and objectives. The novelty in the ISS is
its provision of a more pragmatic security governance structure for companies.
This appreciates a variety of important factors and is not stated in rigid, hard
to understand and follow, contractual terms. Formally, the ISS can be seen to
build on and considerably extend the idea of cross-enterprise policies introduced
in [137, 91].
Figure 3.4 shows that the central activities in the creation of the ISS are: (i)
restating businesses’ mutual goals for the scenario—this will provide a clear vision
for the strategy, and (ii) actual definition of the security strategy’s directives. In
addition to the use of requirements and business constraints, when defining these
directives the framework suggests consideration of two aspects. These are, the
legal and regulatory mandates which may influence companies and interactions,
and secondly the best practice security standards available from industry. These
are discussed below.
In business today, legal and regulatory requirements pertaining to secu-
rity are becoming increasingly important, especially within the arena of online
business. These mandatory requirements cover topics such as data protection,
data privacy, computer misuse, incident disclosure and notification, third-party
auditing and even security within business relationships. The aim of the ISS with
regards to these requirements is mainly to stress that businesses make themselves
aware of the content of these laws and regulations. This is not only to fulfil the
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statutory need, but also because a number of these laws stress principles of good,
reliable security that should be practiced by companies.
Some of the most relevant laws to be considered include the following. The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 (U.S.) emphasizes the maintenance of ade-
quate internal controls to ensure the accuracy of financial information [194, 128].
The Health Insurance Privacy and Portability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 (U.S.) fo-
cuses on confidentiality, integrity and availability of personal data (medical or
personal records) ensuring it is protected whilst in storage and during transmis-
sion, both within and external to the company [128]. The Data Protection Act
(DPA) of 1998 (U.K.) is targeted towards personal data, ensuring that it is ad-
equate, accurate and processed fairly and lawfully, amongst other things [216].
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB) of 1999 (U.S.) is mainly aimed at financial
institutions, and stresses activities such as the evaluation of IT environments to
understand their security risks, establishment of security policies to assess and
control risks, and the scrutiny of business relationships to ensure partners have
adequate security in place [128]. Knowledge of, and adherence to these regula-
tions is critical as companies look to conduct business in an increasingly regulated
marketplace.
In addition to promoting the compliance with legal and regulatory require-
ments, the ISS emphasizes the incorporation of best practice standards in the
approaches by companies towards inter-organizational security. Whilst it may be
tempting to assume that businesses already accommodate such standards, recent
surveys [210] have shown that companies are largely not aware of key security
guidelines.
The ISO/IEC 27000 series is a perfect example of important standards
and as Figure 3.4 shows, they form a key input into this framework stage. This
standards set, in particular, is targeted at the provision of an internationally rec-
ognized, organization independent framework for effective, extensive information
security management [19]. Internal security management system for an organi-
zation is a fundamental objective of this standards set.
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Looking directly at the ISS’ emphasis on standards during this Agreements
phase, there are many benefits. As mentioned above, the term ‘cross-enterprise
interactions’ denotes interactions spanning and including collaborating businesses
and their internal systems. Therefore, securing the internals of businesses which
participate in these interactions is also a crucial goal—this is especially where the
ISO/IEC 27000 standards set is useful. Two specific benefits of applying these
standards are that they provide organizations with a systematic way of fulfilling
legal and regulatory responsibilities (for example, some standards can help meet
SOX requirements) and secondly, through accreditation schemes, businesses that
can demonstrate adherence to guidelines can be issued with a certificate. This
would show customers and business partners that their systems and practices are
secure to an international standard [19].
At the external level security standards also prove useful as certain clauses
(for example, ISO/IEC 27001, Control A.6.2) deal specially with external par-
ties. These would typically focus on maintaining the security of an organization’s
information assets as they are accessed, processed, communicated with, or man-
aged by external parties [19]. The two main tasks involved in this attempt are
the identification and addressing of risks directly related to external parties; these
are two activities that were completed to some extent during the risk assessment
in the preceding Requirements Elicitation phase. Reflecting on Control A.6.2
therefore, as opposed to resulting in an exhaustive legal contract (as is suggested
by the Control), any new risks and their respective controls which were identified
would feed into the cross-enterprise security directives for the ISS.
Having discussed the ISS, its goals and its main influences, a look is taken
at examples of what the ISS could cover. The first example is the definition
of best practices each company should abide by internally. One best practice
might be related to ensuring parties maintain sufficient logs of system events,
as this information would be very useful in cases of a security breach. Another
example of an aspect the ISS would address would be the definition of scenario
incident response activities. This would consider what procedures companies
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should jointly follow if a security incident is suspected or has occurred. The third,
and somewhat general example, relates to the responsibilities and expectations of
companies towards security. The ISS would enable companies to almost always
have some clear vision of what their partners should be doing (likely stated in
terms of policies and procedures) relating to aspects of security.
The final example is the creation of a small, cross-enterprise team specifi-
cally to handle security matters and update the ISS and other security measures
as and when appropriate. Here, the ISS recognizes and appreciates that security
is an ongoing concern. Therefore, it calls for a team to be formed constituted of
persons from all enterprises to manage this concern. In essence, the ISS forces
businesses engaging in joint interactions to consider and address security issues,
both internally and externally, that previously may have been overlooked due to
overly simplistic or isolated approaches towards security.
By jointly creating an ISS companies can have some degree of certainty
that partners are committed to maintaining an acceptable security posture. This
leads to another central goal of this strategy, that is, to foster trust amongst
business partners. The ISS aims to foster trust through predictability and trans-
parency in security approaches, by outlining a security strategy and subsequent
framework that all businesses agreed to adopt and follow. Trust within e-business
was outlined before (in Section 2.3.3) and its importance should not be neglected.
This research does appreciate other, more direct methods to assess a busi-
ness partner’s commitment to security, such as audits, on-site visits and question-
naires (suggested by Misrahi [128]), but leaves this choice to individual organi-
zations that adopt BOF4WSS. Within very closely-knit and highly collaborative
relationships (such as the e-supply chains) however, audits amongst other precau-
tionary mechanisms are strongly recommended, and this opinion is supported by
Baker et al. [6]. The closer businesses are, the more likely they are to be affected
by each other’s security risks. Businesses should be mindful of this factor as they
seek to work with other enterprises. To complete the Agreements phase the fol-
lowing documents and information should be produced and carried forward to the
3. The BOF4WSS Approach 54
next stage. These are the high-to-medium level requirements, high-to-medium level
envisioned processes, any business rules and constraints, and cross-enterprise se-
curity directives in the form of strategies, policies, procedures, best practices and
security objectives (or more formally the ISS).
3.6 Analysis/Architectural Phase
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Figure 3.5: Workflow model of the Analysis/Architectural phase
Following on from agreements, next is the Analysis/Architectural phase.
The workflow is given in Figure 3.5. This phase’s purpose is to enable companies
to take the agreed requirements and define conceptual (medium-level), secured
business process models for the foreseen interactions. These models are expected
to encompass not only the high-level company-to-company process flow, but each
company’s internal process flows that constitute part of the general business sce-
nario. Internal process definition and sharing is encouraged to cultivate an at-
mosphere of openness between the companies, but especially to make companies
properly analyse the expected internal flows and how they fit into the general sce-
nario. At this point, it is still relatively easy for companies to make any necessary
updates.
Since it is almost certain that businesses would have engaged in process
modelling at some point before, the teams’ business and systems analysts are
likely to have preferred techniques. As a result of this, the first task in this phase
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is agreeing on the technique that they will use. The framework does not stipulate
a particular method for use but does advise businesses to carefully deliberate the
benefits and shortcomings of the options available.
To define the medium-level business process models needed, various stan-
dard modelling techniques are available ([158, 69, 2]) for project teams to use,
and analysts and domain experts are key personnel at this stage. Some of
the most popular of these are UML (inclusive of its many specialized profiles—
see [146]), Data Flow Diagrams (DFD), Integration Definition for Function Mod-
eling (IDEF) techniques and the Business Process Modeling Notation (BPMN).
The UML 2.0 extension for SOA, UML4SOA [117], is a recent proposal from
research which also provides an interesting technique. This profile however ap-
pears to be targeted at service orchestration only (thus, internal as opposed to
cross-enterprise systems). Yet another option is the UML profile in [190] for WS
composition. This could be very useful because a main design goal is the inclu-
sion of transformation rules that allow designed UML models to be transformed
to Web service compositions that are executable (for example, BPEL, albeit an
older version)—a necessary task in future stages.
Companies’ discussions on modelling techniques should bear in mind: (i)
the goal of this phase, that is, the definition of secured medium-level process
models, (ii) the fact that these models will have to be further decomposed and
used to express varying aspects at lower level, and therefore having standard ways
to state these aspects may be beneficial, and (iii) the impending need to translate
these models into more WS-specific formats, for external and internal usage.
Regarding the last two points, businesses for example might find it useful
to know that there have been proposed extensions to UML to account for se-
curity. Furthermore, with highly esteemed options like UML and BPMN, there
are mechanisms publicized that can translate these medium-level models to WS-
specific languages as will be seen in subsequent sections. Figure 3.6 is a reference
guide that BOF4WSS would provide to companies for a summary view of UML
and BPMN with respect to modelling security. Information on a UML profile for
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QoS and FT, Security requirement with a UML 2.0 profile, and Extension for the
Modeling of Security Requirements, can be found in [147, 172, 173] respectively.
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Figure 3.6: Options for modelling security with UML and BPMN
Research work by Aguilar-Save´n [2] and Giaglis [69] has investigated the
nuances of a number of popular process modelling techniques and their findings
would be a first point of reference (suggested by BOF4WSS) to guide companies in
choosing a method. The first article provides a taxonomy of modelling techniques
to assist decision makers in evaluating and selecting a suitable option based on
the project and/or the specific purpose for modelling [69]. Purposes could range
from functional (task-focused) to informational (data flow-based), or from process
development to simply enabling understanding and communication. The second
article is a more recent review of the techniques for modelling and culminates in a
detailed summary of these approaches (covering their attributes, characteristics,
strengths and weaknesses), and a framework classifying them according to their
purposes [2].
Once the modelling technique has been agreed, Figure 3.5 shows that busi-
nesses then proceed to use the phase’s inputs to define and model the cross-
enterprise processes. During this task, companies should be wary of the temp-
tation to prematurely define the processes in great detail. Even though it is
understood that this is the next step (the Design Phase) and that for some secu-
rity objectives low-level analysis is ideal, agreeing on and defining a conceptual
model is a critical base step to the following stages. This degree of modelling en-
ables visualization and description of processes at an abstract but holistic level.
It is also comprehensible by all members of the companies’ teams, as opposed to
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only systems designers or software developers. Conceptual process definition can
allow companies to analyse processes, weigh alternatives and assess process inter-
relations. Most importantly however, it enables the achievement of agreement
on the vision for the medium-level architecture and process flow, in and across
enterprises prior to low-level design.
Identifying and agreeing on where security
directives might be applied to secure models
Application of security directives to process
models either using (i) generic security
objectives or (ii) targeted security patterns
medium-level process models with security objectives
applied (i.e. a candidate security architecture), medium-
level requirements & all inputs passed to this stage
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Figure 3.7: Identification and application of directives
After defining the cross-enterprise process models, the next general task
presented again in Figure 3.7 is to conceptually apply the security directives to
provide options for the security architecture. This is therefore not the final archi-
tecture nor does it concentrate on a low-level application of directives. Due to the
range of directives and the variety of possibilities in which they could be applied
to even these medium-level models, businesses are faced with a complex under-
taking. Initially therefore, the framework suggests that companies (especially
system analysts and security professionals) focus on identifying and agreeing on
where security directives might and should be applied to secure the models. A
detailed table is one simple way that companies could match relevant security
directives to the processes they will affect.
When the matching has been completed, there are two well-accepted meth-
ods in which directives can be initially applied to the process models. These
are, (i) through the use of generic security objectives (as done by Ro¨hrig and
Knorr [174]) or (ii) by employing targeted security patterns (see Steel et al. [194]).
These two methods are especially suitable for BOF4WSS because they provide
good security procedures which are generic enough to be applied, even if only
by way of annotations, to a number of the aforementioned modelling techniques.
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Figure 3.8 diagrammatically presents the general process.
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Figure 3.8: Process from security directives to security architecture
To use the first approach ([174]) in its original form, companies’ secu-
rity professionals will have to ensure that process-related security directives are
stated with regard to the security objectives of confidentiality, integrity, availabil-
ity and accountability. This list however is not definitive as the framework does
appreciate the desire of businesses to add other relevant objectives that reflect
the directives. These additions might include objectives on nonrepudiation and
authorization for example.
After this is complete, individual process components (inputs, outputs,
activities and actors—users of process activities) are assigned rating values (for
example High, Medium, Low) in terms of these objectives. These values indicate
level of security desired for the component and should be based on previous risk
analysis findings and the security directives as opposed to being just randomly
chosen. The following gives an example of assignment; if a data value α (repre-
senting a bank account number) is output from an activity and the risk analysis
or security directives dictate that α is very sensitive data and its confidentiality
is likely to be threatened, companies might assign process component α with a
confidentiality rating of ‘High’. This type of assignment activity is done for all
process components in the previously defined models.
The second approach is the application of security patterns to secure the
process models [194]. Formally, “a security pattern describes a particular recur-
ring security problem that arises in specific contexts and presents a well-proven,
generic scheme for its solution” [184] (p.5). Simply, it can be thought of as a well-
proven, generic solution to a recurring security problem. An immediate benefit
of employing this approach therefore is that it would utilize catalogues of proven
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and tested security patterns to address the requirements in the security direc-
tives. This accounts for the input of the security pattern catalogues to this stage
as shown in Figure 3.7. Steel et al. [194] have investigated this topic in detail
and have provided an extensive listing of existing and new patterns spanning the
Web, Business, WS, and Infrastructure and Quality of Services tiers of a typical
company’s systems.
Using the example of data value α from the objectives approach above,
personnel would check through the security catalogues for an appropriate pattern
to protect α. Having identified suitable alternatives, these would then be noted for
formal analysis and application during the subsequent framework Design Phase.
The goal at this Architectural stage therefore (as illustrated in Figure 3.8 and
also done in [194]) is mainly the identification of relevant security patterns.
To briefly compare the security objectives ([174]) and security patterns
([194]) methods, the first approach is likely to be more time consuming, as apply-
ing priorities for the security objectives to each process component is a substantial
task. Conversely, two benefits accompanying this method are, the simplicity of
use and application and secondly, that it naturally enables the security priorities
(of High, Medium, Low) to be associated with the specific components. The lat-
ter of these tasks is not inherently accommodated in the security pattern concept,
albeit easy to add in some cases.
If parties’ security professionals and analysts choose to use patterns, the
advantages include having their security problems addressed in a structured way,
and also the ability of non-security experts to reference and apply proven secu-
rity solutions (through the use of pattern catalogues) to solve otherwise complex
problems [184]. An additional benefit of using the pattern catalogue in ‘Core
Security Patterns: Best Practices and Strategies for J2EE, Web Services, and
Identity Management’ ([194]) specifically, is that it is largely geared towards WS
interactions and is thus equipped with standards and technologies that can be
used to implement the pattern in later stages. Regardless of the method cho-
sen, the Architectural stage’s output should be medium-level process models with
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security directives applied (formally, this constitutes the candidate security archi-
tecture), the medium-level requirements (functional and security-specific) accom-
panying these models, and the inputs passed into this phase.
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Figure 3.9: Workflow model of the Agreements phase
Following the formal conceptual process definition, the framework suggests
the use of another Agreements phase. The respective workflow can be viewed
in Figure 3.9. This agreement is in the form of a more thorough legal contract
reflecting detailed expectations of parties included in the envisaged scenario. The
business rules and constraints, functional requirements and security requirements
all factor into this contract. The medium-level requirements are especially im-
portant as they provide further detail on the agreed interactions. As with the
previous contract, the business and system analysts have the role of ensuring that
business requirements and needs are transferred adequately into the legally bind-
ing agreement/contract. Security professionals act on the security requirements.
During contract drafting, requirements may change and therefore any up-
dates made can be fed back into the known requirements and process models.
Again, this legal document is used primarily as a safety net (in the event that
companies have an irreconcilable disagreement and need formal arbitration) and
therefore still relinquishes the role of governing day-to-day security interactions
to the ISS. Many authors [40, 186] support this and similar views, and define
a number of drawbacks to using contracts as the sole basis for conducting busi-
ness. The outputs of this phase are the medium-level process models with security
directives applied (formally, this constitutes the candidate security architecture),
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the updated medium-level requirements (functional and security-specific) accom-
panying these models, the business rules and constraints and any other the inputs
passed into this phase.
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Figure 3.10: Workflow model of the Systems Design phase
The Design phase is analogous to a company’s internal systems design
process (such as that present in [194]) and therefore targets the definition of a
low-level (or logical) systems-related view of exactly how the conceptual model
from the Architectural phase will be put in place. Figure 3.10 defines the tasks.
The first activity is for the teams from each business to jointly define the
low-level process models. The systems analysts within the teams should be in-
volved at this point as they will have a more practical and low-level orientation
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towards models. The framework advises businesses to reuse the modelling tech-
nique chosen before (in the Architectural phase) but on this iteration, to break
down the medium-level models to the lowest level of detail. The goal is to de-
compose models such that the individual message flows between companies and
the specific tasks which constitute each process activity can be seen.
In defining these low-level interactions, it is critical for company teams to
identify the actual services and define the interactions in terms of these services.
Erl [51] is one commendable reference for companies suggested by the framework,
that examines moving from business processes to service models and designs,
and also provides thorough guidance. Generally however, businesses should be
attempting to identify aspects of functionality within processes that could form
distinct logic units. To exemplify this task, Figure 3.11 is used.
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Receive
confirmation
Receive bill...
Supplier
Receive order...
Verify order can
be fulfilled...
Send order
confirmation
Process order...
Bill customer...
Buyer
Place order...
Receive
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Receive bill...
Supplier
Receive order...
Verify order can
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Send order
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Process order...
Bill customer...
Purchase
order service
Accounts
payable service
Order
receipt
service
Order
processing
service
Billing
service
Medium-level process model Services identified from models
Figure 3.11: An example of moving from processes to services
This diagram shows a simplified medium-level process flow of a typical
order processing scenario (on the left) and next to it (on the right) the services
that were deduced from it. In identifying services, special attention was paid
to subprocesses that could be somewhat independent and could be grouped and
encapsulated with related tasks. The purchase order service is a good example of
this as it encapsulates the ‘place order’ and ‘receive confirmation’ subprocesses
into one unit of functionality that can be referenced.
Depending on how open companies have chosen to be with how their pro-
cesses (or systems) will work internally, the low-level process definition task might
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be primarily of the interactions between companies, or the interactions between
and also within the businesses. To use Figure 3.11 to explain this point, the
former of these tasks refers mainly to the arrows connecting the Buyer and Sup-
plier, whereas the latter refers to those arrows plus the arrows and flows within
companies. Even though the ultimate degree of openness maintained by par-
ties throughout the framework’s activities is largely left to the individual teams,
BOF4WSS stresses that openness and transparency could foster trust. This trust
is a key ingredient to successful future business interactions.
Building on the low-level process definitions, Figure 3.10 shows that the
following task for system analysts is the application of WS process specification
technologies, to state these low-level definitions in terms of WS-level interactions
(expressing them in terms of WS wherever appropriate). This transformation task
is made much easier once the low-level processes have been stated to resemble
services. WS should be viewed as the Internet-based implementation technology
that will implement designed services. At this point, expressing the interactions
from a global perspective (that is, showing interactions between companies rather
than internal process flows) is desired as it allows for the creation of a contract
that defines a jointly agreed set of orderings and constraint rules whereby service
message exchanges can take place [224].
To facilitate the expression of this global services contract, the framework
suggests one of two options, either (i) the use of W3C’s Web Services Choreogra-
phy Description Language (WS-CDL)—WS-CDL provides a standard mechanism
for defining WS collaborations and choreographies of message exchanges from a
global viewpoint [224], or (ii) BPEL4Chor—a recent proposal from the research
community built on Business Process Execution Language (BPEL), that aims
to address a number of perceived shortcomings of WS-CDL [44, 43]. These ap-
proaches were chosen specially because of their suitability for WS and ability
to produce formal, Web service-level process specifications that could feed into
future framework phases.
In deciding whether to use WS-CDL or BPEL4Chor, the framework notes
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the following factors for consideration by businesses. In terms of politics in the
standards world, WS-CDL is likely to have more support from industry because
it is under the charter of the W3C. A second advantage of WS-CDL is that
from the process specification defined, companies have the flexibility to then use
their preferred internal technologies to implement the definitions. Furthermore,
there is scope for automatically generating workflow templates for these internal
technologies that mirror the global perspective [157, 121]. A high-level example
is given in [224], where one company may use BPEL engines to drive workflow
whilst another uses a more traditional J2EETMsolution.
Another factor regarding WS-CDL is that if companies had chosen to use
the UML Profile for Schedulability, Performance, and Time Specification [148] to
model processes in the Architectural phase, research work by Cambronero [21]
has investigated a method for translating those models into WS-CDL documents.
This might be plugged in and used by companies to automate document creation.
Lastly, there is some free (albeit very limited) tool support targeted at
providing users with the ability to produce, view, simulate and validate WS-
CDL choreographies—namely WS-CDL Eclipse [5], Pi4SOA [163] and LTSA WS-
Engineer [63]. Alternatively, software could be purchased, including Oracle SOA
Suite 11g [151] (a complete suite of SOA products for development and execution)
and IBM Rational Software Architect for WebSphere Software [88] (platform
focused on development and deployment of SOA solutions).
At its core, the second approach, BPEL4Chor, defines extensions to BPEL
to enable the definition of choreographies [44]. In light of this close association,
BPEL4Chor can be seen to be specially suited for situations where businesses
will desire subsequent BPEL workflow specifications for their internal process
flows. The ability to allow for a seamless transition between choreographies (in
BPEL4Chor) and orchestrations (in BPEL) is actually one of the main advantages
this approach has over WS-CDL (when considering moving from WS-CDL to
BPEL workflows) according to its proponents [44].
A second noteworthy factor is that if analysts have used BPMN to model
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processes in previous stages, research by Decker et al. [43] describes how these
BPMN models can be reused and largely transformed to BPEL4Chor. A plug-in
for an available graphical modelling environment is also proposed to aid in this
transformation. Decker et al. [44] could be referenced by companies for more
nuances of this approach as compared to WS-CDL. In summary, WS-CDL and
BPEL4Chor are both viable solutions for Web service-level process specification.
With the information provided above, businesses can choose their technologies of
preference.
Along with the low-level process definition shown in Figure 3.10, harmo-
nization of process and data semantics across companies is critical. In this re-
search however, this activity is not covered as it would necessitate an extensive
discussion that digresses considerably from the focus on security. For informa-
tion, some of the main aims during this stage would be tackling the semantic
interoperability problem at both the data and business process levels. This prob-
lem as it relates to the B2B context is discussed in detail by Papazoglou [157].
Addressing these issues would likely include the use of tools such as ontologies,
shared vocabularies, metadata repositories and depending on companies’, also
technologies such as Semantic Web Services.
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Defining quality requirements for
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process models, low-level
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Figure 3.12: Definition of quality requirements task in Systems Design
Next is the determination of the quality requirements at these lower levels.
For ease of reference Figure 3.12 illustrates the task. In earlier stages, quality
requirements were produced at a high level and these form the base for the actions
here. For this task analysts and systems designers play central roles.
Business teams will need to identify details such as availability of sys-
tems/services, acceptable latency levels, performance expectations by parties and
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more general aspects including scalability, and even maintainability of envisioned
systems. Work by Garcia and Felgar de Toledo [66] has compiled an appropri-
ate listing of WS QoS attributes that can be used as a starting point by teams.
These requirements and their relation to processes should be well conceived be-
cause they constitute prime factors against which the security design will have to
be balanced. Businesses can either mainly discuss and agree on these quality re-
quirements, or if a more hands-on approach is preferred, use available techniques
to specify requirements. UML for example has a profile for modelling quality
characteristics (see OMG [147]) that can be used.
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Figure 3.13: Security analysis and application tasks in Systems Design
The next step in BOF4WSS (shown in Figure 3.13) returns the focus to
security and aims to finalize the security architecture and build the security de-
sign. The first task in fulfilling this aim is analysing the trade-offs between the
adoption of security objectives/patterns and the low-level functional and quality
requirements from prior tasks. Cost, where possible, should be generally factored
in by business teams as it pertains to adopting the security directives, remem-
bering that these will translate into security mechanisms and technologies later.
Systems designers and security professionals with knowledge of this area can aid
significantly in this task.
Sherwood et al. [186] yield a perfect example of the hard task faced by
businesses in attempting to balance these often conflicting objectives. Abstracting
to the three basic, conflicting aspects, namely security (for example, security
requirements), cost (that is, a general limitation) and usability (normally a quality
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requirement), the authors state, “To obtain higher security . . . will cost more. To
increase security often impacts upon usability and visa versa” [186] (p.27).
Once the analysis is complete, the viable security objectives/patterns are
then applied to the low-level process models to fashion the business process de-
signs. Figure 3.13 covers this task. In the Architectural phase, security objectives
have already been applied therefore if businesses have utilized this method, the
task now is to break down the secured medium-level processes and associate the
objectives with lower-level process components (from the low-level models above).
For example, as opposed to specifying a confidentiality objective of ‘High’ on all
outputs from one activity (or task or system), businesses should consider the
individual messages output and whether they all need the ‘High’ confidentiality
rating. The messages should be visible from low-level process models, therefore
the ideal situation would be to take the low-level models and modify them to
show the new, specific levels of security required for all process components.
For the application of viable security patterns, depending on the mod-
elling technique chosen, patterns can be easily woven into the low-level process
models. Companies will first need to gather the associations made between the
medium-level processes and security patterns from the Architectural phase. Then,
using the associations, teams can begin to link low-level processes (from which the
medium-level processes were defined) to the relevant security patterns. This is fol-
lowed by the actual application of patterns to models either conceptually (by way
of detailed annotations), or logically (within the formal models). Even though
some techniques may prove more efficient at this application task, the conceptual
solution that security patterns provide should enable a relatively manageable task
for the security professionals on the teams.
Due to its versatility and extensibility, UML again forms one of the better
techniques for the modelling task. In Figure 3.6 it was shown that, for simple
modelling, sequence or activity diagrams are useful. To facilitate detailed mod-
elling, one suggested option is the UML profile for security, quality and fault
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tolerance requirements. This profile is defined in OMG [147] and provides a
standard mechanism for expressing security.
Another noteworthy option still within the structured confines of UML can
be found in Rodr´ıguez et al. [172]. This research work supplies a UML profile
specifically for secured business process modelling using activity diagrams. Secu-
rity aspects accommodated include auditing, and security requirements such as in-
tegrity, attack detection, non-repudiation, access control and privacy. UMLsec [96]
and SecureUML [112] are two additional, more detailed security-related exten-
sions to UML that might also be of interest to businesses.
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Figure 3.14: WS standards agreement and assessment tasks
The penultimate task in the Design phase depicted by Figure 3.14 is iden-
tifying and agreeing on the standards that will be used to implement the services,
and especially the security and QoS requirements. In general, even though WS is
one of the leading interoperability technologies today, basic tasks such as agree-
ing on standards (within WS) is still crucial to a successful deployment. Fischer
and Werner [61] allude to this fact as they discuss the “What’s missing” in WS.
The main interoperability problems they identified stem from the existence of
too many standards (innoQ [86] shows over sixty), the tweaking of standards by
individual companies and the numerous versions of even the basic WS standards.
Fischer and Werner [61] accept that WS-Interoperability (WS-I) [219] profiles can
address some of these problems, however they note that this is only possible if
companies make their WS compatible with the WS-I profiles. Their work pro-
vides just one example of the importance of the agreement on the standards to
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be used by businesses.
In this task, systems analysts and designers knowledgeable in the in-
tricacies of WS should take the lead. As analyst help to provide the bridge
between the previous works (requirements, low-level processes and so on), de-
signers look at service and technology details. Due to the extensive number of
technologies available and the frequent updates made, instead of covering the
standards within the framework, BOF4WSS documentation directs companies
to key information sources which they can reference. Sources range from pub-
lished texts [157, 194, 4, 28] for introductory- and intermediate-level material,
to the standards Web sites such as W3C [225], OASIS [153], Liberty Alliance
Project [110] and WS-I [219], for up-to-date, definitive information. InnoQ [86]
is a good reference for a diagrammatic overview of standards placed within their
context, including transaction specifications, reliability specifications and so on.
To identify security standards, the work of Steel et al. [194] is particu-
larly relevant if companies have used their security pattern catalogue in previous
framework phases. The reason for this is that within their catalogue, also sup-
plied is a list of standards and technologies that can implement the respective
patterns.
Briefly touching the topic of standards and technologies for QoS require-
ments, this area is less developed. Companies however can find some information
in articles such as [230]. This covers a number of WS QoS aspects, mentions
standards which are used to implement them and discusses techniques to im-
prove service quality.
A final point companies should be mindful of during the identification and
selection of standards is the tool support available to actually use the standards
in a production environment. This consideration should help guide the choice of
technologies. If there is an absence of tools, regardless of the benefits of standards
proposed, these standards cannot be applied.
Having agreed on the standards and technologies to be employed, BOF4WSS
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(see Figure 3.14) advises companies to consider (i) the common vulnerabilities
and pitfalls in WS and the mechanisms chosen, and (ii) the best practices in using
them and implementing them as securely as possible. Both of these factors may
have been analysed in some respects before, but because of their significance and
the complexities regarding technologies themselves, it is reiterated here.
As done above with standards and technologies in the previous task, be-
cause of the large number of vulnerabilities and range of best practices, BOF4WSS
references more complete and detailed sources rather than listing them. For the
first factor that is, for common vulnerabilities and pitfalls in WS, two prime
sources are documents from organizations such as NIST ([189]) and WS-I ([218]).
These give information on common attacks, risks and typical security challenges.
The research community is another useful source for up-to-date information, for
example, [92]. Examples of vulnerabilities in Jensen et al. [92] range from those
linked to XML or networking generally, to more recent ones which target WS
cryptography techniques, BPEL processes and internal workflow engines.
For the second task in Figure 3.14, namely the consideration of best prac-
tices in using standards and dealing with the various security challenges, the
following articles provide designers and developers with some useful techniques.
Industry-based work by Singhal et al. [189] provides general guidance in ad-
dressing threats and on secure implementation tools and technologies. Jensen
et al. [92] outline a few of the general technology-related mechanisms to defend
against attacks in the WS arena. Authors in [194] give various best practices and
design strategies. WS-I [218] identifies typical countermeasures (technologies and
protocols) to mitigate common WS threats.
Finally, [187] lists techniques to protect against more threats to WS. In
light of the vulnerabilities and best practices discussed, BOF4WSS gives com-
panies the option of revisiting the preceding task to reassess the standards and
technologies chosen. This progression can be seen in Figure 3.14 and is high-
lighted because depending on vulnerabilities or best practices, teams may often
opt to use different, more robust standards or technologies with extensive guid-
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ance (practices) on their use.
This completes the Design phase and the expected outputs are low-level
process designs, service-level interaction definitions, security architecture design,
a semantics framework, the standards and technologies of choice to implement the
WS interactions and the low-level requirements (functional, security and quality).
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Figure 3.15: Workflow model of the Agreements (for QoS) phase
With the low-level process designs and service-level interactions defined,
the Agreements phase now concentrates on the agreements necessary at the
QoS level. During the task shown in Figure 3.15, the goal is to actually specify the
mutual understanding of the priorities, responsibilities and guarantees expected
by each business with respect to the other entity, regarding the actual WS. This
phase directly extends the preparatory work on quality requirements in the Design
phase and results in a set of formal and contractual agreements.
As done before, QoS requirements typically assessed include service avail-
ability needs (such as, a service uptime of 99.98%), performance requirements
(for example, average response time of 30 milliseconds) and so on. Besides qual-
ity requirements, process designs and service interactions are necessary for input
because they too need to be considered in defining appropriate QoS levels for
services and systems.
To specify the QoS requirements agreed, businesses’ executives, analysts
and lawyers (these are the people that would be directly involved) have a few al-
ternatives. The first and most common option is a contractual, natural language
agreement referred to as a Service-Level Agreement or SLA. SLAs date back to
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many years before WS and since their inception have proved very useful mech-
anisms to define levels of service in a measurable way (to allow for monitoring),
and also the penalties where agreed levels are not fulfilled. For WS, SLAs will
have the same usage and general mode of application. The only difference may
occur in how services are monitored, as more WS-specific tools and techniques are
likely to be employed which enable increased granularity and efficiency in mon-
itoring. For more details on SLAs and what can be included in a WS context,
BOF4WSS directs companies to reference [157, 131].
Another option is to make use of accepted policy standards such as WS-
Policy to specify a service’s quality requirements [65]. This method however is
ideally suited for dynamic interactions where quality requirements greatly in-
fluence the services, or service providers chosen for use. The last noteworthy
approach is the Web Services Level Agreement (WSLA) framework described by
Keller and Ludwig [102]. Broadly, this framework allows for the technical specifi-
cation and monitoring of SLAs for WS. It enables service users and providers (or
companies in BOF4WSS’ context) to define a variety of SLAs, specify the SLA
parameters (including availability and response time) and the method for their
measurement, and finally relate them to implementation systems. Implementa-
tions of the WSLA framework have been built and are available for use in some
IBM products [89, 87].
Once the specification of the QoS requirements of each company for ser-
vices is complete, the outputs of the phase to be made ready are QoS agreements,
low-level process designs, service-level interaction definitions, security architecture
design, a semantics framework, the standards and technologies of choice to im-
plement the WS interactions and the updated low-level requirements (functional,
security and quality).
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Figure 3.16: Workflow model of the Development and Testing phase
3.10 Development and Testing Phase
As with most methodologies, the penultimate stage in BOF4WSS is the Devel-
opment and Testing phase. Having discussed how services and systems would
interact in a cross-enterprise context, this phase (shown in Figure 3.16) is centered
on the actual development, implementation, deployment and testing of services
and systems in the companies. Because of this factor, it is mainly carried out
by companies individually. This involves all members of the project teams from
each company working on their own systems development, and this development
would be guided by previous companies’ agreements. Occasional, or even pro-
longed joint interactions are however greatly appreciated especially for services
testing, updates, troubleshooting and systems verification to the requirements
established in previous framework phases.
All the inputs to this phase are to be used by companies and their devel-
opment teams to steer the internal systems implementation. It is stressed that
even though Testing is presented last (after discussing Development), companies
may choose to do some testing as services and systems are developed.
Unlike some of the previous tasks covered by BOF4WSS, activities for
the development stage appear to be somewhat well-established in literature and
practice. This is consistent with this research’s argument regarding the significant
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focus on technology-based and -oriented solutions (which are dominant during
this phase). The benefit of this to the framework is that there are a variety of
tested development processes, techniques and tools that can be plugged in during
this framework phase.
Practically therefore, this phase is much less strictly prescribed, with Fig-
ure 3.16 mentioning only three very generic tasks (Planning, Development and
Implementation, and Testing) which are not structured in detail like prior tasks.
BOF4WSS’s aim at this point therefore becomes the identification of relevant,
mature and largely complete development processes, techniques and tools that
can be employed, and allowing companies the freedom to combine them to best
suit their respective situations. Two such processes which might be of great
interest in aiding in this internal process are described in [157, 75].
In the first process mentioned above, Papazoglou [157] presents a WS life-
cycle methodology that concentrates on critical internal aspects. These include
application integration, packaging legacy applications into reusable components,
migration from old to new WS-based processes, and the ‘best-fit’ ways of im-
plementation which appreciate company constraints, risks, costs and returns on
investment. This methodology is cyclic (as opposed to linear) and consists of nine
stages, namely Planning, Analysis, Design, Construction, Testing, Provisioning,
Deployment, Execution and Monitoring. This process is one of the most appro-
priate and comprehensive within the literature. It covers from initial analysis
of internal systems to the construction and final installation or deployment of
services.
A caveat to the lifecycle methodology however is its lack of emphasis on
security concerns—a prime target and goal within BOF4WSS. To compensate for
this shortcoming, another suggestion businesses might consider is the integration
of PWSSec [75]—a detailed development process for creating secure WS. This
would be integrated such that it could run in parallel.
The novelty behind PWSSec is (i) its appreciation of the complex task
faced by businesses as they attempt to make use of WS, (ii) the highly structured,
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methodical approach to constructing a security architecture for WS systems, and
(iii) the emphasis on traceability and reusability which translates into the es-
tablishment and use of a number of repositories and record stores. The three
phases in PWSSec are Web Services Security Requirements, Web Services Secu-
rity Architecture and Web Services Security Technologies. These work together
to enable the development of secure WS systems. In brief, another general point
of reference to supplement the two already mentioned can be found in [234]. This
text provides some useful guidelines that can be applied within the planning task,
related to planning and staffing a WS development project.
Probably the biggest benefit of using the processes listed above is that
almost all of the information gathered and produced earlier in the framework
can be reused to quickly complete their initial stages. Such information includes
functional, security and QoS requirements, risk assessment data and business
process models. To consider the Analysis phase in Papazoglou [157] for example,
in BOF4WSS’s Requirements Elicitation and Architectural phases, companies
have already worked on the current and envisioned (or “to-be” processes).
Regarding the Design phase (in [157]) and the specification of business
processes (looking towards WS-CDL and BPEL), BOF4WSS’s Architectural and
Systems Design phases have previously defined business processes to even these
lower levels. Even though the framework’s focus was towards WS-CDL (and
BPEL4Chor), these process definitions can be converted to the BPEL advocated
in [157]. For the more security-specific PWSSec [75], the medium- and low-level
security requirements and security patterns identified from BOF4WSS can be
reused in PWSSec’s Requirements and Architectural stages. That approach ([75])
also uses UML and the profile for security ([147]) for some of its modelling—this is
a method supported in BOF4WSS. These are just a few concise examples of how
the outputs from BOF4WSS’s previous stages can be reused in these processes.
In addition to the identified processes, as mentioned above, literature has
supplied a number of techniques and tools to help in this internal development
task. An area in particular which has received great focus is the automated
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creation of BPEL processes from theoretical modelling techniques (such as UML
and BPMN). To recap, BPEL allows for the specification of business process
behaviour based on Web services [152]. Amongst other things, it is an execution
language which can be run by software engines (such as [123, 150]) to orchestrate
message, control and data flows. If companies have modelled processes in UML
or BPMN therefore, techniques such as [190, 154, 20, 114] that offer some aid in
translating these models to executable processes (in BPEL) are ideal. Specifically,
[154] works with the translation of BPMN models to BPEL definitions, whereas
[190, 20, 114] aim at transforming their various UML variants and extensions to
their respective BPEL representations.
A critical activity in the Development phase is the implementation of the
security standards and technologies that have been agreed. Implementation in-
cludes the actual application of standards and security levels to the services and
systems, but also the correct configuration of the security mechanisms employed.
Even though output from the previous phases gives a clear outline of security and
where, and to some extent how, it is to be applied, noting the peculiarities of WS
(such as service policies, federated security), this task is still far from trivial.
Researching security configurations for WS, Tatsubori et al. [198] high-
lighted the difficulty in this task and the usability problem faced by developers
regarding choosing cryptographic algorithms, encryption keys and so on. To aid in
this activity therefore, they propose a tool to fill the gap between business-level
security requirements and the lower-level, concrete, technology-specific policies
implementing them. This GUI tool, called the WS-Policy Organizer (WSPO),
enables users to partially create a platform-specific WS-SecurityPolicy document
from a somewhat high-level process definition, through the use of a number of
preset security patterns. The integration of this tool within the framework should
be reasonably simple because the process scenarios necessary are available from
previous BOF4WSS stages. Secondly, the preset security patterns used can easily
be matched to the security objectives and patterns from the Architectural and
Design phases.
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Before moving on, it is worth explicitly stating the importance of including
tools for monitoring both the QoS levels defined in the SLAs and the security im-
plementations for their reliability and robustness. QoS monitoring constitutes the
main focus of the Monitoring stage in the WS lifecycle methodology from [157].
Companies that use that methodology therefore can receive more information on
it there. Regarding security monitoring, the key is to install software to maintain
adequate logs, audit trails and records that can be referred to as required. Steel
et al. [194] highlight that having these audit trails has even become a requirement
of some laws, for example, SOX. Intrusion detection or prevention software may
also be of interest to businesses.
The final task within this phase is the testing of the developed WS and
systems. This is done to verify that the developed applications meet the in-
tended requirements. It can and should be done at a cross-enterprise level (that
is, internally and externally across companies). Testing can occur from three
main perspectives, functional (do WS do what they should), quality (are the set
performance, usability, scalability, etc. requirements met) and security (is there
adequate protection in place for WS and systems).
Guidance on testing the functional and quality requirements is given in
the lifecycle methodology [157] mentioned before. A much more complex opera-
tion is testing the security of the applications developed. Whereas one can pass
input data into a system or process and (based on the output) quickly determine
whether a functional requirement has been met, security is not that absolute nor
can it be so easily measured [186]. This does not however mean that testing is
impossible nor should it be viewed as a task to be avoided by businesses.
Like approaches for the other testing perspectives, the initial activities
are the same, therefore, identify requirements (these may be in terms of actions,
goals, threats that should be handled), and carry out controlled tests to see if,
or how well requirements have been addressed. For testing the security of the
implemented WS, Barbir et al. [8] offer a number of strategies and guidelines.
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These are both generic (that is, just highlight the use of test suites, patterns and
so on) and targeted (focus on specifics such as testing application data).
Vulnerability analysis is another aspect that needs to be addressed in de-
tail during testing. For this task, companies can refer to [229] regarding vari-
ous guidelines on software vulnerability analysis for WS. These include checking
for cross-site scripting, services traversal, DoS attacks and access validation at-
tacks. Businesses can also reuse the original listing of threats that were factored
into security requirements determination, and conduct penetration tests against
services to evaluate how well the implemented security addresses these threats.
Particularly keen companies, or businesses that lack the expertise internally, may
consider employing security companies to conduct these tests. This decision how-
ever, should not be taken lightly as exposing systems to external parties demands
great amounts of trust.
Processes, guidelines and techniques are all essential in testing, but to
enhance or at least ease this task, tool support would be ideal. Unfortunately,
there has not been much notable work in this area as yet, perhaps this is likely
because WS testing is a discipline still in its infancy [8]. One tool that has
surfaced however is wsChess [134]. wsChess is described by its makers as a freely
available toolkit for WS assessments and defense [134]. Sidharth and Liu [187]
give a brief example of how wsChess can be used to probe for vulnerabilities and
formulate attacks against services.
To assess Web applications that may constitute part of the developed WS
systems, a number of tools are available. Curphey and Arawo [37] provide a
comprehensive, albeit slightly dated source of information on these tools and an
objective discussion of their aims. These industry-based researchers also outline
a taxonomy of tools which encompass prime testing areas such as source-code
analysers, Web application scanners, runtime analysis tools and configuration
management tools, to assist companies with their tool selection [37]. The tools
and techniques supplied here and those available from other sources should be
used wherever possible to enable thorough, adequate testing of the developed WS
3. The BOF4WSS Approach 79
systems. This testing activity completes the Development and Testing phase,
and phase outputs are the developed services and systems, low-level process de-
signs, service-level interaction definitions, security architecture design, a seman-
tics framework, the standards and technologies of choice to implement the WS
interactions and the low-level requirements (functional, security and QoS agree-
ments).
3.11 Maintenance Phase
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Figure 3.17: Workflow model of the Maintenance phase
Having developed this comprehensive, multilayered security solution, its
upkeep becomes the next crucial undertaking. BOF4WSS addresses this and
other typical monitoring and preservation tasks in the Maintenance phase
shown by Figure 3.17. It is important to recognize that this phase is a continuous
one (unlike the others which have clearly defined endpoints) and will last for the
lifetime of the implemented systems.
Specifically, this stage will involve continuous functional and quality-based
system enhancements, but additionally will stress the continued updating and
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enforcement of security measures, both in developed systems and the overarching
ISS. To facilitate the required maintenance activities, the framework strongly
suggests that businesses form cross-enterprise maintenance and monitoring teams.
Ideally, the majority of the persons chosen should be members of the teams that
participated in the BOF4WSS process. The advantage of this is the experience
they bring. One team already mentioned is the security team from the first
BOF4WSS agreements stage. These personnel are responsible for monitoring
the internal and external environments and considering new threats, laws and
security requirements, and how these will be included in system updates.
When considering the updating activities of the Maintenance phase, com-
panies must be extremely careful in how they make changes and updates to cross-
enterprise agreements, directives and systems. This is even when these updates
are agreed by both companies involved. Changes should not be made in isolation
without first analysing what effects they might have on other system aspects and
whether respective updates to these other aspects would be necessary. It is for
this reason that a smaller scale BOF4WSS process is suggested in this phase (see
Figure 3.17). Reiteration of this process for new needs in the form of updates and
changes allows modifications to be made in a structured and controlled context.
Repetition of previous phases is not uncommon during software maintenance as
noted by Sommerville [193].
Because the BOF4WSS process has been discussed in detail previously, it is
not covered here or in Figure 3.17. Instead, Figure 3.17 is used to display some of
the key new inputs (in addition to the ones outlined in previous phases) which are
very likely to surface. Examples are, changes in the business policies (reflecting
possibly new goals and aims), new regulations (therefore new, mandatory security
actions for interactions and systems), new threats and vulnerabilities (these need
to be assessed and addressed), and new techniques and tools (these may facilitate
easier development or even system testing).
The other tasks depicted by Figure 3.17 focus on monitoring in general, but
specifically as it relates to (i) QoS levels and (ii) the monitoring and enforcement
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of the ISS and implemented security measures. In the first task, the goal is to take
the actual service levels (recorded by management, auditing or tracking software
added in the Development phase) and compare them with the SLAs and QoS
agreements made earlier, to determine if quality requirements are being met by
parties. Particularly of interest to companies will be aspects that affect general
WS performance levels such as service response times, and system downtime and
latency. SLAs are also the point of reference that dictates the penalties and
options for recourse if the agreed levels are not fulfilled.
The second task deals with the monitoring and enforcement of the ISS
and the security measures implemented. Security, in every regard, is a constant
process. In their description of information security, Calder and Watkins [19]
liken it to a journey, not a destination. Within this journey, monitoring of the
implemented security mechanisms and rules is critical. The reason for this is
that new threats may surface, new attacks might be launched and consequently,
there needs to be constant monitoring to detect (and initiate a reaction to) these
advances. Again, the output (audit trails, logs) from monitoring and detection
software is used in this activity.
Beyond tracking new threats and attacks, it is imperative that companies
use this information to identify areas where directives and measures may need
to be enforced, both internal and external to a company. Therefore, in addition
to monitoring and following up on internal security concerns, business partners
should be periodically assessed to ensure that they are maintaining the agreed
levels of security. These levels can be found in the ISS and systems design doc-
umentation, amongst other documents. Some of the common options to assess
the security posture of partners has been covered before (in the first agreements
phase) and includes audits (done by a third party possibly) and on-site visits.
A final noteworthy aspect shown in Figure 3.17 is that as smaller scale
BOF4WSS processes are conducted to accommodate for updates, the final up-
dates are then re-input into the respective monitoring tasks. This is done to keep
the information used for monitoring as up-to-date and relevant as possible. This
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last task concludes the BOF4WSS process. Next, a brief summary and justifi-
cation of BOF4WSS is presented. That section also identifies the main target
group of businesses for which the framework is intended.
3.12 BOF4WSS’ Scope
Reflecting on BOF4WSS in its entirety, especially with regard to its use by com-
panies, this is not a process to be taken lightly. In the design of this framework,
not only were security practices within WS and business processes in general
assessed, but also literature on joint business ventures such as the extended en-
terprise (for example, in work by Davis and Spekman [40]) and how security and
trust—beyond the technical layer—is reached and maintained across enterprises
there. With these factors in mind, the framework is thus aimed particularly
towards businesses that emphasize trust and medium-to-high levels of security
and expect long-term interactions as opposed to the short-term, highly dynamic,
e-marketplace-type interactions also possible with WS. Ideally, a set of business
partners in the early planning stages for a WS project will adopt BOF4WSS to
create an agreed, communications security infrastructure. Collaboration, which
encompasses business and technical layers is the real focus of this approach.
Another prime application case for the framework is in extended enterprises
that emphasize security, which utilize or are considering adopting WS to support
a business scenario. The suitability of the framework to this context should be
no surprise as the security approaches and research problems in the extended
enterprise domain were considered in the development of the framework.
Due to the long-term nature envisioned, it is not expected that companies
will frequently enter or leave the business scenario, therefore scalability is not
a critical issue. Should companies be added however, it is crucial that they go
through some of BOF4WSS’s phases. It will be up to existing businesses whether
the new partners adopt the active security charters and infrastructure, or if they
all recomplete key security-related framework phases.
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In general, the framework tasks to be executed when new partners join will
be very context dependent. For example, depending on the new company and its
purpose, additional services may need to be created by all companies, or only a
small subset of companies. The extent of the services necessary, or the companies
that are required to make modifications to their systems, will then determine the
level of systems development that is required using BOF4WSS. There may even
be cases where new partners already have their systems exposed as services and
therefore technical integration is not a problem (therefore no need for in-depth
emphasis on later framework phases). In situations like these, existing companies
may choose to focus more on initial phases of BOF4WSS, such as identifying risks
and negotiating on security actions. Then, they would look towards ensuring that
all companies share the same goals with regards to cross-enterprise security. The
ISS would be very relevant in this regard.
E-businesses adopting this framework will have to be committed to col-
laborating and devoting resources—financial and nonfinancial (including time,
skills and experience)—to this business venture. If these resources are not avail-
able internally, employing consultancy firms, particularly in terms of process re-
engineering and security, should be an option. Generally therefore, the framework
will require changes in how the businesses worked before WS adoption, but po-
tential benefits to WS use might merit this.
3.13 Summary
This chapter presented a solution approach targeting the core problems identi-
fied in Chapter 2. To reiterate, these problems centre around an overly reliant
emphasis on technology for security and security approaches that are often too
isolated and individualistic. The BOF4WSS approach attempts to tackle these
issues by concentrating on all components of the security environment and stress-
ing a much more collaborative approach to businesses’ security. These steps also
have the secondary design goal of fostering trust across the interacting entities.
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Within the chapter, each of the nine phases of BOF4WSS was discussed
in detail. This discourse included considering the inputs and outputs of phases,
key activities to be undertaken and critical stakeholders that should be involved
in each phase. In addition to providing details of all the individual parts of the
framework, this chapter presented information on how the aspects would enhance
collaborative e-business security. The last section rounded up the presentation by
highlighting likely areas and scenarios where the framework might be best suited,
stressing the point that BOF4WSS might not be ideal for all scenarios.
Chapter 4 builds on the detailed framework presentation and aims to out-
line a thorough example of how the framework would work in practice. This
consists of applying BOF4WSS to a designed scenario. This seeks to add a more
realistic perspective to the framework’s discussion and provides a clear example
of its use and application.
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Chapter 4
Applying BOF4WSS to a
Scenario
Example is always more efficacious than precept. — Samuel Johnson
4.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3, BOF4WSS was presented as an approach for enhancing the security
of companies that conduct business online using Web services (WS) technology.
This chapter builds on that presentation and aims to provide a comprehensive
example of how BOF4WSS would work in practice. Specifically, this consists of
applying it to a developed scenario. Given that the scenario would be largely
fictitious (considering research limitations), a number of published articles such
as [127, 158, 157, 30, 194, 203, 137] (a majority of these containing cases them-
selves) were referenced for guidance and real-world requirements. To further
strengthen scenario practicality, particularly in terms of security, an IT secu-
rity professional with experience in cross-enterprise interactions was informally
interviewed and his input used to inform case development.
The purpose of this chapter therefore is to supplement Chapter 3’s largely
abstract discussion and supply realistic examples of BOF4WSS’ use. This is
expected to add to the practicality of the framework’s proposals, to highlight
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some of its usages/benefits and also to identify any possible problem areas (as
this would feed into future chapters). Taking steps to achieve this goal, the next
section outlines the scenario to be used. This is followed by a phase-by-phase
application of BOF4WSS to that scenario. Finally, the last section discusses the
framework application in terms of the uses in and advantages to the scenario and
in general.
4.2 Scenario Background
This section provides a very brief overview of the scenario BEFORE the frame-
work has been applied.
Focus: Raw materials procurement process—that is, all activities which are
involved in a company acquiring items (raw materials for production) from its
suppliers. These activities generally include (i) searching for items required, (ii)
purchasing the right quality/quantity items and at the right time, (iii) making
the final payment for items, and lastly (iv) receiving the delivery of those items.
Participants: Supplier is a medium-size seller of high-performance electrical
parts (raw materials). Buyer is a high-tech equipment manufacturer which uses
a variety of high-spec electronic parts to manufacture a set of final products.
Background: In the past, Buyer has used various suppliers for raw materi-
als under many short-term contracts. The company’s procurement process in
that regard is primarily conducted using Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) for
automated data exchange, and manually using phone, fax and email with spread-
sheets.
To gain a better competitive advantage and minimize the administrative
overhead, Buyer is deciding to work closely and more exclusively with its prime
supplier, Supplier. This is expected to be a strategic alliance and entered into
for the foreseeable future (5-10 years). To enable their processes to be more
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integrated and streamlined, the companies are choosing to use the Internet and
WS technology suite for business-to-business communications.
The security of this Web-based scenario and its cross-enterprise commu-
nications is also of great importance to both parties. This is attributed to the
large volume of expected transactions, the proprietary nature of some of the
data transferred, the costs of the items (hi-tech) involved, and the large sums of
money constantly exchanged. Furthermore, in the past there have been targeted
denial-of-services and virus-based attacks on Buyer’s Web sites from unidentified
external sources.
As a result of these factors, the companies are choosing to adopt BOF4WSS
to aid in the creation of a secure WS-based business scenario. The companies
are expecting that the framework would be able to supply a comprehensive yet
flexible cross-enterprise methodology, that also encompasses WS-specific guidance
to support secure scenario implementation. Flexibility is particularly important
as businesses wanted to be able to choose and plug in their own techniques, tools,
software packages, standards and such.
In addition to creating fully functional interactions, Buyer and Supplier
are especially keen on attaining: (i) adequate and agreed security across part-
ners, (ii) a security governance structure beyond rigid contracts and technology
products and systems, (iii) traceability in original security needs through to final
technical and policy implementations, and (iv) generally, a inter-organizational
business scenario that all partners can trust.
Having presented the general scenario, the following sections show how
BOF4WSS is applied to it. The aim is not to be exhaustive in the discussion,
but rather to give practical details of the flow of processes and tasks which are
involved. As such, each section is partitioned into Task and Case segments. A
Task represents guidance by BOF4WSS (typically in the form of some activity
companies should/could do), whereas a Case is the application of that guidance
to this particular scenario. Throughout the presentation, emphasis is placed on
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security components rather than detailed coverage of functional or QoS aspects.
This is in line with the framework’s core security focus and allows those issues to
be adequately explored.
In the discussion of the first phase, the process is considered from one
company’s perspective, that is, Buyer. This was done to maintain clarity, and is
similar to how the framework advocates a largely individually completed Require-
ments Elicitation phase. Supplier would however go through the same general
process internally. Phase outputs are shown for Supplier as necessary.
4.3 Phase-by-Phase Application
4.3.1 Phase 1: Requirements Elicitation
Task 1: Forming teams and then gathering knowledge about processes related
to the envisaged scenario, identifying influential stakeholders, process or business
constraints, and so on.
Case: As suggested in the framework, Supplier and Buyer first begin by creating
teams responsible for the cross-enterprise project. These consist of project man-
agers, process domain experts, business and systems analysts, system developers,
end users, legal counsel, and IT security specialists/professionals. After forming
teams, they set about speaking to their business managers and personnel involved
in related procurement and order processing services (domain experts, users and
so on). Some of these persons will already be on the teams formed. Having iden-
tified these sets of persons, the teams collect documentation on how the existing
processes function. This includes models, produced reports, functionality charts
and so on.
Task 2: Use the data collected to define and analyse existing processes to thor-
oughly understand the current flows. This activity will enable the identification
of the core processes to carry forward.
Case: Following the guidance in the framework, Buyer’s domain experts and an-
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alysts define the current procurement process (largely done manually) at a high
level. That process is shown below.
Step 1. Buyer needs materials. Buyer’s employee queries a number of suppliers
to determine which of them could fulfil the company’s need. Once found, Buyer
selects materials, quantity and sets delivery schedule. The Internal department
then approves order. The order is placed (using EDI, an online system, email
or fax) with selected supplier.
Step 2. The chosen supplier receives order, and Buyer is billed (using EDI, an
online system, email or fax)
Step 3. Buyer receives goods shipment and checks that the specific goods
ordered have been received. Accounting Department checks goods received
against the original order placed and then issues payment to the supplier.
Figure 4.1 gives more detail of this process flow, the inputs, outputs, and actions
involved using a UML diagram defined by Buyer. UML is one of the prime
techniques suggested within BOF4WSS.
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Figure 4.1: Current process displayed in a UML sequence diagram
Task 3: Model the envisioned business processes. This may involve process
redefinition/redesign depending on how different the new processes are to be.
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Case: Based on the information and current needs, Buyer’s domain experts and
analysts define the envisioned procurement process:
Step 1. Buyer needs materials. Buyer’s system recognizes this need (because
minimum stock levels have been reached) and identifies materials, quantities,
and sets delivery schedule. The order is sent to the Internal department for
approval. The Internal department approves order (manual). Buyer’s system
places the order with Supplier’s system over the Internet using WS.
Step 2: Supplier system receives the order from Buyer, and Buyer is billed
using Web services
Step 3. Buyer receives goods and checks that the specific goods ordered have
been received. Accounting Department checks goods received against the orig-
inal order placed, and then directs the system to issue payment to Supplier.
Figure 4.2 is created by Buyer to provide more detail into the new process.
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Figure 4.2: Envisioned process displayed in a UML sequence diagram
Task 4a: Analyse the process flows at a relatively high level to identify what
participants should be able to do, and what inputs, outputs and actions are
required for a process to be successfully completed. If UML sequence diagrams
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are being used, it should be relatively straightforward to identify these. This
produces the functional requirements.
Case: With consideration of the sequence diagram in Figure 4.2, business ana-
lysts at Buyer note that there should be a Procurement system capable of the
following functionalities (inputs and outputs are clearly shown in the figure and
are therefore not specifically identified again here).
i Continuously monitoring the stock levels for all production materials. The
Procurement system will therefore need to interface with the existing legacy
stock system—this is a system which has up-to-date information on all the
materials needed in production.
ii Automatically generating an electronic purchase order depending on materi-
als needed, including quantity and schedule of dates.
iii Passing the order for manual approval to personnel in the Internal Depart-
ment (possibly using email).
iv Subsequently enabling the electronic purchase order to be sent (using WS
messages) over the Internet to an order processing service system at Supplier’s
enterprise.
v Logging bills sent by Supplier using WS.
vi Interfacing with personnel in the Accounting Department and allowing for
their manual approval of bill payments.
vii Issuing payment orders to Supplier for goods supplied.
viii Interacting with the existing legacy stock system to enable new stocks to be
recorded and stock levels updated.
In terms of BOF4WSS’ suggestion that companies should identify quality
requirements, Buyer and Supplier personnel opt to define these aspects at a
later date in the Systems Design phase and last Agreements phase.
Task 4b: Identify the general security actions and requirements for the processes
and the scenario.
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The first step is to analyse access restrictions on processes, actors etc., and
assess the threats, vulnerabilities and risks that can affect processes. Next would
be a scenario risk assessment as this enables a comprehensive security-driven
analysis of the overall business scenario to be undertaken. The general process is
to identify risks, estimate and evaluate them, decide on possible treatments, and
finally, elicit and generalize to the high-level security actions and requirements.
Case: To identify security necessary for the scenario, the IT security special-
ists on the project team at Buyer choose to apply the NIST Risk Management
approach [195]. This is the preferred approach in their company. Instead of pre-
senting the complete process, a few of the key aspects of the approach are shown
below. First, in Table 4.1 is part of the list of assets, vulnerabilities and threats
within the scenario that are identified by the security specialists.
Item Asset Vulnerability Threat
source
Threat action
6 WS mes-
sages
Sending information over
the Internet in inappropri-
ately secured formats
Malicious
party
Eavesdropping and tam-
pering with data in a WS’
message (in transit)
7 Procure-
ment
system
No facilities for the
logging of transactions
between Buyer and
Supplier
Third
party,
Malicious
party,
Insider
Repudiation of services;
unauthorized changes
made to orders or system
8 Sensitive
WS mes-
sages, for
example,
payment
orders
No allowance for sensitive
messages to have added
security
Malicious
party with
sophis-
ticated
tools
Unauthorized access
gained to sensitive data.
For example in pay-
ment orders, they are
bank codes and account
numbers
Table 4.1: Assets, vulnerabilities and threats faced by Buyer
From here, the next step is the identification and estimation of related
security risks in Table 4.2. Table 4.3 supports this by outlining descriptions of
risk levels from the NIST Guide.
The next aim in the Guide is to assess the treatment options for risks in
terms of related organizational policies, laws and regulations, and effectiveness of
recommended options/controls. For the first two risks in Table 4.2, the following
information is key in making the treatment decision.
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Risk no. Related item Likelihood Impact Risk Level
RSK-12 Item 6 Medium High Medium
RSK-13 Item 7 Medium Medium Medium
RSK-14 Item 8 Medium High Medium
RSK-15 Item 9 Low Medium Low
Table 4.2: Buyer’s risks faced and their estimated values
Risk Level Risk Description and Necessary Actions
High If an observation or finding is evaluated as a high risk, there is a strong
need for corrective measures. An existing system may continue to oper-
ate, but a corrective action plan must be put in place as soon as possible.
Medium If an observation is rated as medium risk, corrective actions are needed
and a plan must be developed to incorporate these actions within a
reasonable period of time.
Low If an observation is described as low risk, the system’s approving au-
thority must determine whether corrective actions are still required or
decide to accept the risk.
Table 4.3: Risk scale and necessary actions ([195])
For Risks RSK-12 and RSK-13, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (a United
States federal law) is a critical consideration. This act requires that companies are
able to confirm that only authorized persons have access to private information
and sensitive systems. Additionally, audit trails are necessary to ensure this
is done and enable other types of checking and verification. Regarding RSK-12
specifically, Buyer also has a security policy that strongly advocates the protection
of integrity and confidentiality of all non-public communications.
With the aspects above in mind and a risk level of Medium, security spe-
cialists at Buyer decide to mitigate the two risks and define respective security
requirements to achieve mitigation.
Applying the general process above to find all risks, threats and so on,
Buyer derives the following high-level security requirements (recall that a security
requirement represents the application of a mitigation action to treat a risk). Only
some are shown noting space considerations.
1. The Web services messages to be used between companies to facilitate busi-
ness transactions cannot be adequately secured by normal transport-level
security (that is, Secure Sockets Layer or Transport Layer Security). These
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mechanisms provide only point-to-point security and not the end-to-end se-
curity needed by Web services (readers can view Boncella [17] for details).
As a result, measures should be taken to support security at the Web ser-
vices message level to ensure data integrity and confidentiality. This relates
to risk RSK-12 above.
2. A part of reliable business process execution both within the company and
externally (thus, with trading partners) involves comprehensive logging and
subsequent enforcement. This especially relates to the maintenance of an
audit trail for transaction monitoring, which would also facilitate tracing
and accountability checks when required. This relates to risk RSK-13.
3. The interactions within and external to Buyer (that is, with business part-
ners such as Supplier) involve the transference of a wide variety of infor-
mation. This information has varying levels of sensitivity. Appreciating
this fact, measures should be taken to secure this information (in terms of
confidentiality and privacy) to mirror these sensitivity levels. Classification
levels of High, Medium and Low are proposed to do this, with different
degrees of security on each level. To enable this, all information should first
be classified. This relates to risk RSK-14 above.
4. No matter how secure and sophisticated the application infrastructure is,
a denial-of-services attack can cripple companies or business partners by
making their applications/services oﬄine and unavailable. Thus, companies
and business partners should adopt appropriate measures that can help
defend and respond against a security breach and ensure further service
continuity without disrupting legitimate user/system requests. (Adapted
from Steel et al. [194])
The security requirements to be assumed as output from Supplier’s Require-
ments Elicitation process are next.
Contrary to the bullet-point requirements listing Buyer produces, security
professionals at Supplier employ two other formats/techniques to express their
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requirements. The first of these formats is a predefined, standard security re-
quirements checklist commonly used by the company when dealing with external
parties. An excerpt of the checklist is displayed in Table 4.4.
Item Description Yes/No
Requirement 1. There should be an infrastructure plan that ensures the
capability of having systems, applications and services available in the event
of a security breach or accidental (human or natural) incident. If such an
event occurs, Supplier, and previously defined business partners should have
mechanisms in place to recover from the event. Such mechanisms may even
stop the event from occurring in the first place. (Adapted from [194])
Requirement 2. Organizations participating in a B2B transactions should
have security directives in place that address the topic of viruses, malware and
all other malicious types of applications. Typically this should be handled by a
well-known antivirus software, which is updated regularly, installed on the local
networks, and used to scan all networks periodically. ([203] aided definition)
Requirement 3. Authentication is critical and should be used.
Table 4.4: Supplier’s security requirements checklist
To complement the standard requirements checklist, professionals from
Supplier apply the CORAS [47] risk assessment technique to identify other nec-
essary security requirements and risk treatments. As security team members
from Supplier are of the opinion that diagrams would be more useful for compa-
nies’ discussions in the Negotiations phase, they supply the diagrammatic output
from the CORAS technique. An example of the requirements diagrams which
Supplier would bring into the Negotiations phase of BOF4WSS are shown in
Figures 4.3 and 4.4. These figures display Supplier’s requirements #4 and #5
respectively; specifically, the ‘Treatment’ components of the diagram depict the
actual requirements.
To summarize therefore, for their requirements Supplier is taking the
checklist and the set of diagrammatic models into the Negotiations phase.
In addition to the references mentioned above, [13, 32] also aid as a general
resource in defining the security actions and requirements.
Case Output: Each company’s functional requirements and security actions
– the requirements above are examples of what is output and what they carry
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Figure 4.3: Requirement #4: Supplier’s risk treatment for servers
Figure 4.4: Requirement #5: Supplier’s risk treatment for sensitive communi-
cations
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forward to subsequent phases. Also, the supporting documentation, for example
process models.
4.3.2 Phase 2: Negotiations
Task 1: Discuss and negotiate on functional and quality requirements for sys-
tems. This starts with the requirements and process models brought by each
company.
Case: This task is not shown because of the space that would be required, and
especially considering that the focus is on security in this scenario. An assumption
is made however that the general (UML) process flow and resulting functional
requirements which are outlined by Buyer have been agreed for adoption by
companies.
Task 2: Discuss and negotiate (or compare and reconcile) security actions and
requirements for scenario interactions.
Case: Teams from Buyer and Supplier consisting of business and systems ana-
lysts and security professionals, meet to negotiate on their documented security
actions and chart an agreed path forward.
The first task is the exchange of security documents/reports to allow each
company to gain an understanding of the high-level security requirements of the
other company. As requirements documents and formats across companies are
so different however, this entails many queries to the other company’s personnel
as they attempt to understand: (i) what exactly the other company means by
particular requirements, (ii) explanations of the proprietary checklists, require-
ments listings, and the graphical formats used to express requirements (these are
unknown to business partners), and (iii) the motivation behind the need, that is,
why a company has a particular security action/requirement.
Specific questions asked in line with these factors therefore include the
following. Is there an underlying reason behind the security requirement? Is
there a risk the company is trying to protect against in checklist items? If so,
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why is it considered important to mitigate this risk as opposed to some other
option? This process is conducted for each requirement.
With some understanding of the other company’s actions and require-
ments, the second task was for both companies to look at comparing their indi-
vidual actions/requirements. This process is conducted by security professionals
and analysts from each company. The aim being to determine if Supplier’s and
Buyer’s security actions for the scenario were compatible, and therefore could be
carried forward to be applied to the pending business scenario. To ease compar-
ison, the companies first choose to categorize each of their requirements by topic
(for example, requirements regarding communications security were grouped).
Table 4.5 displays the resulting groupings for nine requirements.
Category Buyer Sec. Req. Supplier Sec. Req.
Communications security #1, 3 #5
Auditing/Logging #2 –
Availability of services/data #4 #1
Systems security – #4
Entity verification – #3
Malicious software security – #2
Table 4.5: Grouping of companies’ security requirements
Next, each company’s personnel use the other company’s requirements doc-
ument/reports to determine if that company has similar security requirements to
their own. This is done on a requirement-by-requirement basis. If that company
does not, then discussions take place questioning that fact. Typical questions
include the following. Why has this type of requirement not been considered?
Does the company not see the potential risk associated here? Are there other rea-
sons/factors supporting why the underlying risk was chosen not to be handled?
Taking one requirement as an example of the narrative above, the following
shows the supporting information given by Buyer for its security requirement #1
(listed previously). Supplier queries this requirement because it had no similar
requirement. The supporting information by Buyer includes the following.
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– The reality that there are unique risks associated with the use of WS-specific
technology and therefore these require additional security considerations.
– The fact that the possible impact of threats on interactions would be very
costly. Also, there is a medium risk likelihood as Buyer has been the victim
of targeted attacks in the past.
– The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (a United States federal law) requires that
companies should be able to confirm that only authorized users have access
to sensitive information and systems.
– Buyer’s security policy (labelled SPX2) strongly advocates the protection of
the integrity and confidentiality of all potentially sensitive communications.
The final task is to identify a way forward and determine what require-
ments to keep and apply to the business scenario. Security actions (and their
supporting information) from Buyer and Supplier are therefore discussed and
compared at this point. In deciding security actions/requirements to keep, nu-
merous factors play a part. Prime factors that aid how analysts and security
professionals at companies decide on and reconcile security actions are: the ac-
tual factors that support requirements, for example, laws and regulations (legal
compliance), limited IT security budgets, and calculated likelihoods and impacts
of underlying threats and so on.
Expanding on the requirement example from above, the following snippet
shows how these factors are used by companies’ personnel to negotiate on and
reconcile conflicting security actions of Buyer and Supplier:
– Buyer security requirement #1: The Web services messages which are used
between companies to facilitate business transactions cannot be adequately
secured by normal transport-level security. As a result, measures are to be
taken to support security at the Web services message level, to ensure data
integrity and confidentiality. Factors supporting Buyer’s requirement were
given before therefore are not restated.
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– Supplier did actually consider the underlying risk associated with message-
level security during its Requirements Elicitation phase. Its personnel however
choose to accept (and not mitigate, and thus have a security requirement
for) this risk. This is primarily because of limited security funding and the
unlikelihood that this risk would materialize as message-level attacks require
above-average skill.
– Solution: After discussions on the main factors supporting requirements,
the companies agree to adopt the security requirement. The decisive factors
were: (i) the mandatory need to satisfy a law, that is, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
(previously Supplier did not consider that this law applied to interactions),
and (ii) the increased threat likelihood and possible impact, both in terms of
loss in production time and costs if measures were not put in place to protect
communications at this WS level. Combined, these factors make stronger
arguments for risk mitigation than risk acceptance. This therefore leads to the
reconciliation choice above. To address Supplier’s limited budget constraint,
options of shifting resources from other requirements or using free open source
tools is put forward.
This provides one example of a reconciliation where one company’s security ac-
tion (in this case, a security requirement) was chosen. Other situations could
result in: (i) combining similar requirements, for example, Buyer requirement #4
and Supplier requirement #1 are quite similar therefore either could easily be
adopted or rephrased to the satisfaction of both companies, or (ii) dropping a
company’s security requirement if the reasons supporting it were not adequate,
deemed surplus to security actions, or the other company had a stronger case for
their treatment of the requirement’s underlying risks.
Case Output: High-to-medium level scenario functional requirements and se-
curity actions and requirements. The agreed security actions and requirements
identified above can be used as an example of what is output and to be carried
forward to subsequent phases.
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4.3.3 Phase 3: Agreements
Task 1: Legal contract drafting and signing by Buyer and Supplier.
Case: To formally specify the agreements made thus far, companies opt to define
a legal contract at this point. The contract covers requirements and also include a
non-disclosure agreement. The business analysts and legal teams from entities are
useful here. Analysts work with lawyers to ensure that business agreements are
adequately converted to legal documents. In Table 4.6 an excerpt of the contract
is displayed. (Examples in [199] aided in the contract structure and definition.)
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Joint Development and License Agreement
Buyer (“Buyer”) and Supplier (“Supplier”) enter into this Joint Development and License
Agreement (the “Agreement”) as of 29 March 2010 (“Effective Date”).
RECITALS
WHEREAS, Supplier is a seller of high-performance electrical parts and Buyer is a high-
tech equipments manufacturer. To enable their business processes to be more integrated,
an IT system (the “System”) spanning both enterprises is to be jointly developed.
NOW, THEREFORE, Buyer and Supplier agree as follows:
1. Scope of Services
Companies will perform the services and fulfil the agreed requirements described in Annex
A (the “Work”), in order to develop the System according to time and specifications set
forth therein. This Agreement is expected to mainly form a basis for interactions that will
be built upon in a more detailed contract at a later date.
2. Terms and Termination
Unless terminated as provided herein, this Agreement will extend to and terminate upon
completion of the Work as defined. Parties may terminate the Agreement without cause
upon 60 days written notice. Additionally, either entity may terminate the Agreement for
breach in terms provided that 20 days notice is given.
3. Non-disclosure
A. All information (especially about business processes, security risks and security needs)
relating to Buyer and Supplier known to be confidential, proprietary, or which is labelled
as such, will be held in confidence and not disclosed to others without the express written
consent of the owning party.
B. All information relating to Buyer and Supplier known to be confidential, proprietary, or
which is labelled as such, will only be used for the purposes of entering a foreseen business
relationship with the other entity.
4. Cost Terms ...
5. System Ownership ...
Buyer Supplier
Print name: Print name:
Title: Title:
Company seal: Company seal:
Annex A
Specifications Document 1: General
Requirements Overview
– The developed System should enable streamlined interactions over the Internet between
Buyer and Supplier. These interactions would support the Buyer’s procurement of high-
performance electrical parts from Supplier.
– The necessary security features and capabilities should be in place to ensure accurate and
trustworthy transactions, and fulfil regulatory, contractual and standards requirements.
...
Table 4.6: Joint Development and License Agreement
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Task 2a: Restate mutual business scenario goals to provide vision for Interaction
Security Strategy (ISS) definition.
Case: Companies state: Supplier is a seller of high-performance electrical parts
and Buyer is a high-tech equipments manufacturer. The proposed agreement
and business scenario would enable communications to be significantly stream-
lined across businesses. This alliance would lead to operational and production
efficiencies and an increased competitive advantage for involved entities.
Task 2b: Define the cross-enterprise directives (strategies, policies and such) that
form the core of the ISS. For this task, companies are to start with the agreed
security actions/requirements from previous framework phases and any business
rules or constraints facing companies (for example, costs or skills limitations).
Entities should also consult the legal frameworks (company lawyers or specialists)
and security standard best practices (for example, ISO 27000, NIST guides) for
further guidance.
Case: To enable trustworthy interactions, Buyer and Supplier are applying a
number of their agreed security requirements to produce the following security
directives. Laws, regulatory requirements and security best practices also guide
these directives. They are the following.
1. All information which is used and processed as a part of interactions be-
tween Buyer and Supplier is to be classified as either High, Medium or
Low priority. These priority levels are to indicate the degree of importance
of the information and therefore the grade of protection needed. Once all
information has been classified, appropriate security controls appreciating
these levels are to be implemented and maintained by all parties.
The companies’ decision to include this requirement is based on agreed secu-
rity requirements and legal responsibilities focused around financial-related
data protection, particularly the SOX Act.
2. Comprehensive logging is a crucial part of reliable service communications.
This is especially related to the maintenance of an audit trail for transaction
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monitoring, which would also facilitate/enable tracing and accountability
checks as necessary.
In addition to requirements and auditing SOX Act requirements, this di-
rective is strongly motivated by security best practices listed in [194], titled
“Logging and Recording of Audit Trails”.
3. The Web services messages to be used between companies to facilitate busi-
ness transactions cannot be adequately secured by normal transport-level
security. As a result, measures should be taken to support security at the
Web services message level to ensure data integrity and confidentiality.
4. An initial mandatory step to all communications should be the identification
of both parties.
5. A security team should be assembled to handle ongoing evaluation and
updates to ISS directives, create programmes to instill the requisite level
of training and awareness in personnel, and also handle the enforcement
of directives. The team is to consist of members from both companies
and will include business analysts, security professionals, and Web services
architects and developers.
Case Output: Agreed functional requirements, envisioned processes (which have
been modelled) and the cross-enterprise security directives exemplified above.
4.3.4 Phase 4: Analysis/Architectural
Task 1a: Identifying and agreeing on a process modelling technique.
Case: Business analysts at Buyer typically use UML to model business processes,
whereas at Supplier, analysts prefer Data Flow Diagrams (DFDs) and a pro-
prietary modelling format. At first, both companies are keen to use their own
techniques but after deliberations and concerns about standardization they agree
to use UML. This was primarily because, as the framework notes, UML is a stan-
dard technique and there are a number of simple and comprehensive extensions
to account for security and QoS.
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Task 1b: Business process definition and modelling.
Case: After discussing the processes, Figure 4.5 is jointly defined by analysts
from Buyer and Supplier to model their cross-enterprise processes.
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Figure 4.5: Full envisioned process flow
This figure shows key inputs, outputs, processes and requests as a part of
the companies’ interactions.
Task 2a: Identifying and agreeing on where to apply security directives to secure
the process models.
Case: Smaller teams from Buyer and Supplier consisting of analysts and secu-
rity professionals first map out the directives and consider how they relate to the
models. From this exercise, they choose to identify three general processes and
process aspects. These are shown in the left column of Table 4.7. The respec-
tive security directives agreed by companies’ personnel is presented in the right
column of the table.
Task 2b: Initial application of security directives to process models either using
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Processes and their aspects ISS Security directives
All process information, data, and messages trans-
ferred between and within companies. For example,
purchase orders, material bills, orders status queries,
payment orders
Classification of information (Di-
rective #1); Web services mes-
sage level security (Directive #3)
Sending and receipt of order-related messages and
requests by systems and companies’ personnel. For
example, newly placed purchase orders, and bills sent
to Buyer via WS. This also relates to internal com-
pany systems and their processing.
Identification and authentication
of communicating parties (Direc-
tive #4); Maintenance of system-
wide audit trails (Directive #2)
System-based or manual processing of order-related
data and information. This includes data input, pro-
cessing conducted, and information output. For ex-
ample, receipt and processing of orders by Supplier,
and logging of the materials bill by Buyer.
Maintenance of system-wide au-
dit trails (Directive #2)
Table 4.7: Processes and respective security directives
generic security objectives or targeted security patterns. Recall that objectives
are mainly related to stating the process aspects in terms of what needs con-
fidentiality, authentication, integrity and so on. Whereas, patterns provide a
well-proven, generic solution to a common problem.
Case: To enable application of directives, analysts and security professionals
first deliberate on the advantages and drawbacks of the two possible application
methods. Out of this discourse, Buyer and Supplier choose to use security pat-
terns rather than security objectives. This decision is attributed to the standard,
proven solutions to common problems they provide, and the availability of com-
prehensive pattern catalogues such as that highlighted by BOF4WSS in ‘Core
Security Patterns: Best Practices and Strategies for J2EE, Web Services, and
Identity Management’ [194].
According to BOF4WSS, the next step is the identification of possible
patterns to achieve security directives. These would then be passed into the
subsequent Systems Design phase for formal analysis and actual application. As
an example, the following paragraphs present information regarding the first two
ISS directives.
To address Directive #1 (Classification of information), the secu-
rity patterns from the catalogue in ‘Core Security Patterns: Best Practices and
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Strategies for J2EE, Web Services, and Identity Management’ ([194]) being con-
sidered are the ‘Secure Pipe’ pattern, ‘Message Interceptor Gateway’ pattern and
‘Message Inspector’ pattern. These patterns and how they address the problems
and directives, are now presented in detail.
The ‘Secure Pipe’ pattern focuses on securing a basic connection between trading
parties or systems (typically point-to-point, and over the Internet but can also
be applied internally). It adds further value by giving the option of requiring
mutual authentication and establishing confidentiality and/or non-repudiation
between entities. The capabilities possible with application of this pattern would
aid in ensuring that the appropriate security mirroring data classification levels
are maintained as information is passed between companies and systems.
The ‘Message Interceptor Gateway’ pattern purports a centralized location or
gateway to manage security enforcement tasks. For example, tasks include the
application of transport and message level security mechanisms/standards neces-
sary for securely communicating using WS. This pattern is responsible for adding
the security that keeps Purchase order-related messages and data appropriately
protected.
The ‘Message Inspector’ pattern works closely with the ‘Message Interceptor
Gateway’ and handles the verification and validation of the security elements
in the data or message delivered. This ensures that Purchase order-related mes-
sages received, which are headed for order processing systems, have not been
tampered with.
To address Directive #2 (Maintenance of system-wide audit trails),
the security patterns from the catalogue in [194] being considered are the ‘Secure
Logger’ pattern and ‘Audit Interceptor’ pattern. Descriptions of these patterns
are given below.
The ‘Secure Logger’ pattern provides logging services for all security-related ac-
tivities. It records all events and messages including the identities of senders,
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requested operations and results/output returned. This pattern would support
the need for system-wide audit trails of security-related activities specifically.
The ‘Audit Interceptor’ pattern supplies a centralized means for capturing and
recording system audit events. It allows developers of Buyer and Supplier to
define events of interest that are to be captured in an audit log for recording
purposes or audit trails as required.
Case Output: Medium-level process models with security directives applied (or
in terms of the patterns, initially chosen), the medium-level requirements (func-
tional and security-specific) accompanying these models, and the inputs passed
into this phase.
4.3.5 Phase 5: Agreements
Task 1: Legal contract drafting and signing by authorized representatives from
Buyer and Supplier.
Case: Lawyers from Buyer and Supplier under the guidance of their analysts
and security professionals, draft a new contract including the lower level require-
ments derived from the process definition in Figure 4.5. As the prime difference
between this contract and the previous one (see Table 4.6) is the level of detail
of the requirements in the Annex, only the new contract’s Annex is displayed.
This is shown in Table 4.8. Examples in [199] aid in the contract structure and
definition.
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Joint Development and License Agreement
Buyer (“Buyer”) and Supplier (“Supplier”) enter into this Joint Development and License
Agreement (the “Agreement”) as of 17 June 2010 (“Effective Date”).
...
Annex A
Specifications Document 1: Detailed Functional Requirements
There should be a procurement system at Buyer capable of the following functionalities
(inputs and outputs are clearly shown in Figure 4.5 therefore are not specifically identified
again here):
– Continuously monitoring the stock levels for all production materials. The procurement
system will therefore need to interface with the existing legacy stock system, this is a
system which has up-to-date information on all the materials needed in production.
– Automatically generating an electronic purchase order depending on materials needed,
including quantity and schedule of dates
– Passing the order for manual approval to personnel in the Internal Department (possibly
using email)
– Subsequently enabling the electronic purchase order to be sent using Web services mes-
sages over the Internet to an order processing system at Supplier’s enterprise
– Logging bills sent by Supplier using Web services
– Contacting the system at Supplier to check the status of a specified order
– ...
There should be a order processing system at Supplier capable of the following function-
alities (inputs and outputs are clearly shown in Figure 4.5 therefore are not specifically
identified again here):
– Accept purchase orders via Web services messages at any time (availability is discussed
later), and process them immediately
– Order processing at Supplier should involve checking the availability of items/materials
in legacy stock systems
– Billing Buyer via Web services for specified materials orders
– Interfacing (requesting shipments and providing payments to and) with shipping com-
panies to allow for items/materials to be delivered to Buyer as per time defined in the
original schedule
– Responding to queries from external entities (for example, Buyer) regarding status of
particular orders
– Logging and processing payments from Buyer
– ...
Information and Process Security
In addition to the functional requirements above, security features and capabilities should
be in place to ensure accurate and trustworthy transactions, and fulfil regulatory, contrac-
tual and standards requirements. These security features are outlined within the directives
and requirements in the Interaction Security Strategy (ISS). Parties should refer to that
document for further details.
...
Table 4.8: Joint Development and License Agreement (Detailed)
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Case Output: A detailed legal contract and the inputs passed into this phase.
4.3.6 Phase 6: Systems Design
Task 1a: Business process definition at the low-level and then service-level (that
is, expressing choreography of interactions using WS standards).
Case: Using medium-level process models input into this stage, systems analysts
at Buyer and Supplier define low-level interactions (and models) in terms of
services (where a service is a distinct or packaged unit of logic or functionality).
As an example of the process definitions resulting, Figure 4.6 is displayed. This
covers the Buyer’s internal systems.
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Figure 4.6: Full envisioned service-based process flow
The next step is business process definition at the lower service-level. Based
on the options provided in the framework, teams start by considering the Web Ser-
vices Choreography Description Language (WS-CDL) and BPEL4Chor. These
technologies would be used to enable the message choreography to be defined
and thus provide a global view of message interactions between companies. From
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those options, company discussions lead to the preference of WS-CDL. This is due
to its industry support and the existence of tested modelling tools. Parties select
Pi4SOA [163] software (identified in the framework) to facilitate modelling and
code generation. Apart from a usable GUI, business personnel viewed Pi4SOA a
good choice as it allows for automated generation of Web Services Business Pro-
cess Execution Language (WS-BPEL) code for internal system orchestration. In
this scenario, Pi4SOA is used particularly because it is freely available. However,
companies might opt for more polished software suites such as those from Oracle
or IBM mentioned in BOF4WSS.
Applying Pi4SOA to the UML processes thus far, Figure 4.7 gives a screen-
shot of the tool’s GUI and the graphical WS-CDL-based models which the com-
panies create. This figure specifically focuses on the actual message interactions
between entities, therefore the activities of placing an order, sending a bill and
requesting shipment.
Figure 4.7: A screenshot of the processes defined in Pi4SOA
A sample of the WS-CDL code itself which is behind the graphical model
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in Figure 4.7 is displayed in Code Snippet 1. This therefore accompanies the
models above and serves as the service-level business process definition output by
this framework task.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="Cp1252"?>
<org.pi4soa.cdl:Package xmi:version="2.0" name="BuyerSupplierChoreographyT"
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xmlns:org.pi4soa.cdl="http:///org/pi4soa/cdl.ecore" ... >
<typeDefinitions>
<informationTypes name="purchaseOrderType" typeName="PurchaseOrderMsg" />
<informationTypes name="billType" typeName="BillMsg"/> ...
<tokens name="purchaseOrderID" informationType="intType"/>
<tokens name="billNum" informationType="intType"/> ...
<roleTypes name="Buyer">
<behaviors name="buyerForSupplier" interface="BuyerSupplierPT"/>
</roleTypes> ...
<relationshipTypes name="BuyerToSupplierRel" firstRoleType="Buyer"
secondRoleType="Supplier" ... /> ...
<channelTypes name="BuyerChannelType" ... >
<identities tokens="purchaseOrderID"/>
</channelTypes> ...
</typeDefinitions>
<choreographies name="BuyerSupplierChoreography" root="true">
<variableDefinitions name="purchaseOrder" type="purchaseOrderType" />
<variableDefinitions name="billNum" type="billType" /> ...
<activities xsi:type="org.pi4soa.cdl:Interaction" name="placeOrder"
operation="handlePurchaseOrder" ... >
<exchangeDetails name="request" ... /> ...
</activities>
<activities xsi:type="org.pi4soa.cdl:Sequence">
<activities xsi:type="org.pi4soa.cdl:Parallel">
<activities xsi:type="org.pi4soa.cdl:Interaction" name="issueBill"
operation="handleBill" ... >
<exchangeDetails name="sendBill" sendVariable="billNum" ... /> ...
</activities>
<activities xsi:type="org.pi4soa.cdl:Interaction" name="shipmentRequest"
operation="handleShipmentRequest" ... >
...
</activities>
</activities>
</activities>
</choreographies>
</org.pi4soa.cdl:Package>
Code Snippet 1: WS-CDL underlying the graphical model
Task 1b: Harmonization of process and data semantics across companies. In
agreeing and outlining the service-level interactions, companies will also have to
agree on the capabilities, description and syntax of the various data and services.
Generally, this covers the semantics that will govern their interactions.
Case: To address this task and set up a semantics structure, project managers
and analysts opt for the use of a shared vocabulary. This would act as a bridge
between each company’s metadata repository and allow for a direct mapping of
data across companies’ systems and software. This is not covered in more detail
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noting the chapter’s focus on security.
Task 2: Define quality requirements for businesses (low- and service-level).
Case: To identify the necessary quality requirements, personnel on the project
teams use the companies’ previous EDI quality requirements as a basis. This,
along with the guidance article (that is, Garcia and Felgar de Toledo [66]) which
is referenced in the framework aid in the creation of a list of quality requirements.
Some of these are listed below.
– Performance (this concerns how fast a Web service is processed and the time
it needs to complete the transaction): 30 milliseconds both ways (Buyer to
Supplier and Supplier to Buyer) during normal loads, 40 milliseconds during
high loads
– Availability (the probability that the Web service is up and in an immediate
usable state): 99.99% uptime requested by Buyer of Supplier. Supplier’s
availability request of Buyer is 99.97% uptime
Task 3a: Analyse trade-offs between adoption of security patterns and the func-
tional and quality requirements for interactions.
Case: From an analysis of the security patterns and how their fulfilment would
affect functional/quality requirements, company personnel identify a few concern-
ing areas. For example, to apply all of the security patterns which are outlined
(particularly the ‘Secure Pipe’, ‘Secure Logger’, ‘Audit Interceptor’), achieving
Performance QoS requirements above may not be possible. These patterns, al-
though providing defence-in-depth, slow down interactions and increase process-
ing time. Additionally, Supplier is mindful of the cost of the software and hard-
ware to provide all these security functions. As a result of these factors, project
teams decide to abandon mutual authentication at the transport level that is of-
fered by the ‘Secure Pipe’ pattern, and to only apply the ‘Secure Logger’ pattern
to the bill payment (Buyer to Supplier) transaction.
Task 3b: Application of viable security patterns to low-level process models.
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Case: With viable security patterns which reflect ISS directives, system design-
ers from businesses apply these to the low-level process models. The application
of the ‘Secure Pipe’, ‘Message Interceptor Gateway’ and ‘Message Inspector’ pat-
terns to the Buyer side of the ‘bill issue’ activity of the low-level systems models
(displayed in Figure 4.6) is shown in Figure 4.8. This yields the security systems
design. For continuity from Figure 4.6 and ease in presentation, only the systems
used at Buyer are shown.
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Figure 4.8: Applying security patterns to process model
Task 4: Identify and agree on the standards and technologies to implement
interactions, especially security and quality requirements. Also, consider the best
practices and vulnerabilities in the context of WS.
Case: According to BOF4WSS, analysts and designers begin by considering the
options available which are listed on WS standards websites such as W3C and
OASIS. The overview in innoQ’s article [86] (also in the framework) is particu-
larly useful in enlightening designers not familiar with detailed WS technologies.
In addition to the general research, because both entities would need to purchase
additional WS-specific business process software (application servers, orchestra-
tion engines and so on) to facilitate internal processing, standards implemented
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by off-the-shelf products from IBM, Oracle and Microsoft are considered.
From these discussions and analyses, designers from companies agree to
utilize the following standards to support functionality of services: SOAP (for
messaging), WSDL (for service description and binding), WS-BPEL (for inter-
nal process orchestration), WS-CDL (for external process definitions) and WS-
Addressing (aiding in the addressing of services). A majority of these are em-
ployed by a number of the commercial (such as Oracle SOA Suite 11g) and open
source tools (including ActiveBPEL Engine [1]) currently available.
To implement the security patterns and QoS requirements, analysts follow
the framework’s guidance and made use of the extensive pattern catalogue in
‘Core Security Patterns: Best Practices and Strategies for J2EE, Web Services,
and Identity Management’ [194]. The advantage of this catalogue is that it also
supplies technologies that could be used for pattern execution. Furthermore, with
an appreciation that the next framework step includes considering best practices
and vulnerabilities, company analysts and designers factor in publications and
practices from NIST (‘Guide to Secure Web Services’ in [189]) and WS-I [218] in
choosing technologies. Table 4.9 provides an excerpt of the data in this catalogue
which is adopted by businesses.
To implement QoS requirements for service interactions between entities,
Table 4.10 displays the agreements made.
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Pattern Standards and Technologies Details
Secure
Pipe
HTTPS (SSL/TLS)
(256, 512 and 1024 bit encryption for
Low, Medium and High priority infor-
mation classifications respectively)
These generally accepted standards are
used to authenticate the recipient and
establish point-to-point confidentiality
and non-repudiation at the transport
level.
Message
Inter-
ceptor
Gate-
way
WS-Security, XML Signature, XML
Encryption, SAML tokens, X.509 cer-
tificates, WS-SecurityPolicy
(Generally these standards are pur-
ported for use in services. WS-
SecurityPolicy is key as it will be used
to specify security requirements for in-
dividual services at this lower level, that
will also implement and enforce higher-
level directives such as varying levels of
priority - and thus security - for mes-
sages. High priority messages for ex-
ample will require services to digitally
sign and encrypt the messages, include
message expiry times, and nonce val-
ues (to protect against message replay).
This can be specified in an individual
service’s policy.)
WS-Security specification provides a
framework that integrates and unifies
multiple security models and technolo-
gies (XML Signature, XML Encryp-
tion). Its prime goal is to define how
to attach security information (such as
SAML tokens or X.509 certificates) to
provide end-to-end (or message-level)
security for SOAP messages.
The Gateway provides a central loca-
tion to apply this specification on out-
going messages as is dictated in the ser-
vice’s security policy.
Message
Inspec-
tor
WS-Security, XML Signature, XML
Encryption, SAML, XKMS
The pattern checks for, verifies and val-
idates the quality of the XML message-
level security mechanisms such as XML
Signature and XML Encryption in con-
junction with a security token.
Table 4.9: Security technologies to implement patterns (adapted from [194])
QoS Requirement Methods and Technologies
Performance
(Response time as main
metric)
Generally: The use of simple SOAP data types; compres-
sion of data from the sizable XML format to a binary
format; and load balancing with servers hosting services.
These are all suggested in an academic article [230]. Mon-
itoring could also be done by management and reporting
software that would automatically check services for com-
pliance.
Reliability and Availabil-
ity
WS-Reliability specification can be used as it ensures guar-
antees delivery of messages, elimination and/or detection
of duplicate messages, and right order delivery of messages
Availability of service
(Focus on protection and
recovery from attacks that
disrupt service from being
in a usable state)
Generally: Web service clustering, that is, making the same
service available over multiple servers.
Specifically: An XML (message-level) Firewall could be de-
ployed at a company’s perimeter to inspect and filter mes-
sages for malicious content before any harmful messages
reach the service.
Table 4.10: QoS methods and technologies
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Case Output: Low-level process designs, service-level interaction definitions,
security design, a semantics framework supporting processes, the list of stan-
dards/technologies to implement WS interactions, and low-level requirements re-
sulting from processes (functional, security and quality-based).
4.3.7 Phase 7: Agreements (for QoS)
Task 1: Formal agreement and specification of the QoS requirements of each
company for services.
Case: Using the quality requirements from the previous task, companies involve
their analysts, lawyers and executives to formally specify the agreements. After
assessing the options available (including WSLA and WS-Policy additions) which
are mentioned in the framework, a natural language SLA is defined. Designers
prefer this choice as they are not confident in the reliability, use, or maturity of
these WS standards. An excerpt of the SLA which the entities create is presented
in Table 4.11.
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Service-Level Agreement
Buyer (“Buyer”) and Supplier (“Supplier”) enter into this Joint Development and License
Agreement (the “Agreement”) as of 3 August 2010 (“Effective Date”).
RECITALS
WHEREAS, Supplier is a seller of high-performance electrical parts and Buyer is a high-
tech equipments manufacturer. To enable their business processes to be more integrated,
an IT system (the “System”) spanning both enterprises is to be jointly developed.
NOW, THEREFORE, Buyer and Supplier as it pertains to quality requirements agree as
follows:
1. Performance
Performance is defined as how fast a Web service can be processed and the time needed
to complete the transaction. The requirement is: 30 milliseconds both ways (Buyer to
Supplier, and Supplier to Buyer) during normal loads, and 40 milliseconds during high
loads
2. Availability
Availability is defined as the probability that the Web service is up and in an immediate us-
able state. The requirement is 99.88% uptime requested by Buyer of Supplier. Supplier’s
availability requests of Buyer are at 99.7% uptime
– Exceptions: Objectives may not be met due to the following: scheduled maintenance (for
example, hardware or software upgrades); network issues not in direct control of service
provider; ...
– Obligations: In cases of expected downtime, businesses must notify and have the support
of other partners at least 48 hours prior. In cases of unexpected downtime, businesses
must notify other partners immediately.
– Other: Evaluation of objectives should be carried out on a monthly basis to ensure quality
requirements are being met and maintained.
...
Table 4.11: Service-Level Agreement for Buyer and Supplier
Case Output: The SLA QoS agreements, low-level process designs, service-level
interaction definitions, security design, a semantics framework, the standards and
technologies of choice to implement the WS interactions, and the updated low-
level requirements (functional, security and quality-based).
4.3.8 Phase 8 and 9: Development and Testing, and
Maintenance
Thus far in this chapter, BOF4WSS’s phases have been applied to the outlined
scenario to give a clear example of the framework’s uses. These phases were some-
what theoretically driven (in terms of ability to document) and highly structured,
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and therefore lent themselves to good presentation and discussion. Phases 8 and
9 however are not similar to these for two main reasons. These are, firstly the
lack of a clear structure—phase 8 particularly provides only very general phases
and encourages companies to plug in methods they deem as appropriate, thus
being extremely context dependent. Secondly, with the actual systems already
defined, it is primarily acting on these definitions that is required. The second
point therefore involves hands-on programming, testing, system configurations,
monitoring services, making updates and such. These are not viewed as activi-
ties that would be appropriate or able to be adequately covered in this chapter’s
discussions.
As a result of the two reasons mentioned above and the reality that ap-
proaches/methods suggested for application by BOF4WSS (WS lifecycle method-
ology and the Process for Web Services Security(PWSSec)) are well documented
(and even have their own case study analyses available), it was decided not to
cover these in detail in this thesis. Instead, this work seeks to provide an idea
of how and where the outputs from previous phases would fit in and be con-
sumed by methods. First therefore, the WS lifecycle methodology is presented
in Figure 4.9. Secondly, in Figure 4.10, the integration of documentation from
BOF4WSS into the parallel security process PWSSec.
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Figure 4.9: The use of framework output in the WS lifecycle methodology
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Figure 4.10: The use of framework output in PWSSec
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The Maintenance phase within BOF4WSS is somewhat similar to the
Execution and Monitoring phase in the WS lifecycle methodology. Buyer and
Supplier would therefore be monitoring their interactions and making updates
to services and functionalities as required. From a security perspective, the aim
becomes maintaining the security of the developed systems and ISS directives
by constantly being mindful of new threats and attacks. ‘Audit Interceptor’ and
‘Secure Logger’ security patterns would also help in checking for and identifying
any breaches in systems.
According to the framework, Buyer and Supplier should also monitor new
computer and data protection legislation as these would affect the ISS directives
and security requirements defined above. Lastly, in terms of ongoing support per-
sonnel for functional modifications and security issues, persons from the project
teams would be identified by companies to fulfil these tasks.
4.4 Discussing the Framework’s Use
Concentrating on the scenario presented in the sections above, the uses and ad-
vantages of BOF4WSS can primarily be found in its adequate fulfilment of the
companies’ expectations. In line with company needs, the framework is compre-
hensive, in that it covers the full spectrum of activities from planning to devel-
opment, while also remaining relatively flexible. This was exemplified in the fact
that even though Risk Management (RM) approaches were suggested to deter-
mine security requirements, companies were allowed to use their own methods,
found in the CORAS and NIST RM Guides. Furthermore, the framework satisfied
Buyer and Supplier’s desire for a WS-specific and security-focused methodology.
From a security specific perspective, the uses of the framework included
attaining the agreed and adequate security infrastructure—BOF4WSS and its
constant focus on negotiations and agreements at every level helped this. Sec-
ondly, in terms of a security governance structure, the framework’s ISS acts as
a less rigid but clearly defined charter for companies, which guides their joint
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security posture. This strategy naturally appreciates security as more than a
technical issue and is supported on an ongoing basis by a security team from
companies.
Thirdly, the framework aids in achieving the traceability requirement de-
sired by Buyer and Supplier. This is apparent as BOF4WSS encourages suitable
model documentation early on and continuously builds on initially agreed security
requirements to achieve final designs and security technologies. A good example
is the security requirement regarding confidentiality of WS messages. This was
first conceived as a result of a RM process. Then, appropriate security patterns
(‘Message Interceptor Gateway’ and ‘Message Inspector’) to apply to the models
were defined. Lastly, WS security technologies such as WS-Security and XML
Signature were identified for the technical implementation.
The final expectation of BOF4WSS placed by businesses was trust across
the newly formed scenario. Even though the framework is not a panacea in this
regard, it would be expected that from the constant interactions process, Buyer
and Supplier would have established some trust. This could be trust in each
other (business level), trust between project teams that worked together, or trust
in the scenario interactions that they jointly planned, designed and developed.
The points highlighted in the paragraphs above provide a few examples
of how BOF4WSS can be useful and advantageous to Buyer and Supplier and
their particular scenario. Considering the nature of those companies’ expectations
however, it would also be fair to state that many of those expectations would be
relevant in a wide variety of situations. This is particularly in terms of flexibil-
ity in process, WS-specific security methodology, security guidance/governance
structure and cross-enterprise trust. This concludes this section.
4.5 Summary
The purpose of this chapter was to supplement Chapter 3’s discussion of the
framework and supply real-world examples of BOF4WSS’ use. A key underlying
4. Applying BOF4WSS to a Scenario 124
aim was to support the practicality of the framework, and to highlight some of its
usages and benefits. To do this, a scenario was presented and BOF4WSS applied
to it phase-by-phase. Options were discussed as companies would face them
and choices in terms of the framework were made. At the end of the scenario’s
presentation, Section 4.4 provided a brief discussion on the framework’s use and
advantages in terms of the case, and in general.
The next chapter focuses this project on a more manageable research prob-
lem within the framework’s investigation. As will be seen, the specific problem
of interest relates to the likely transitional issues arising when companies move
between two framework phases. Chapter 5 forms a bridge between the higher
level framework approach in this and the previous chapters, and the lower level,
more detailed discourse in future chapters.
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Chapter 5
Supporting BOF4WSS and the
Transition Between its Phases
Extended networks, for many organizations, represent an enormous challenge with
regard to security controls. Different partners have unique access requirements,
want specific security policies in place, and have varying SLAs [Service Level
Agreements] and legal obligations, all leading to security mayhem. — James S.
Tiller
5.1 Introduction
Having presented the framework and discussed its practical application to a sce-
nario, this chapter narrows the scope to the identification of a specific and more
manageable research problem for in-depth analysis. This problem would still be
in the confines of the framework. Both these aims are in line with the original
research objectives (specifically the third objective) in Section 1.2.
To aid in the problem identification process, the scenario from Chapter 4
was used and analysed in detail. The aim was to identify any processes or tasks
that could prove difficult or overly labourious for companies as they attempted
to use BOF4WSS to support their interactions. From this analysis, one area that
proved intriguingly problematic and also had the potential to be a significant bar-
rier for companies, was the inherent difficulty that surfaced when companies tried
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to share, compare and negotiate on the high-level security actions/requirements.
This related to when these security needs were passed from the individually under-
taken Requirements Elicitation phase into the subsequent joint Negotiations
phase (where companies reconciled their actions on security) in BOF4WSS.
The core problem during the phase transition process mentioned above
was the disparate nature of the varying security actions and requirements sup-
plied by each business. This problem was perpetuated by the need for companies
to understand each other’s actions and the motivations behind them, be able to
discuss actions thoroughly, and then arrive at appropriate agreements and judge-
ments. Focusing on the disparity specifically, dissimilarities in approaches were
apparent at the semantic and practical levels, and even in the format of supplied
security actions. For example, Chapter 4 shows that companies might use graph-
ical means, checklists, or bullet points to express requirements. This makes even
simple comparison of these actions across companies much more painstaking.
With appreciation of the importance of a smooth transition through the
framework’s phases (particularly in terms of BOF4WSS’ adoption by companies)
and the intricacies of this problem at a research level (as will be detailed further),
it was chosen for this project’s focus.
The next section of this chapter examines the transition problem in de-
tail, drawing upon literature and a critical study of the scenario in Chapter 4
to identify the core issues. Once the problem area has been presented, specific
investigative questions are defined. A solution model is then proposed in Sec-
tion 5.3 which sets the platform for all subsequent work. The solution model and
its components (conceptual and physical) complement BOF4WSS in forming the
main contributions of this thesis. Before proceeding, readers are reminded that
a security action is a generic treatment method for a risk, whereas a security re-
quirement is a treatment method geared towards risk mitigation. Security actions
therefore encompass security requirements.
5. Supporting BOF4WSS and the Transition Between its Phases 127
5.2 The Transition Problem
5.2.1 Related Literature
Sharing, comparing and negotiating on security actions and requirements across
companies, even for security at a high-level, has always been a complex issue. In
Section 2.3.1, Tiller’s work ([205]) gave insight into this issue as he labeled the
related process “security mayhem” because of the variety of aspects of security
to be considered in forming business collaborations. This area has also been
defined as a core research question by Dynes et al. [49] in terms of how interacting
companies can achieve a shared vision on risks and security which appreciates
their range of differences.
In the somewhat similar field of outsourcing, a few approaches have been
seen which attempt to tackle the ‘coming together’ problem (this problem is akin
to the transition problem identified previously in BOF4WSS). Kajava et al. [98]
for example offer generic guidance in the form of preconditions to any outsourcing
agreement. These include, “Both partners’ information security capabilities must
be at a high level prior to cooperation” and “The agreement negotiations are an
essential process and, if need be, the parties must utilize the services of external
specialists to ensure success”.
Work by Todd et al. [206] documents a real-world case involving two large
companies, BT and HP, and exemplifies another approach. To help decide some of
the security actions necessary, first each company’s respective security standards,
policies and procedures were compared and contrasted (it is not mentioned, but
it is assumed this was done in a manual fashion). Next, a principle-based ap-
proach was utilized where the highest security level from whichever company was
adopted. Joint security risk assessments were also used.
The two approaches identified above are valid methods, however they sup-
ply only very high-level guidance on negotiating security actions and requirements
across companies. Furthermore, some of this guidance is not likely to be widely
applicable. In situations where there are tight security budgets or limited exper-
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tise in companies, for example, approaches such as the “adopt the highest security
level”-based approach in [206], are infeasible. Reflecting on the general problem
defined in the first paragraph therefore, this research has found no appropriate
approach in literature or practice which might be applied to aid in the transition
from the Requirements Elicitation to Negotiations phases.
5.2.2 Problem Area
To solve the transition problem particularly in the context of BOF4WSS, it was
first necessary to identify the core difficulties faced by companies in this process.
For support in this task, the scenario from Chapter 4 was analysed critically from
this perspective. The aim of this section is to present the main problem areas
discovered from that assessment. These areas are also somewhat generic, in that
they would apply to all scenarios in which BOF4WSS is used.
Predominant emphasis on security requirements
As companies meet up for negotiations, it is common to bring together the security
requirements for the envisaged scenario. This very standard task however has a
shortcoming. By supplying only their security requirements, companies actually
only show information on the risks that they would like to mitigate (recall that
security requirements link to risk mitigation, as highlighted in Chapter 3). Risks
that companies choose to accept, avoid or transfer are usually given no mention
as exemplified in the case study by Steel et al. [194] and in Chapter 4’s scenario.
This incomplete information leads to a problem during comparison because in
situations where there are conflicts in how risks are to be treated, companies have
to re-enter discussions. This is as opposed to merely referencing a treatments
document (which would list complete information on suggested treatments for
all risks) as currently done for security requirements. The prolonged, repetitive
discussions required are therefore the core issue here.
For companies that are going to be working closely together and need to
agree on ways to treat (that is, choosing either mitigation, acceptance, avoidance
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or transference) certain shared risks, this research strongly asserts that entities
must initially acknowledge more than just one risk treatment option (risk miti-
gation) by way of security requirements. This acknowledgment does not require
any new tasks or techniques, but simply involves having companies also supply
non-mitigation-based treatments (and information on all pertinent shared risks
they have assessed) into the Negotiations stage. This would at the very least start
companies with a more complete information base and reduce the repetition in
negotiations and discussions.
Understanding the security actions documents/reports of the other
companies “as is”
There are three sub-problems in this area, two relate to semantics and one to
security actions format. At the beginning of the Negotiations phase, companies
supply their high-level security actions (in Chapter 4, all were security require-
ments) to their business partners for review. A major difficulty even at this early
stage is gaining an appreciation of what exactly companies mean when they out-
line a security action or requirement in a few brief, informal statements, often
with little justification. This is the first semantics problem.
In the scenario in Chapter 4 for example, Supplier notes “Authentica-
tion is critical and should be used”. This statement is so abstract that it has
little meaning to Buyer, which would cause them to ask: “Authentication of,
or between whom?”, “Is this authentication at the level of business parties or
otherwise?”, “Is authentication required for use all the time, or only in specific
scenarios?”. At times these requirements may be relatively obvious, but at other
times, numerous queries are likely to result which can lengthen this discussion
process considerably.
The second semantics issue relates to the ambiguities in the security field
and the plethora of terms, concepts and meanings which exist. As companies
meet therefore, they are likely to be using a range of disparate terminologies
which then adds to the possible misunderstandings and makes negotiations even
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more difficult. The lack of any common terminology or common understanding
of terms and concepts is a barrier to interactions.
The last sub-problem is centred around the variety of unique formats that
could be used by businesses to document their security actions/requirements.
This point is exemplified in Chapter 4 as Buyer uses a requirements listing
whereas Supplier uses their company’s standardized security checklists along
with graphical models and tools. From this simple example with only two enti-
ties, three different formats have been applied, all of which need to be explained
and discussed. This is particularly pertinent if the formats are proprietary or
other partners are simply unfamiliar with them. The core issue here therefore
is linked to the disparity in formats and subsequent need for all companies to
understand these formats prior to any negotiations taking place.
Understanding the motivation behind other companies’ security
actions and requirements
From the few brief statements which constitute companies’ security actions and
requirements, it is often somewhat challenging for other businesses to determine
why that security desire exists. Even if the security threat/risk which the re-
quirement is intended to address is included in the requirement description, there
may be various other considerations in the preceding risk assessment that are not
specified in the requirement statement provided. These factors are important be-
cause they provide insight into security actions that form the basis for companies’
negotiations and decisions.
The scenario in the previous chapter depicts the point mentioned above
clearly as it looks at the reasons supporting Buyer’s security requirement #1. The
way this supporting information was elicited was to begin discussions once again,
and for each company to query the other to gain a better appreciation of the
requirements and their supporting factors. This process however is quite tedious
and may require assessing a number of the requirements again. Additionally,
depending on the number of the companies involved (the scenario has only two,
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however more are possible) and the amount of requirements to be discussed, this
can be very time consuming. In summary, the main problem thus results from a
lack of information on motivational and supporting factors provided initially.
Categorization of security requirements
As companies come together there is likely to be a wide range of security require-
ments spanning a variety of topics. There is little guarantee that the security
requirements (and the threats/risks they intend to address) conceived by one
company have not been overlooked or forgotten by another company. Catego-
rization tries to group requirements into similar topic areas with the hope of
easing the comparison task faced by personnel.
The challenges with this step however are that (i) once more, it is very
time consuming (companies have to identify and agree on suitable categories, as-
sign requirements, etc.) and (ii) it may have little added value since it is highly
dependent on requirements listings and their innate similarities, and also the gran-
ularity of the categories chosen. For example, in the scenario, only two of the
chosen categories (‘Communications security’ and ‘Availability of services/data’)
have similar requirements across companies. Therefore the majority of categories
have requirements from one company only; this represents four out of nine re-
quirements in total. Both of the aspects mentioned act to somewhat defeat the
purpose of categorizing requirements.
Comparison of companies’ security actions and requirements
This task entails studying other companies’ requirements to identify (and ques-
tion) similarities and differences. Initial requirements categorization would have
made this task easier, however it is far from seamless. In the ‘Communications se-
curity’ category for example, there is no comparable requirement from Supplier
to suit Buyer’s security requirement #1. Companies would therefore need to dis-
cuss this requirement further. Once it is clarified that this requirement represents
a unique security desire, Supplier queries Buyer’s motivation and factors that
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support this security action.
Fortunately, some of the motivational factors may have been identified
before (in one of the first tasks). However, as companies look to support and pro-
mote their individual security actions, more concrete and well-justified aspects
will need to surface (relevant laws for example, or further details on pertinent
organizational policies). In summary, the main difficulties therefore emerge from
the huge tasks of studying requirements, finding similar requirements, and query-
ing other entities once again for adequate justifications. This is especially when
requirements represent conflicting needs across companies.
Deciding on security actions to apply to the scenario
Having discussed security actions, defined the aspects supporting each company’s
desires and compared the actions and requirements across companies, the next
task is to reconcile the security actions to carry forward. (‘Security actions’ are
held to be carried forward as opposed to ‘security requirements’ because there is
no guarantee that companies will always agree to mitigate a shared risk.)
In this last task and particularly in situations of conflicting security actions
(therefore, where there are different action types, for example one company wants
to mitigate a risk whereas another wants to accept it), the factors supporting
each entity’s security actions played a crucial role. The scenario exemplifies this
point as two factors that supported Buyer’s security requirement #1 (that is,
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the increased threat likelihood and possible
impact to businesses if the underlying risk/threat materialized) were crucial to
making the final decision. The challenges at this decision stage therefore are
again reviewing factors supporting each action and then arriving at a conclusion
on the way forward with each security decision.
5.2.3 Research Question
In an attempt to address most of the problems identified above and support
the transition between phases, the following research question was posed. This
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question is directly linked to the fourth research objective in Section 1.2.
– As companies bring their various security actions together for negotiations,
a tedious, repetitive and long-winded task often ensues. Can this process
be streamlined or significantly automated to allow for an easier and quicker
transition between the framework’s Requirements Elicitation and Negotiations
phases?
To aid in answering this research question four guidance steps have been defined.
Step 1: A first step towards supporting the negotiation of security actions across
companies is the establishment of some common and shared security-related se-
mantics. This would act as a bridge between the internals of companies (for ex-
ample, terminologies and structures) and the internals of their business partners.
Section 5.2.2 previously identified a semantics gap in terms of security actions
and terminologies. However, there is also the possibility of semantic misunder-
standings when considering the factors motivating/supporting security actions
and exactly where and how they fit into businesses’ decisions.
In light of these aspects, it would be beneficial to have a common semantics
structure shared by companies which encompasses security actions, their moti-
vational factors and other relevant aspects in that domain. To avoid introducing
any additional semantic issues, it is imperative that this new structure is easy to
understand and reference. Furthermore, it should allow a range of heterogeneous
company terminologies and structures to be mapped to and captured by it.
Can a common semantics structure (such as a conceptual model, ontology
or meta-model) be defined, therefore, to fulfil the aims mentioned above? Fur-
thermore, how seamless would it be to map some of the internals of companies
(for example, the outputs of typical security action determination methods) to
the shared semantics structure? At the very least, this could act as a test for the
adequacy and use of the model.
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Step 2: A semantics structure shared between companies in the context of their
interactions is an important initial step to easing the discussion and comparison
of security actions at the high level. Beyond using this structure to tackle pure
semantic issues however, are there any additional ways in which it could be used
to address other problem areas, or in generally expediting parts of the transition
between stages? For example, could this structure be used as a basis for the
creation of a common format or template for companies to express their security
actions and related factors as they enter negotiations? If this were possible, it
would (i) help in resolving the disparity in the formats problem area and (ii)
provide a guide for companies on what information they should supply as they
prepare to come together. Point (ii) thus seeks to address the problems associated
with incomplete information in Section 5.2.2.
Lastly, assuming that a common template or format could be created,
could it also have a machine-processable representation? This would open the
approach to opportunities for automation. Automation for example might be seen
in expressing companies’ security actions or in comparing them across businesses.
Step 3: The security actions and requirements brought by companies are likely to
span a wide range of topics, and address a variety of risks and threats to parties
and the overall business scenario. As exemplified in Section 5.2.2, this reality
typically leads to a number of difficulties in action categorization, matching and
comparison. These difficulties mainly centre around the tedious and repetitive
tasks which need to be undertaken by companies’ personnel.
With appreciation of the difficulties mentioned, are there any ways to
streamline these arduous processes? More specifically, how could this matching
and comparison problem be addressed such that it lends itself to some noteworthy
degree of automation? For example, is there a way that some risk or security ac-
tion listing could be used as a common, shared base for companies? If this could
be achieved, a system might be investigated that would automatically catego-
rize, match and allow for the personnel-led comparison of security actions from
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businesses.
Step 4: Within the goal of easing phase transition, there must be an appreciation
that any information generated, especially that from Step 3, should be very usable
by humans. This is primarily to aid in making decisions on security actions to
apply to the scenario. Amongst other things therefore, personnel from companies
should be able to (i) see detailed information on risks and security actions being
compared, (ii) possibly tweak comparisons, for example, requesting that only
differences in security action types across companies be highlighted, and (iii) have
inconsistencies that represent exceptional situations flagged for follow-up. All of
this information should be supplied in a user-friendly interface which significantly
supports users in their decision making activities. Step 4’s guidance questions
therefore are, how can this be done and how best can information be presented
to users?
5.3 A Solution Model
To answer the research question and generally support the progression between
phases and subsequent negotiation of security actions, the Solution Model in
Figure 5.1 was defined. The model contains four components, namely, Secu-
rity Actions Analysis, Ontology Design, Risk Catalogue Creation and Language
Definition. There is also a system that will be implemented to consolidate these
components. In the following paragraphs an overview of the components is given.
This also forms an introduction that puts work in future chapters into context.
Chapter 6 presents a detailed discussion of the first two components and Chap-
ter 7 covers the remaining two and the overall system implementation.
Security Actions Analysis
Step 1 from the previous section explores the notion of a common semantics
structure to define aspects in the security action domain. A security action (or
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Figure 5.1: Solution Model
risk treatment choice) is just the end result of a very detailed and often non-
trivial risk-based process. The aim of this component therefore would be to
critically examine security in general, but especially how security actions come to
be, and identify common, critical factors that motivate/influence their derivation.
This will include aspects such as threats and vulnerabilities, but also higher
level factors including security policies and company budgets. This component
relies heavily on security literature to allow for a firmly grounded analysis. The
Ontology Design stage complements this analysis and presents an ontology as the
semantics structure to address Step 1.
Ontology Design
Ontologies are widely known for their ability to specify a shared understand-
ing about a domain across persons and systems [55]. In this case, an ontology is
employed to provide a conceptual relational model and supporting semantics doc-
umentation for the security actions domain (specifically resulting from findings in
the Security Actions Analysis stage). These characteristics fulfil the requirements
for an easy to understand and reference structure for companies, (as the ontology
is at a high level and diagrammatically presented), showing relationships between
concepts, and including documentation. Companies are therefore free to refer to
the ontology at any time for a clear understanding of the common terminology
to be used throughout interactions. Readers should note that at this point the
ontology is not formally expressed and therefore there is no corresponding formal
ontology language representation. This will be covered in a subsequent compo-
nent.
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To avoid limiting the usability of the ontology, general concepts in the
security field are also modelled. Establishing this single understanding and se-
mantics structure is a critical prerequisite in creating the overall solution when
considering how different the terminologies, methods and influencing factors in-
ternal to each business are likely to be. It is also important that the ontology is
accommodating and allows for an easy mapping of concepts onto it from typical
security action determination methods used by companies. Providing this, in ad-
dition to a structure well-grounded in the security actions domain (that considers
relevant standards, RM/RA approaches and so on), will strongly support the use
and applicability of the ontology and any derived models/tools.
Risk Catalogue Creation
To address research Step 3, a shared risks base has been chosen. This choice
was made after reviewing the Security Actions Analysis and noticing that in
a majority of cases, security actions were established to handle or treat some
inherent risk. The creation of a risks catalogue which contains an up-to-date,
extensive listing of threats and vulnerabilities (or generally the security risks)
serves one main purpose therefore — it forms a common input to each company’s
RM/RA processes (that is, the process that identifies, analyses, evaluates and
decides treatment for the risks). Thus, even if businesses use different processes,
they will maintain a common input in terms of what risks are considered.
Furthermore, the risk catalogue would be updated to accommodate new
risks found by companies in their actual RM/RA methods. Using a shared risks
base means that regardless of the derived security actions, the underlying security
risk can always be used to automatically match security actions across compa-
nies. The difficulty with categorizing, matching and comparing actions therefore
becomes much less arduous.
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Language Definition
This component stage targets research Step 2 and therefore seeks to use the
shared semantics structure (represented in the ontology model) to define a com-
mon template/format for expressing companies’ security actions. This format
should also act as a guide for companies on the information they should furnish
as they prepare to come together. Considering these facts and the request for a
machine-processable template/format, one way to address this step is to specify
a common formal format (for example, based on XML or Web Ontology Lan-
guage (OWL)) to express actions, and then to encapsulate it in a user-friendly
interface such as a data entry screen or template document. This interface would
be the information guide for companies. The underlying formal format which
actually specifies the security actions and related factors would be the common
basis across parties.
To create this common format which represents a more formal implemen-
tation of the ontology, an XML-based language and schema were preferred. XML
is a useful format as it is a very mature, widely recognized, platform indepen-
dent markup language which has numerous applications and systems support
options (APIs for parsing, verifying and validating XML are readily available).
The increasing popularity of OWL in the field of ontologies also led to it being
considered for this task. After some investigation however, it was concluded that
OWL offered much more functionality (layers of logic and reasoning) and a much
higher degree of expressivity than was required at this point. Additionally, these
advantages came at the price of added complexity. Euzenat [53] provides a good
example of ontology ordering in terms of degrees of expressivity and formality.
In that work, XML schemas are one category away from very formal ontologies
(such as those represented in OWL).
The aim of the language and schema in this report therefore, is to allow
data on security actions and factors influencing them (such as risks, laws and
policies) to be defined in a highly structured way that could be exchanged and
compared across companies.
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5.4 Solution Model in Action
5.4.1 Process Overview
A general idea of how the implemented Solution Model would work towards eas-
ing and possibly automating stage transition is illustrated in Figure 5.2 (readers
are asked to assume that Supplier and Buyer are businesses using BOF4WSS
to facilitate an envisioned online business scenario). As the diagram is somewhat
self-explanatory and the general implementation discussed in detail in future sec-
tions (such as Chapter 7), it is not examined at this point.
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Figure 5.2: Solution Model in action
Another prime objective of this implementation is addressing the remaining
research step, that is, Step 4 from Section 5.2.3. Referencing Figure 5.2, the
output of human-readable information in points (i) and (ii) from the Comparison
system are seen to address the guidance questions posed in Step 4. In detail,
matching of different companies’ security actions is done based on the risks which
they address, whereas tweaking comparisons can be done by changing system
query settings. Specifics of the user-friendly interface encapsulating the output
are forthcoming in Chapter 7.
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It is worth noting that to accommodate the Solution Model and the result-
ing implemented system, a slight change is needed in the BOF4WSS’ process flow.
This change includes the addition of a formal task in the Requirements Elicitation
phase which focuses on inputting (automatically or manually) security actions,
risks and motivational factors into the system created. All of these aspects are
then transferred to the Negotiations phase. This is unlike the framework pre-
viously where only security requirements were typically carried forward. The
Negotiations phase works similarly to before. The only change is that companies
use the Model and implemented system to streamline a variety of initial tasks
during the negotiation and discussions on security. Companies can for example
centre in on problem areas and quickly get to the core discussions necessary for
stage progression.
5.4.2 Related Models
Before concluding this chapter, related work by Yau and Chen [227] deserves men-
tion. In that article the authors assessed similar disparity problems in commu-
nicating security requirements and proposed a framework for formally specifying
requirements and detecting conflicts. Their framework also utilized an ontology
for providing a common base to facilitate the unambiguous specification of re-
quirements amongst collaborating parties. The differences between that research
and the Solution Model are apparent in the Model’s focus on high-level security
needs, and the fact that [227] only considers security requirements as opposed to
other ways to address risks (such as acceptance or avoidance).
5.5 Summary
This chapter engaged in a detailed assessment of the framework and its applica-
tion to a real-world scenario. From this assessment, the transition problem from
the Requirements Elicitation to Negotiations phase of BOF4WSS was identified
as a key area for research emphasis.
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Once the problems were clearly defined, a research question and a number
of guidance steps were derived to chart a research path forward. A solution
model was then proposed to address these problems and significantly support
phase transition. This model consisted of four components: Security Actions
Analysis, Ontology Design, Risk Catalogue Creation and Language Definition.
Beyond discussing the conceptual Solution Model, insight was also given into
its operation and implementation. The chapter concluded with a brief look at
related work.
In the next chapter, discussion on the Solution Model components is ex-
panded. Emphasis is placed particularly on the Security Actions Analysis and
Ontology Design, and reporting on those stages, their outputs and contributions.
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Chapter 6
An Ontology for Defining Factors
Influencing Security Actions
The growing popularity of ontologies is in a large part due to what they promise:
a shared understanding of some domain that can be communicated between people
and application systems. — Dieter Fensel
6.1 Introduction
In Chapter 5, the Solution Model was defined to address the phase transition
problems identified within practical use of BOF4WSS. The aim of Chapter 6 is
to expand on that Model and report on the implementation of some of its core
steps, namely Security Actions Analysis and Ontology Design. This chapter will
conduct a critical analysis of what security actions are and the methods compa-
nies use to determine them. This analysis allows for the identification of several
important factors that influence companies’ individual security actions, and there-
fore adds to the disparity between businesses outlined in the previous chapter.
These factors and their relationships are then modelled in a high-level ontology
which, along with the preceding analysis, constitute the main contributions of
this chapter.
It is worth noting that the main steps in the general process consist of
considering ontology goals, defining core terms/factors in the domain (for this
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work, this is the security actions domain) and identifying relationships amongst
other things. This process is presented by King and Reinold [104] as a core
methodology for the creation of an ontology.
6.2 Security Action Determination Methods
6.2.1 Defining Security Actions and Requirements
Security actions and security requirements were first introduced in Chapter 3 and
since then have formed important terms and topics in this research. This section
seeks to complement previous discussions by recapping and expanding on them.
In addition to presenting these terms from more of a literature-based perspective,
this discourse sets the context for the following sections in the chapter.
Security actions and requirements have occupied discussion for many years
and in countless fields spanning both practice in industry and research focus in
academia [58, 67, 76]. Whereas a security requirement is a well-known term—
albeit not always clearly defined (see Haley et al. [76]), a security action, as a
term, is a new proposal in this work and is aimed at covering a wider topic range
than a requirement (as shown in Section 3.3).
To avoid confusion in the context of this research, a security requirement
is defined as a high-to-medium level desire, largely in terms of the information
security goals of confidentiality, integrity, availability and accountability. Re-
quirements are therefore usually expressed to protect against risk associated with
a general process or action, as opposed to specific systems or technical-level con-
straints. In this context, this approach to requirements is similar to that alluded
to in [174, 201].
A security action refers to any way (that is, setting up protective measures
or not) in which a company treats or handles a risk it faces—the use of the anal-
ogous term of risk treatment choice/action in prior chapters highlights this. The
main difference between the action and requirement concepts is that a security
action does not always represent a positive action to eliminate a risk or reduce its
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severity level, whereas a security requirement does. The types of security actions
are covered in detail in forthcoming sections.
6.2.2 Risk-related Methodologies
Regardless of the intended purpose, a security action or requirement represents
the culmination of a detailed and often non-trivial process, which considers a
number of aspects (including risk assessments, statutory and contractual require-
ments, and business principles and objectives) as highlighted by Jones and Ashen-
den [94]. To examine this process from a general perspective, this section consid-
ers the work of Firesmith [59].
In [59], as Firesmith researches the topic of engineering security require-
ments, he outlines some of the most basic and crucial precursors to defining
requirements, and thus generally, security actions. These factors, as inferred in
Figure 6.1, include the identification of assets and services to be protected, anal-
ysis of their innate vulnerabilities and also a review of the security threats which
endanger the assets. Only after this process has been carried out can appropriate
and ultimately useful requirements be ascertained.
Assets and
Services
Security
Threats
Security
Requirements
Security
Mechanisms
are
vulnerable
to
necessitate require
counterprotect
Figure 6.1: Relation of requirements to assets, threats and mechanisms [59]
To consider the process in Figure 6.1 formally and in a comprehensive
organizational context, this series of tasks constitute a process analogous to that
of Risk Management (RM). RM here, and as defined in its most basic form by
ISO [90], represents the full complement of coordinated activities to direct and
control an organization with regard to the risks it faces.
Reflecting on the comparison made above, the activities to determine risks
(in RM) are similar to the ‘identification of assets and services, and the threats
to which they are vulnerable to’ (the first two boxes in Figure 6.1). Whereas
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the activities to control an organization’s risks (in RM) are held to match to the
‘definition of security requirements, or generally security actions, and respective
mechanisms’ (the last two boxes in Figure 6.1). The tight association of risks with
assets, threats and vulnerabilities is not surprising, and can be seen in various
articles such as [67, 52, 106]. For a more detailed definition of RM which is within
an IT-specific context, readers are referred to [195].
To aid in the complex process of managing organizational security risks,
an abundance of methodologies has been offered and researched. These proposals
target not only RM in its entirety, but also inclusive tasks such as risk analysis
which is defined as, “systematic use of information to identify sources and to
estimate the risk” [90] (p.5). Following on from this definition, key intentions of
the analysis therefore include the identification and assessment of risks, plus their
subsequent valuation [67, 196, 215].
Returning to the discussion on RM, RM methodologies include the NIST
SP 800-30: Risk Management Guide [195] and OCTAVE [24, 3]. Focusing on
component stages within RM, CORAS [47], ISRAM [99] and the IS risk analysis
based on a business model [196] (hereafter, ISBBM) provide good examples for
risk assessment and analysis processes. Combined, these form the main refer-
ence methodologies for this chapter’s work. Their effectiveness, popularity and
extensive documentation are the main driving factors behind selection.
The wide variety of methodologies available to manage, assess and treat
risks is undoubtedly of great use and benefit to businesses. By having a number
of choices, organizations can adopt one or a combination of methods that best
addresses their needs and also fits their respective company structure and cul-
ture. This is with full appreciation that different methods will have varying uses,
strengths and weaknesses, and may stress a dissimilar set of aspects. To consider
OCTAVE for example, its creators clearly identify it as being targeted at organi-
zational risk and focused on strategic, practice-related issues; this is as opposed
to a technology-focused assessment mechanism targeted at technological risk [3].
Conversely, in the Risk Management Guide provided by NIST, the ultimate goal
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is stated as aiding organizations to better manage IT-related mission risks [195].
This is one example of two methodologies targeting different levels of risk.
A similar scenario is apparent in the comparison of risk analysis method-
ologies when assessing the way risks are valued and prioritized. Vorster and
Labuschange [215] identify this as they examine and compare a number of risk
analysis methodologies. Possibly the best example of the difference in focus can be
seen in the formulae of risk valuation used by the CORAS and ISRAM processes.
Vorster and Labuschange concluded that CORAS prefers simplicity and thus
provides a simple ‘impact and probability’ approach to determine loss, whereas
ISRAM employs a complicated, all-inclusive formula to value risk, thereby stress-
ing accuracy of valuation over simplicity.
The focal point of the previous two paragraphs is that with different
methodologies, different factors will be stressed, different tools used, and ulti-
mately a wide range of security actions and requirements will be determined.
These actions, even at this high level, are likely to be very dissimilar across com-
panies.
6.3 Security Actions Analysis
6.3.1 Justification of Approach Chosen
Having provided an overview of the process in which security actions are deter-
mined, this section aims to narrow that scope and investigate the primary fac-
tors which influence action derivation. To conduct this investigation, two of the
most intuitive approaches are methodology-by-methodology or RM stage-by-RM
stage. The first option involves individually examining a range of methodologies
and then identifying the pertinent factors. The second approach differs as it de-
composes RM into smaller stages, and then identifies the factors applied by each
methodology at that respective stage.
For the investigation, the latter of these options was preferred. The reason
for this was twofold. Firstly, using general RM stages allows for methodologies
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to be concisely compared and contrasted. Secondly, this method provides an
excellent opportunity to define some major processes that constitute RM such as
risk assessment, risk analysis and risk evaluation. These processes, albeit very
mature in practice, are at times still equivocally defined; for example see [90,
106, 195] in terms of risk analysis versus risk assessment, and [106, 196, 215] as
compared to [67, 161] on the core objectives of a risk analysis.
As previously defined in ISO [90], RM is the umbrella term for activities
to direct and control risk. Within this process ISO has identified a number of
activities. A subset of the most critical of these is presented in Figure 6.2.
Risk Management
Risk Assessment
Risk Analysis
Source Identification
Risk Estimation
Risk Evaluation
Risk Treatment
Risk Acceptance
Risk Communication
Figure 6.2: Relationship between RM processes (adapted from [90])
From the illustration in Figure 6.2, one can easily grasp the relationships
between these processes and put each into context with regards to the overarching
RM task. The focus of the following section’s analysis is on the lower level, well-
defined, core processes of source identification (which we consider analogous to
risk identification, a view seemingly shared by Munteanu [129]), risk estimation,
risk evaluation and risk treatment. For ease of reference, the factors that play a
pivotal role are italicized.
6.3.2 Factors Influencing Security Action Determination
Risk Identification is defined as the “process to find, list and characterize
elements of risk” [90] (p.5). In simple terms this process identifies the risk to
the organization, system and so on. Within the methodologies assessed, it was
found that the general consensus (as shared by CORAS, OCTAVE, ISBBM and
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Landoll [106]) as to the factors which help ascertain risks is based strongly on
assets, their vulnerabilities and the threats to them; this finding confirms the prior
analysis in Section 6.2.2.
In other methods such as the NIST Guide, the concept of risk identification
is not as definitive. In assessing their definition of risk and their Risk Determi-
nation stage however, it is clear that they heavily associate the notion of risk not
only with assets, vulnerabilities and threats, but also with the likelihood of threat
occurrence and potential of impact (if the threat occurs). This definition suggests
another way (in terms of valuation) that risks can be initially viewed. Hogganvik
and Stølen [83] give an example of other work which holds a similar perspective
of risk.
Risk Estimation follows, and is the “process used to assign values to the
probability and consequences of a risk” [90] (p.6). This stage, also known as risk
valuation, is often regarded [196, 161, 205] as one of the most critical in a risk
analysis. As implied from the ISO definition, the probability or likelihood of a risk
occurring and the consequence or impact if it materializes, are two critical factors
to estimating the value or level of a risk. This perspective is supported by the
fact that ISRAM, OCTAVE, ISBBM, CORAS and published texts [106, 161] all
employ these factors, even if only as the basis for more complicated estimations.
Beyond probability and consequence, Kairab [97] introduces a third factor
which focuses on the importance of assessing the effectiveness of existing con-
trols (a control is a risk-reducing measure) in reducing a risk to an acceptable
level. This factor acknowledges that the adequacy of a control directly affects
the possibility that a risk will materialize, and thus should have a value which is
considered in the final risk value estimated.
Thus far, all the methodologies assessed aim to be high-level and therefore
either focusing on general organizational or IT risks. As the lower-level of WS
is important to this work however, assessing Web application risk approaches is
necessary for a comprehensive analysis. To facilitate this evaluation and identify
more influential factors within risk estimation, the DREAD model [118] of risk
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estimation was examined. Apart from its suitability at the Web application layer,
this model was selected because it was supported by a market-leading company,
that is, the Microsoft Corporation.
The DREAD model uses the Damage potential (how great is the damage
if the vulnerability is exploited), Reproducibility (how easy is it to reproduce
the attack), Exploitability (how easy is it to launch an attack), Affected users
(roughly, how many users are affected) and Discoverability (how easy is it to find
the vulnerability) factors to assess and ascertain a qualitative rating for risks.
As compared to the previous methodologies, DREAD, albeit targeted at a lower
level, is not drastically different. The ‘Damage potential’ and ‘affected users’
aspects for example are simply specific categorizations of an impact, whereas the
three other factors can influence the probability of a risk occurring. For example,
if it is easy for an attacker to discover a vulnerability (the Discoverability factor)
then the probability of it occurring will be higher.
Risk Evaluation’s purpose is to compare the estimated risks against a
given risk criterion to determine the significance of the risk [90]. As stated by
ISO [90], risk criteria will normally include associated costs and benefits, legal
and statutory requirements, socio-economic aspects, concerns of stakeholders and
the determined risk priorities. With regards to the chosen methodologies, only
CORAS treats risk evaluation as a separate stage. However, even in CORAS’
case, it only encourages finalizing the risk values and therefore does not state
any specific influencing factors/criteria. In OCTAVE, evaluation is a part of risk
analysis, whereas ISRAM and ISBBM exclude risk evaluation—probably because
they are strictly risk analysis methods. Lastly, the NIST Guide moves from Risk
estimation directly to assessing control recommendations to reduce risk levels.
Risk Treatment is the final stage to be examined and entails a “process
of selection and implementation of measures to modify risk . . . treatment mea-
sures can include avoiding, optimizing, transferring or retaining risk” [90] (p.6).
Having estimated and evaluated the risks, the next task is deciding how they are
to be treated/addressed (a salient fact being that not all risk might be mitigated).
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In making this decision, the NIST Guide stresses the consideration of various fac-
tors. Some of the most distinct are legislation and regulations (do any laws affect
the decision), organizational policy (are any business policies to be assessed) and
cost-benefit analysis of recommended controls (what is the cost—maybe finan-
cial, operational, feasibility—of treatment compared to benefit or effectiveness of
control implementation).
To look more closely at the cost-benefit analysis and what is involved,
Houmb and Georg [84] provide an excellent example of how some of the aspects
mentioned above influence the determination of the treatments. Key factors
identified are policies, regulations, risk priorities and treatment effects and costs.
Apart from OCTAVE which emphasizes the influence of stakeholders, none of the
other methodologies specially focus on new risk treatment factors.
The next section uses the factors highlighted above to create a represen-
tative ontology design.
6.4 Ontology Design
6.4.1 Ontology Use
An ontology can be defined as a set of assertions meant to model some particular
domain [53]. These assertions can be very formal (see Fensel [55]) and thus
utilize special languages such as Web Ontology Language (OWL). However, they
can also be considerably high-level and therefore use conceptualizations such as
diagrams and object-oriented models [53, 164]. Regardless of the level conceived,
a prime use of an ontology is in providing a shared understanding of a domain
that can be communicated between people and application systems [55]. This
fact is the main motivation for applying an ontology in this research.
Specifically, the ontology is used to produce a high-level relational model
of the most pertinent factors from the RM process which influence security ac-
tions and requirements derivation. This model would act as a common reference
point to communicate the relationships of factors between companies and their
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personnel. Furthermore, it would be used as the basis for a tool to help in security
actions comparison and negotiation. In the following section, the related work is
reviewed before presenting the ontology design.
6.4.2 Related Ontologies and Models
There have been numerous articles presented which research into and use ontolo-
gies to convey ideas and knowledge in their respective domains. The most note-
worthy and relevant of these articles are reviewed below with the aim of drawing
attention to their individual use and identifying some key concepts within their
models. As before, concepts identified are italicized. It is worth noting that in
all of these articles, a diagrammatic ontology design is included, even though not
always presented (due to space considerations) in this review.
As identified previously, an ontology is a prime candidate for use in the field
of knowledge representation, sharing and management. Fenz and Ekelhart [56]
exemplify this fact as they develop and present a security ontology to formally
model information security domain knowledge. Additionally, their model is in-
tended to include concepts and relations used by common information security
risk management methodologies, thereby extending its scope. From the high-level
ontology model developed and shown in Figure 6.3, some of the main constituent
concepts are organization, asset, threat, security attribute, vulnerability, control
and standard control.
Figure 6.3: Security relationships concepts in [56]
6. An Ontology for Defining Factors Influencing Security Actions 152
Tsoumas and Gritzalis [209] also employ an ontology as a knowledge re-
source for the foundation of their work. They investigate the topic of security
management and provide a framework for reusable security knowledge interop-
erability, aggregation and reasoning. Their goal is to exploit security knowledge
from a range of useful and diverse resource sets. The ultimate aim is to provide
a structured approach to help security experts to consider these various informa-
tion sources and better transition from high level statements from risk analysis
documents to deployable technical security controls. Their framework uses a Risk
Analysis Security Ontology as a basis for its development and some of its most
pertinent concepts include assets, vulnerabilities, impact, security policy, controls
and countermeasures.
Within the CORAS method previously assessed, several supporting mod-
els have been defined which give special emphasis to aspects such as risks and
security requirements. Two of these models can be found in [72] and [46]. Un-
like the other articles above which are geared towards formal ontologies, the aim
of these models is to use a visual depiction to convey meaning and to illustrate
relations between important risk assessment concepts. The aspects prevalent in
these models include risks, risk value, assets, asset values, security requirements,
security policy, unwanted incidents, likelihood and treatment.
The next model for review is seen in Firesmith’s article [60]. In that re-
search, Firesmith hypothesizes about utilizing reusable, parameterized templates
for specifying security requirements. One of his first tasks in that process is the
clear definition of a conceptual model including factors which influence security
requirements and the relationships between them. The resulting model is one
of the most comprehensive and complements its design by describing terms and
concepts used. Some of these terms are security, security risk, security goal, se-
curity requirement, security policy, security mechanism, harm, attack, people and
property.
Mayer et al. [116] define another intriguing ontology targeted specifically
towards the information system security risk management domain. This is de-
6. An Ontology for Defining Factors Influencing Security Actions 153
picted in Figure 6.4. The purpose behind this ontology is its further use as
a meta-model for the security risk management modelling language which the
authors intend to define. The main relevance with this meta-model is its strong
base in RM literature to define and relate the concepts. Concepts in their domain
model include risk, event, impact, vulnerability, attack method, asset, security cri-
terion, risk treatment, security requirement and control.
Figure 6.4: IS Security Risk Management meta-model ([116])
The last ontology of interest is that introduced by Houmb and Georg [84].
The primary aim of that model is to illustrate the key concepts involved in their
risk assessment framework. Once identified, these concepts are then used to
specify and compute the Return of Security Investment for the various treatment
strategies available. This ontology and its concepts are similar to those previously
discussed, but its most salient factor is the explicit inclusion of risk level and
constituent elements such as frequency and impact.
The works discussed above provide excellent examples of how ontologies
and models can be employed for various purposes within security and risk-related
processes. Considering the suitability of these conceptualizations to the identifi-
cation of factors influencing security actions determination (one of the core pur-
poses of this chapter) however, none of them alone offers an adequate foundation.
In [209, 60] for example, the ontologies seem to be reasonably comprehensive (in
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that they span from risk identification to risk treatment), however neither appre-
ciates the importance of a risk level/priority concept. A similar case is apparent
with Fenz and Ekelhart [56], as they also do not include the concept of a risk or
risk level/priority. Only at a lower ontological level do they begin to consider rat-
ings for the effectiveness of control implementations and probabilities of threats
occurring.
In addition to the CORAS models, the proposals in [84, 116] were the
most relevant models. This is likely due to the grounding of the models in RM
methodologies. Mayer et al. [116] especially adopt a comparable approach to that
used in this chapter to define their domain model. One core problem with some
of these conceptualizations however, like their counterparts above, is that they do
not show—either explicitly or implicitly—an appreciation for varying approaches
to treat or handle the evaluated risks. In [46, 84] for example, based on their
models and concept definitions, the authors apparently consider risk treatment
only as a method to reduce the risk and its severity (usually in terms of impact
or probability). Unless there is some implicit meaning associated with these
concepts which gives them a wider range, these therefore exclude the different
types of security actions discussed in Section 6.2.1 which are output from RM
methodologies.
In the context of this research, another shortcoming suffered by all the
models was their predominant focus on risks (including constituent elements such
as vulnerabilities, threats and probabilities) and risk mitigation aspects (for ex-
ample, security requirements and controls). This was as opposed to appreciating
other important factors that aid companies in determining the actual security
action or risk treatment. Examples of such factors from the NIST Guide include
company policies or country laws and regulations.
Comparing the reviewed ontologies and models with the various stages in
the RM process from Section 6.3.2, for risk identification, factors previously out-
lined such as asset, vulnerability, threat, unwanted incident are generally included
in the models. Within risk estimation, only the factors of likelihood (held to be
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synonymous with frequency and probability), consequence (or impact) and end
priority (or risk value) can be constantly seen. Whereas for risk evaluation and
treatment, none of the models explicitly consider laws, organizational policies or
costs, as influential factors in deciding risk treatment specifically. Therefore, even
though these models may be suited for their individual purposes, for the reasons
outlined above, they are inadequate candidates for use “as is” in this research.
The next section of this chapter will build on and reuse parts of these ontologies
and models, and factors from Section 6.3.2, to design an appropriate ontology.
6.4.3 Risk-based Ontology
Under the guidance of the ontology creation methodology in King and Reinold [104],
and a thorough examination of factors which influence security actions and re-
quirements, the high-level ontology depicted in Figure 6.5 was developed. This
ontology will be critical in supporting the progression between phases, and sub-
sequent comparison of security actions across companies during BOF4WSS.
In defining this ontology, special emphasis was placed on including factors
that were heavily supported in the literature reviewed in previous sections. A
UML-type notation was preferred to specify this design as it provides a stan-
dard, widely accepted modelling tool to describe concepts and their relations.
No standard ontology design notation was identified at the time of writing. The
application of UML to ontology modelling is discussed by Wongthongtham [220],
and examples of its use can be seen in Falbo et al. [54] and less explicitly in
Houmb and Georg [84].
As a risk is the first significant point of contact, this discussion commences
there. The identification of a risk typically involves an analysis of the vulnerabili-
ties in assets and the threats leveraged by threat agents to exploit these vulnera-
bilities. A vulnerability is thus regarded as a weakness in an asset or an existing
security element intended to protect an asset, an asset is anything of value to a
business, a threat is an undesired event with an adverse impact on an asset, and
lastly a threat agent is the cause of the threat [106]. Each of these aspects can
6. An Ontology for Defining Factors Influencing Security Actions 156
Asset
has
Risk
ThreatThreatAgent Vulnerability
exploits
has
leverages
Risk Level
Security Action
Contractual
Obligations
Security
Budget
Policy
considers
considers
implemented by
Legend
A is related to B
B is a subclass of A
B is made up of A
A B
A B
A B
Mitigation
Action
Transference
Action
Preventative Detective Corrective
Risk Rating Factor
Impact Factor ProbabilityFactor
Adequacy of
Controls Factor
Business
Policy
Security
Policy
Avoidance
Action
Acceptance
Action
ControlSecurity
Requirement
uses
Laws and
Regulations
measures
effectiveness
of
Administrative
Physical
Technical
People
Service
Property
Intentional
Natural
Accidental
Security
Attribute
affects
requires
Treatment
Coverage Level
Natural Human
Environmental
Figure 6.5: Risk-based ontology
be further decomposed to display specific types as shown in the diagram. These
types are self-explanatory and are therefore not explained in detail.
A vulnerability can be technical, administrative or physical [106]. As
shown by Firesmith [60], a company’s assets can be generally regarded as its
people, its property (hardware, software, data or facility) or the service (that is,
an activity) provided. If one were assessing WS therefore, most assets would be
of type property or service. A threat is typically an intentional, accidental or
natural (floods or hurricanes) event [160]. Lastly, a threat agent can be natural,
human or environmental (long-term power failure or chemicals) [195]. Readers
are directed to Jones and Ashenden [94] for more information on threat agents
including the elements needed for them to be effective, for example, motivation,
capability, opportunity and catalyst.
Under the heading of risk identification, the security attribute concept
which is identified by Fenz and Ekelhart [56] was included in the ontology. A
security attribute is a property of an asset that is to be preserved and is another
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term for an information security goal. Examples of attributes are confidentiality,
integrity, availability and accountability. The benefit of the inclusion of a security
attribute in the ontology is its ability to allow for a standard relationship between
an asset and the threat which it may be affected by. In reality, an asset requires
a certain security property, whereas a threat when executed will affect that se-
curity property. For example, sensitive data is required to be kept confidential,
however if a hacker breaks into the database this will invariably compromise the
confidentiality of that data.
Regarding risk estimation, the risk level concept is explicitly employed to
represent the goal of this RM stage. Therefore, a risk after estimation has (or
is assigned) a risk level. This level in essence is the value or priority grade indi-
cating the severity of the risk. In determining the level, the following risk rating
factors were found to be the most pertinent based on their acceptance and cover-
age: impact—the consequence (financial, reputation or client-related) if the risk
materializes, probability—the likelihood the risk will occur, based on frequency
of past occurrences and subjective estimation factors (such as intuition, educated
guesses and indirect information) [3] (probability is estimated without consider-
ation of any controls that might be in place, similar to work by Kairab [97]), and
adequacy of controls—the measures adopted and their effectiveness to mitigate
risk associated with vulnerabilities [97].
The factors within DREAD were considered but subsequently discarded
due to their close links (discussed above) with the already included impact and
probability concepts. The theory behind rating factors however is very open to
interpretation and expression at varying levels of detail. Because of this, the
intended use of the model will be the critical factor in deciding whether or not to
include these aspects. The relationship between the factors chosen and risk level
is depicted by the risk rating factor concept.
Security action is primarily linked to the risk treatment stage and refers to
any way in which a company treats or handles a risk it faces. As stated in previous
sections, to decide on a method (namely security action or risk treatment action)
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to address a risk, a number of factors should be considered. The most critical
of these identified in this work are the risk level, relevant laws and regulations,
contractual obligations (that a company is previously legally binded to), the secu-
rity budget (balancing security actions and limited resources is paramount), and
policies, decomposed into business-related (organizational principles, business re-
quirements) and security-specific (unique, tailored security directives). This ac-
counts for the ‘considers’ relationship from security action to these concepts.
Emerging from the security action concept itself, specific types of actions
(supported by [94, 106, 205]) are apparent. These are acceptance actions (if
risk level is negligible or cost to mitigate exceed value of the asset), mitigation
actions (given a risk is to be mitigated, that is, its level reduced to an acceptable
degree), transference actions (if risk is to be assigned to another party through
insurance), and avoidance actions (if the risk is handled by eliminating the risk
cause, for example decommissioning the vulnerable asset). As with any subtype-
to-type relationship, aspects considered by the security action are also noted for
sub-actions. A similar example of the security action and sub-action concepts is
given by Falbo et al. [54]. Even though the four types of action listed are not the
only types seen in the literature (see Stoneburner et al. [195]), they are the most
common and accepted generalizations.
The security requirement concept is used by the mitigation action to define
high-to-medium level desires with respect to the information security goals. These
security desires (when implemented) act to reduce the identified risk to an accept-
able level or simply mitigate the risk. To implement the security requirement to
a more detailed extent a control is employed. A control is broadly defined as any
risk-reducing measure, technical or non-technical [195]. Control types prevalent
in the literature and included in this design are preventative—measures to deter
undesirable events from occurring, detective—measures that indicate an undesir-
able event has happened, and corrective—measures to correct, or recover from
the damage caused by undesirable events [106]. The relations adopted in this on-
tology between mitigation action, security requirement and control are supported
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by Mayer et al. [116].
The final concept presented is the treatment association concept. This
attempts to further describe the relationship between the risk and security action.
In the handling or treating of a risk, reality dictates that a security action might
not always completely address a particular risk. Practitioners often accept that
some of the risk is left behind. This ‘left over’ risk is commonly referred to as the
residual risk [195]. The treatment association concept in the ontology therefore
seeks to capture the known degree to which an action covers a risk. This degree is
represented in the coverage level attribute of the treatment concept. For example,
a company may note that a particular security action only offers ‘partial treatment
coverage’ for a stated security risk.
6.5 Summary
In this chapter an analysis was conducted into the various risk-related method-
ologies in practice that are used to determine security actions and requirements.
This assessment enabled the identification of several critical factors within the
literature which influence how security actions are derived. With these factors
identified, an ontology was used to model them and construct a conceptual rep-
resentation of their relationships to each other. These tasks fulfilled the aims of
this chapter, which were to expand on the Solution Model from Chapter 5 and
implement the Security Action Analysis and Ontology Design components.
The real novelty of the ontology designed in this chapter is its emphasis
on the core factors that influence the definition of a security action. This focus,
coupled with the model’s appreciation of multiple ways to treat risks, form the
main differentiating characteristics when compared to existing security ontologies.
The next research steps include using the ontology to define a formal XML-
based language and creating a Risk Catalogue to aid in comparing security ac-
tions across companies. These steps form part of the following chapter which
documents the development of the system that implements the Solution Model.
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Chapter 7
Security Action Specification &
Comparison System (SASaCS)
Prototype
At times, especially when the new system is an attempt to push the state of the
art, it may be necessary to build a preliminary prototype as a proof of the con-
cept. New solutions, particularly those based on new technology, may not be well
accepted or well understood. In that situation, the project team can build a proof
of concept prototype to illustrate that a solution is possible and feasible. — John
W. Satzinger, Robert B. Jackson and Stephen D. Burd
7.1 Introduction
The work in the previous chapter began the implementation of the Solution Model
from Chapter 5 with the Security Actions Analysis and Ontology Design steps.
This chapter continues the Model’s implementation by concentrating on the re-
maining steps and the system which they jointly result in. The three aims of
Chapter 7 therefore are as follows.
The first aim is to introduce the aforementioned system, which is named
the Security Action Specification and Comparison System (SASaCS). This is the
system which the Solution Model culminates in and is responsible for matching
risks and comparing their resulting security actions across companies. Secondly,
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the chapter aims to report on how the prototype of SASaCS was created, including
functionality, key design decisions and so on. Finally, there is a brief presentation
of the developed prototype itself. This is intended to complement the chapter by
adding visuals to the largely theoretical discourse.
In keeping with the notion of a prototype, the developed system is pri-
marily intended as a proof-of-concept of the research ideas which underpin this
doctoral research. This prototype also enables these research ideas to be practi-
cally explored, but more importantly, critically evaluated in subsequent sections.
To achieve the aims above, this chapter starts by providing an overview
of SASaCS’s goals. This is especially with respect to the Solution Model it
implements. Next, a general description of the development methodology applied
when creating the system is presented. Following this, design documentation is
outlined for the complete version of SASaCS. This provides further insight for
readers into the system’s overarching goals.
Finally, the scope of the implemented prototype is discussed. At that point,
the main goal is to describe the functionality of the prototype in the context of the
full system, and to present the justification of key design and implementation de-
cisions made. Exhaustive reporting on the prototype’s development was avoided
because the prime emphasis of this research is the research ideas it embodies.
7.2 SASaCS Overview
SASaCS has its roots in the Solution Model and ‘Solution Model in action’ con-
structs (from Sections 5.3 and 5.4 respectively) and consequently many of the
system’s aims and components mirror those models. To recap, the general goal
of those constructs was to facilitate the streamlining or significant automation of
the security actions negotiation process across interacting companies. By fulfill-
ing this goal, the transition from the Requirements Elicitation to Negotiations
phases in BOF4WSS should be much quicker and considerably less arduous on
companies and their personnel. The next two paragraphs look in more detail at
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the goals and functionality expected of SASaCS.
As discussed in Section 5.4, the first step would be businesses choosing risks
from the Risk Catalogue (updating it as necessary) which are to be considered
in the scenario. Next, companies would conduct their preferred RM methodolo-
gies to assess and define treatments for existing and any newly discovered risks.
Findings and output from each company’s RM methodologies would be entered
into SASaCS and then encoded into an XML-based language. This language is
the one discussed in the Solution Model which is based on the ontology from
Chapter 6. For ease of reference, the language is called SADML (Security Action
Definition Markup Language) and its actual creation is discussed later.
Documents from companies in the SADML format would then be processed
by the system according to any preferences set by businesses’ personnel. Security
actions would next be compared by the system as much as is automatically pos-
sible. Detailed information on risks and security actions being compared would
then be output to users. Where matching was not achievable or desired common-
alities across documents were not identified, inconsistencies would be flagged for
follow-up by business analysts and security professionals from companies. With
this overview complete, the next section presents the methodology which guided
the development of SASaCS.
7.3 Development Methodology
Sommerville [193] identifies four fundamental activities common to all develop-
ment processes: Specification or Requirements Engineering, which defines the
functionality of the system and constraints on its operation; Design and Im-
plementation, that is, producing systems that meet specification; Validation, or
ensuring systems meet their intended purpose; and Evolution which is having
systems evolve to meet their changing needs. These activities enable systems to
be developed in a structured manner to suit their varying aims.
For the development of SASaCS, these four activities were conducted (or in
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the case of Evolution, are expected to be conducted) in a largely sequential fashion
analogous to the Waterfall Model (WM) methodology of systems development
(see van Vliet [213] for details). This methodology allowed for a well-organized
and highly structured approach to development.
Albeit a useful technique, the WM does have a few shortcomings in terms
of being too mechanical or rigid, especially in lower-level tasks such as require-
ments elicitation, discovery and testing. To compensate for this, the Prototyping
development technique was also utilized. Prototyping refers to the “iterative pro-
cess of developing an experimental system” [193] (p.395), and it is regarded as
an extremely useful technique to employ throughout systems development (for
example, to gather requirements, test systems and so on ([23, 193]). The use
of Prototyping within the general software development process is discussed by
Sommerville [193] and specifically in the WM by Cerpa and Verner [23].
Feasibility Study
Requirements Elicitation & Analysis
Requirements Specification
Requirements Validation
Specification/
Requirements
Engineering
Design and
Implementation
Validation
Architectural design
Abstract Specification
Interface Design
Component Design
Data Structure Design
Algorithm Design
Implementation
User Interface Design
Component/unit Testing
System Testing
Acceptance Testing
output:system models, prototypes,
scenarios, use cases
output:user & system requirements
(UML models)
output:system architecture,
architectural design document
output:software specification
Figure 7.1: Fundamental activities in systems development ([193])
Figure 7.1 (based on Sommerville [193]) shows the main activities which
guided SASaCS development in greater detail. In the diagram, the Evolution
stage is excluded because it is not critical to this discussion. Additionally, for
the benefit of the reader, Figure 7.1 provides an example of some of the output
produced by activities. The next section focuses on the Specification and mainly
Architectural Design phases displayed in the graphic.
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7.4 SASaCS Development
7.4.1 Requirements Specification
As shown in Figure 7.1, the Requirements Elicitation and Analysis tasks are
key activities within Specification/Requirements Engineering. To facilitate the
gathering of requirements for SASaCS, the two techniques used were analysis
of scenarios (that is, real-life examples or narrations of how the system would
work) and small-scale prototypes. These enabled varying levels and perspectives
of requirements to be viewed. The main scenario used is documented below.
Typical Scenario: Company A and Company B first select a set of
pertinent risks from an independently owned and moderated central risks
catalogue/listing. These risks will factor into their RM methodologies. This
is done to ensure that both companies start from the same point concern-
ing the security risks which face the envisioned business scenario. The
central risks listing is to be extensive and updated regularly. Public sub-
missions/suggestions of risks are to be allowed, but moderated by third
party security professionals.
Having selected the security risks, companies individually apply their
methodologies. If new risks are identified, these are shared with the business
partners to ensure all entities consider the same risks. After each company’s
general RM process, the findings and documentation produced are entered
into SASaCS. The system enables users to select the risks agreed previously
and add respective information on (i) their security actions, that is, how
the company has decided to handle the risks, and (ii) the various aspects
(such as laws, risks’ severity levels and so on) that have influenced how
the company treats the risk. Once complete, the system encodes all the
information entered into a standardized document format.
Personnel from Company A and Company B would then meet up, bring-
ing together their documents with the encoded information. These docu-
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ments are fed into the comparison feature of the SASaCS tool. The system
is expected to match the risks and compare the treatment of risks across
companies. This therefore enables an easier negotiation, discussion and
reconciliation of conflicting security actions. Various settings should also
be available in the system to allow detailed security action and risk data
comparison. Output of the system should be (i) a user-friendly interface
where security actions and the related security risks are matched to some
degree and displayed, and (ii) a list of flagged inconsistencies that represent
exceptional situations and thus should be discussed by companies’ analysts
and security professionals.
This scenario of how the developed system would be used offers a general
view of the major tasks that a fully implemented SASaCS should accommodate.
With this documented, the next objective was a scenario analysis to determine
and formally state the requirements of the system. The output of this analysis
is included in a UML diagram in Figure 7.2. The UML use case diagram was
preferred as it is a largely accepted graphical modelling technique to express
system behaviours and functional requirements [193].
To briefly explain the use case diagram, the large box on the right repre-
sents the actual system, which in this case is SASaCS. The two entities on the left
are external actors (or persons) that interact with the system. Within the system
box, there are a number of use case ovals which provide a top-level description
of the behaviour that the system is to exhibit. Figure 7.2 employs a uses
notation to show where system behaviour is part of a larger task. For exam-
ple, the ‘Maintain accessible central risk listing’ behaviour is comprised of the
‘Update global risk listing’ and ‘Accept new risk submissions’ tasks. Conversely,
the extends notation is employed to show where sub-tasks are optional, for
example, ‘Synchronize to global risk listing’ may or may not occur during the
execution of the ‘Maintain local risk listing’ task. Finally, actor-to-use case lines
are used to connect actors and the specific use cases within the system with which
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central risk listing
Update central risk
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Accept new risk
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central risk listing
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dology (RiM) findings &
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Allow user input of
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Allow referencing of
local risk listing
Produce document
with encoded RiM
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Process documents
with security actions
4. Compare & assess
security actions
Identify similarities
& disparities in
documents
Present output to
system users
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Independent Security
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«extends»
«uses» «uses»
«uses»
«uses»
«uses»
«uses»
Company
«uses»
Allow input of security
actions & supporting
factors
Figure 7.2: Use case model of the complete SASaCS version
they interact.
Progressing from the diagram’s notation itself, there are four main use
cases: ‘Maintain accessible central risk listing’, ‘Maintain local risk listing’, ‘En-
code Risk Methodology (RiM) findings & security actions’ and ‘Compare and
assess security actions’. The tasks involved in these use cases largely mirror the
activities discussed in the typical case scenario above. Furthermore, in some sit-
uations they add detail on how the activities may be executed (for example, the
‘Synchronize local to central risk listing’ case expands on how a local risk listing
is maintained). As a result of these two factors, this section does not provide
further descriptions of these use cases.
To accompany a use case diagram, Lunn [113] advocates the application of
use case descriptions and documentation templates. These templates tend to be
very useful as they enable more detail to be provided for the cases outlined in the
diagram. Sommerville [193] adds to the discussion and notes that use cases can
be further supplemented with UML sequence diagrams. The benefit of these is
their ability to expand on a use case and provide a graphical, low-level model of
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the sequence of interactions which constitute it. Both these techniques (templates
and sequence diagrams) were employed to aid in the Requirements Engineering
activity during SASaCS development.
Having provided an outline of the functionality expected by SASaCS, the
next section takes a brief look at the design architecture. This provides an insight
into the general design ideas supporting the complete system and also sets the
context for the prototype implementation section which it precedes.
7.4.2 Architectural Design
The main goal with the architectural design stage is to lay the groundwork for a
system which will satisfy the previously specified requirements. Sommerville [193]
expands on this notion and describes the architectural design as being concerned
with “establishing a basic structural framework that identifies the major compo-
nents of a system and the communications between these components” (p.242).
Because of these aims, the design task is a critical undertaking where various
fundamental but important system decisions are made.
For SASaCS, the architecture design task was guided by [193] and there-
fore one of the main emphases was on identifying system components and their
interactions (readers can refer again to Figure 7.1 for the overview). The ar-
chitecture produced which is shown in Figure 7.3 is also heavily based on the
‘Solution Model in action’ construct. That model supplies a justification for the
architecture conceived. From Figure 7.3, one can also see the implementation
of the use case behaviours outlined in Figure 7.2. To supplement the diagram,
an example of a typical process flow is given. This example provides practical
insight and further detail into the workings of the model that were excluded from
the diagram to avoid clutter. Here are the steps.
1. Businesses reference the central Web site and agree on a risks catalogue
version to use for their interactions. Each entity then synchronizes their
local risk catalogue to the agreed Central Risk Catalogue.
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Figure 7.3: SASaCS architecture overview
2. Companies then carry out their individual risk identification processes for
the scenario, in which they also consider risks from their now-synchronized
local risks catalogue.
3. If risks are found which are not included in a business’ synchronized risks
catalogue, these are then communicated to the other parties so that all
of them can assess these risks in their subsequent risk assessment stages.
In more specific terms, companies will add these newly suggested risks to
their local risk catalogues and refer to them later during risk assessment
and ultimately data entry and encoding.
4. Businesses then branch off to continue conducting their RM methodologies.
Key aspects of interest include risk severity/priority levels and other fac-
tors that aided in how entities decided to treat the identified risks. Full
documentation should be made and kept.
5. Each entity would then input data from their RM methodology documen-
tation into the Data Entry interface of SASaCS. The aim is to get pertinent
information on risks and factors influencing risk treatment choices (that is,
security actions) into the system. A typical process for a single risk would
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be:
(a) Within the Data Entry interface, select a risk (the system would query
from the local risk catalogue to allow risks to be chosen)
(b) Find the selected risk in the risk methodology documentation
(c) Enter pertinent information related to the risk into the Data Entry
interface. This encompasses data on the risk’s severity level, factors
(such as policies, budgetary constraints and so on) that influenced the
decision to choose a security action to address that risk and, finally,
the security action itself.
6. After companies are finished, the Encoding interface of SASaCS allows them
to encode all the information entered and have it output in a SADML
document.
7. At the comparison and assessment stage, businesses then bring their docu-
ments together and allow them to be assessed by the Comparison features
of SASaCS.
8. The system validates the documents to ensure they are well-formed (a com-
mon XML check) and conform to purpose-built SADML schema rules.
9. The system conducts the comparison of security actions. The predefined,
shared risks are a critical component during comparison as they form the
common base on which security actions can be matched and compared.
Finally, the system outputs (i) a user-friendly report where security actions
and the related security risks for all companies are matched and displayed on
screen, and (ii) inconsistencies that represent exceptional situations which
need to be followed up and further discussed by companies’ personnel.
Having reported on the design of the full SASaCS version, the next section
narrows the scope to focus on the prototype system that was implemented.
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7.5 Prototype Implementation Scope
7.5.1 Functionality
In deciding on the implementation scope of the SASaCS prototype, emphasis was
placed on two aspects. First, identifying areas which would demonstrate some
of the core research ideas embodied in the system, and second, using areas that
provided a platform for a good evaluation which appreciated the limitations of this
project. The functionalities chosen which met this criteria were the ‘Encoding
of Risk Methodology (RiM) findings & security actions’ (Use case 3) and the
‘Comparison and assessing of security actions’ (Use case 4). These cases (viewable
in Figure 7.2) adequately characterize core underlying research themes and also
encompass the overarching goal of easing the progression between Requirements
Elicitation and Negotiations phases in BOF4WSS.
Use cases 1 and 2 were accepted as important to this research but their
implementation was not seen to add significant value to the prototype or any
subsequent evaluation of it. They were therefore excluded.
To expand briefly on the functionality of Use case 3, two enabling com-
ponents deserve mention. These are, the Risk Catalogue from which risks are
selected (this relates to both the central and local catalogues), and the SADML
format which is the formal language used to encode risk methodology findings
and security actions data. The former of these aspects encompasses the creation
of a simple database system and its population with risks data. As this task
is relatively trivial, further detail on the construction process is not given; the
database structure for the risks system can however be seen in the more general
entity diagrams in Appendix A.
The next enabling component promotes the SADML format as a novel
document format to define RM/RA data which may also have uses independently
of the SASaCS tool. Example usages of SADML include using it as a document
exchange format or for storage of RM data from various disparate techniques.
With appreciation of the novelties of this new XML-based format, the next section
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gives an overview.
7.5.2 Security Action Definition Markup Language
(SADML)
The structure of SADML was conceived to mirror the knowledge captured in the
ontology (from Chapter 6) and as such, a number of the ontology’s concepts have
been represented as XML elements/tags. To comply with XML’s hierarchical na-
ture it was necessary to define a sensible hierarchy of elements. Furthermore, this
structure would need to accommodate one-to-many relationships across elements
(for example, if a security policy relates to multiple security actions, this should
be appreciated). An excerpt of such a structure is displayed in Figure 7.4.
Asset
Risk(s)
Threat(s)
Threat
Agent
Vulnerabilities Risk Level
Acceptance
Action(s)
Impact
Factor
Probability
Factor
Adequacy of
Controls Factor
Mitigation
Action(s)
Laws and Reg-
ulations Refs
Security
Policy Refs
Coverage
Level
Same as Acce-
ptance Action
Laws and
Regulations
...
...
Security
Requirements
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
Level 4
Security
Policies ...
Figure 7.4: A hierarchical structure of the elements
As shown in Figure 7.4, the top-level elements are based around the secu-
rity actions and treatment factors (such as laws and policies). This was because
the security actions were found to be encompassing elements in which various
other concepts (for example, risks and threats) could be logically composed. Simi-
larly, the treatment factors were independent elements which were only referenced
(using XML elements/tags ending in ‘Refs’) in security actions. In practice there-
fore, there might be an acceptance action that addresses one or more risks, and
one or more security policies may have been used/referenced to determine that
action. Part of the SADML format is presented in Code Snippet 2. The + sign
indicates that there is additional data which is not displayed here.
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<needsBase xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns="urn:risksx-schema">
<mitigationActions>
<mitigationAction>
<name>Security action for auditing/logging purposes</name>
<details>Mitigation action for auditing/logging purposes</details>
<risks>
<risk id="GR1">
+ <threats>
+ <vulnerabilities>
+ <riskLevel value="high">
<riskComment>Risk associated with general logging, auditing, and ...</riskComment>
<riskActionCoverageOfRisk>
<coverageLevel>full coverage</coverageLevel>
<coverageDetail />
</riskActionCoverageOfRisk>
</risk>
+ <risk id="GR2">
</risks>
<lawAndRegulationRefs>
<lawAndRegulationRef idref="LR215"><relationToRiskAction /></lawAndRegulationRef>
</lawAndRegulationRefs>
+ <contractualObligationRefs>
<businessPolicyRefs />
+ <securityPolicyRefs>
<securityBudgetRefs />
<securityRequirementRefs>
<securityRequirementRef idref="SR230"> ... </securityRequirementRef>
</securityRequirementRefs>
</mitigationAction>
+ <mitigationAction>
</mitigationActions>
+ <acceptanceActions>
<transferenceActions />
<avoidanceActions />
<lawsAndRegulations>
<lawAndRegulation id="LR215">Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) requires that companies
maintain a ready available, verifiable audit trail and ... </lawAndRegulation>
</lawsAndRegulations>
+ <contractualObligations>
<businessPolicies />
+ <securityPolicies>
<securityBudgets />
<securityRequirements>
<securityRequirement id="SR230">A part of reliable business process execution both within
the company and externally, involves comprehensive logging ... </securityRequirement>
...
</securityRequirements>
</needsBase>
Code Snippet 2: SADML example
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The snippet gives a snapshot of the implemented XML hierarchy men-
tioned prior. The core of the SADML format is described in the XML schema
designed (indicated by urn:risksx-schema in the document).
The novelty of SADML is rooted in the unique perspective it gives on
security actions and the emphasis it places on aspects which have been overlooked
in other languages. From a review of the literature, only one related generic
(that is, not system-specific) XML-based language was identified. This was the
Enterprise Security Requirement Markup Language (ESRML) [176].
ESRML, as Roy et al. [176] note, is for specifying enterprise information
security requirements which are in compliance with the ISO 17799 standard. The
knowledge gap filled by this language is similar to the area targeted by SADML.
This is particularly as ESRML looks at (i) the higher layers of security and not
specifics such as access control (such as the eXtensible Access Control Markup
Language (XACML)) or identity management (such as the Security Assertion
Markup Language(SAML)), and (ii) sharing and exchanging the enterprise se-
curity information across companies for business purposes. The shortcomings of
ESRML in terms of this research stem from its lack of emphasis on factors which
significantly influence security actions, and its concentration on risk mitigation as
opposed to other ways to treat risks. These are areas addressed in SADML. With
the prototype’s scope now presented, the next section discusses some important
implementation decisions made.
7.5.3 Justification of Implementation Decisions
To implement the functionalities outlined for the prototype, three fundamental
questions were identified. These pertained to what software development tools
to employ, exactly what type of application—desktop versus Web-based—would
be most appropriate to build and lastly, for security actions comparison, should
the system be developed to accommodate any number of companies or would a
more manageable subset be adequate.
The answer to the first of these questions was found in the use of Mi-
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crosoft Visual Studio 2008 [126] (VB.NET language) and SQL Server 2005 [125]
to support SASaCS prototype development. These tools were preferred (to, for
example, a Java-based tool-set) because of the researcher’s previous experience
in working with them and the vast array of predefined controls available. Both of
these factors therefore acted to speed-up and enhance the development process.
The second decision related to the type of application created and this
was important because of the varying nuances linked to desktop and Web-based
applications (see Liberty and Hurwitz [109] for detailed benefits and differences).
After careful analysis, a desktop application was chosen as it allowed for the
development of a much more flexible solution in terms of user interface, data
entry and format of system output.
The final decision focused on the general question of whether the proto-
type’s comparison features should accommodate any number of companies, simi-
lar to the full SASaCS version, or if catering to a smaller subset of companies (for
example, two or three) would suffice. Following deliberations on this topic, it was
decided that allowing for these operations between two companies would suffice.
Although increasing the number of companies might be better as it would more
closely resemble the full system version, for the purposes of the prototype, the
added value of doing this did not merit the increased implementation complexity.
This was mainly because the general conceptual approach which would be applied
to two companies is also the way in which multiple companies would be handled.
7.6 Prototype
The purpose of this section is to complement the development discussion thus
far and display a few screenshots of the created SASaCS prototype tool. These
particular visuals were chosen as they exemplify implemented Use cases identified
previously. Four screenshots are shown in this section and an additional two in
Appendix A.
Figure 7.5 displays the data entry screen in which data on risks to the
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companies/scenario are added or edited. These data include information on the
relevant asset, vulnerability and threat. The retractable bottom half of the screen
is where information on the risk’s (priority) level is entered. The second screen-
shot in Figure 7.6 shows the Security Action data entry screen. The top holds
general information on the specific security action, in the middle there is a list
of risks which the action addresses and lastly, factors which influenced the risk
treatment choice are entered at the bottom of the screen.
Figure 7.5: SASaCS Risk Data Entry screenshot
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Progressing from the figures listed above which illustrate the data entry
features of Use case 3, Figure 7.7 focuses on Use case 4 and capturing the various
settings and options available in SASaCS to enhance security action comparisons.
Four individual tabs (on the left) are shown, each with numerous settings that
companies can modify to customize comparison tasks.
Figure 7.7: SASaCS Security Action Comparison Options screenshot
Generally, comparison settings include (i) outputting report data in HTML
or plain text (and thus more transferable and malleable) format, (ii) only display-
ing risks where there are conflicts in how companies handle them (this would be
based on security action types), (iii) allowing businesses to request to view shared
risks that are handled by specific security action types (for example, personnel
requesting to see risks that Company A wants to mitigate but Company B wants
to accept), (iv) outputting the report data in varying levels of detail, therefore
enabling companies to view bare minimum information (as done in Figure 7.8)
or all risk and treatment factor data (as shown in Appendix A), and lastly (v)
allowing comparisons to be conducted that factor in a risk’s priority level—this
parameter, for example, could enable risks with conflicting treatments to only
be output/shown if they are different risk levels/priorities. The setting in (v)
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is useful particularly if personnel suspect that the reason for conflicting security
actions is due to different perspectives on the respective risk’s priority.
The result of the security actions comparison is shown in Figure 7.8. This
diagram depicts the ‘user-friendly output interface (HTML is used) where security
actions and the related security risks are matched to some degree and displayed’,
which was mentioned in Figure 7.3. This output, presented in the form of a colour-
coded report (red is used to highlight conflicting actions), is expected to be one
of the key aids to businesses’ decision makers. With relevant information on a
conflicting security action viewable on screen, analysts and security professionals
could apply their judgment, immediately discuss the issue and agree on a course of
action. This removes various of the initial semantic issues, security requirements
format problems and difficulties emanating from incomplete security information.
Furthermore, if the output on screen shows the existence of few conflicting actions,
this might indicate that detailed negotiations are not required at this point as
companies have similar security postures.
Figure 7.8 is a screenshot of the output produced when the system was
set to execute a high-level comparison task of security actions across companies.
All of the features covered in this and the previous two paragraphs address re-
search Step 4 in Section 5.2.3. More detailed prototype diagrams can be seen in
Appendix A, which also includes different perspectives the SASaCS tool’s output.
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Figure 7.8: SASaCS Security Action Comparison output screenshot in Firefox
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7.7 Summary
This chapter introduced the implementation of the Solution Model (namely SASaCS)
and reported on the system prototype developed. The functionality selected for
the prototype was seen to adequately cover the core research areas and also to
give insight into the prime use of the Model and general SASaCS tool.
Having completed the main proposals of this research project, Chapter 8
commences the evaluation process. That chapter critically assesses whether the
SASaCS tool, and the ontology (from Chapter 6) which it is based on, are compat-
ible with existing Risk Management/Assessment approaches used by real-world
companies today. Compatibility is crucial considering the interaction required
between these approaches and the tool as exhibited in Figure 5.2 in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 8
Evaluating the Compatibility of
the Tool and Ontology
Compatible: able to exist together harmoniously — Collins Dictionary
8.1 Introduction
The evaluation process of this research contained two main stages, each with a
different method of analysis. The first stage is covered in this chapter and the
second in Chapter 9. Chapter 8’s evaluation task involved the assessment of the
Security Action Specification and Comparison System (SASaCS) tool and the
ontology (from Chapter 6) which it embodies. The overarching research point
which guided this evaluation stage was drawn from the unanswered query on
seamlessness of mapping (under Step 1) identified in Section 5.2.3.
In general therefore, this chapter aims to consider whether the tool and
ontology are compatible with (and thus allowed a good mapping to and from)
existing security Risk Management (RM) and Risk Assessment (RA) approaches.
Compatibility forms a vital requirement because, as the ‘Solution Model in ac-
tion’ in Chapter 5 depicts, there is a noteworthy degree of interaction between
RM/RA approaches (and their respective software outputs) and the SASaCS
tool. This involves risk data (from the Risk catalogue) being input into the RM
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process/software and output from that RM process/software (such as security
actions and influential factors) being input back into the SASaCS tool.
To achieve the aim of this chapter, first the evaluation method used is
presented and justified. A detailed assessment of how well RM/RA approaches
can be mapped to the tool and the underlying ontology is then presented. Special
attention is paid to particularly good mappings as this might highlight fields in
which the tool and ontology are better suited. Difficulties incurred are also of
great interest because these may suggest weaknesses in this work’s proposals or
areas where they will not apply.
The last section in the chapter pulls together the compatibility evaluation
of tool and ontology (and generally Solution Model) through the use of a full sce-
nario analysis. This enables a more complete evaluation of the proposals because
unlike the compatibility assessment preceding it, it progresses from the initial
Risk Catalogue to the final SASaCS output produced. Topics covered include:
how Risk Catalogue data is transferred to the RM/RA approaches/software (as
expected in Section 5.4), how typical RM/RA approach information is represented
in SADML, and finally, how close, if at all, SASaCS can bring together the dif-
ferent RM/RA approaches used by companies to ease transition in BOF4WSS.
8.2 Evaluation Method
To guide this evaluation and add structure to its process, the method for map-
ping security guidelines and standards to an existing ontology (both high-level
and formal) proposed by Fenz et al. [57] was employed. This provided a tested
technique in which data could be sourced from a security guideline, standard or
methodology and then mapped on to an existing ontology. Formally, the method-
ology’s steps are ontological analysis, knowledge base analysis, mapping
concepts and relations, mapping knowledge and lastly, evaluation; these
are described in future sections. Through the completion of most of these steps, a
detailed assessment was carried out to determine how well the tool and ontology
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mapped, and thus to ascertain how compatible these are with existing RM/RA
approaches.
To provide the basis of the compatibility evaluation, two RM/RA method-
ologies were chosen, CORAS [47] (which was introduced in previous chapters)
and EBIOS [42]. These were selected because (i) they are well-known, used and
established techniques [47, 42], (ii) there was extensive documentation openly
available on each, and (iii) they both have supporting software which gener-
ate machine-readable output (both provide XML-based documents). It is this
machine-readable output that is expected to be mapped to and ideally automat-
ically read into the SASaCS tool.
Honing in on the question of compatibility, the specific objective during
this stage of evaluation is to investigate whether there was an adequate mapping
possible from the output (particularly the software’s machine-readable output) of
existing RM/RA approaches, such as CORAS and EBIOS, to the SASaCS tool
and ontology proposed in this research. Here, an ‘adequate mapping’ is defined as
one where a majority of concepts could be easily mapped. General counting and
measurement of successful mappings were therefore the data analysis techniques
used. In the interest of time, the mapping was done at a conceptual and not prac-
tical level (that is, there was no coding involved). It was felt that the conceptual
level mapping would supply an acceptable proof-of-concept test of compatibility
to RM/RA methods.
The next section applies the evaluation method in Fenz et al. [57] to each
of the chosen RM/RA methodologies. The ontology analysis step was skipped
as this activity is similar to the ontology discussion covered in Chapter 6. The
evaluation step was also excluded as the method’s authors devised that step for
cases where very formal ontologies (defined in OWL, etc.) were used. The main
evaluation in terms of this research therefore will be considering the good aspects,
the difficulties or thought-provoking points during mapping, assessing output
and/or concepts which could or could not be mapped from RM/RA methods to
the tool proposed, comparison of mappings and so on.
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8.3 Mapping EBIOS to the Tool and Ontology
EBIOS is a risk management approach created by Central Information Systems
Security Division, under the French General Secretariat of National Defence. It
provides a methodology and supporting software for assessing and treating risks
in the field of information systems security [42].
Following Fenz et al. [57], the first step in the mapping process was the
knowledge base analysis. This step identifies the main entities/concepts and
relationships in the RM approach being studied. For this and various of the
following tasks, the EBIOS software’s XML output (from sample and purpose-
built case studies) and the general documentation on EBIOS in [42] were utilized.
Throughout this section, keywords which identify concepts, entities, attributes
and database fields in EBIOS and the tool and ontology are shown in italics for
ease of reference.
From the knowledge base analysis process, some of the concepts identified
in EBIOS included: an entity, defined as an asset; a menace, which defines a
threat to an entity; a vulnerability, weakness/flaw in terms of information sys-
tems security; a security objective which is the expression of the intention to
counter risks or threats and/or comply with the organizational security policies
and assumptions; a security functional requirement, which is a security function
to be implemented to contribute to the fulfilment of a security objective; and an
assurance requirement, defined as the specification of assurance provided by se-
curity functions implemented to cover security objectives. A full list of concepts
is displayed in subsequent sections.
The next step consisted of mapping the concepts and relations identi-
fied in EBIOS (particularly those from its software XML output) to the SASaCS
tool and embodied ontology. This mapping was approached from two levels. The
first level involved mapping the EBIOS concepts and relations identified to the on-
tology. The mapping is displayed in Figure 8.1, where the EBIOS concepts are in
boxes with dashed lines and ontology concepts in solid lines. A description of this
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mapping was not given here because it was considered relatively self-explanatory.
Furthermore, mapping details and justifications are available in the subsequent
paragraphs (and the set of tables presented). The ideal use and benefit of this
pictorial mapping was the ease with which one can visualize high-level similarities
across models and techniques. It should be noted that as done by Fenz et al. [57],
and to avoid clutter, mainly the mappable concepts from EBIOS were shown in
Figure 8.1.
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Figure 8.1: Mapping EBIOS concepts to proposed ontology
Second, and more aptly, mapping was undertaken from EBIOS to the
low-level implementation of the ontology in the SASaCS tool. This low-level im-
plementation was represented by the database schema actually used to store data
in the tool. To depict the database schema and structure, an Entity Relationship
Diagram (ERD) was used. The SASaCS database ERD and a description of its
tables are given in Appendix A.
8. Evaluating the Compatibility of the Tool and Ontology 186
For the low-level mapping, relevant data from EBIOS and the tool were
analysed and Tables 8.1, 8.2, 8.3, 8.4, 8.5 and 8.6 were created. These tables
list all the XML elements in EBIOS methodology output, describe them, identify
the ERD concept which they would map to (remember, the aim in the evaluation
process is to conduct a conceptual mapping) and then provide a brief justification
of the mappings chosen. It is worth noting that in the ERD, the term ‘Risk action’
(which is short for risk treatment choice/action) was used as opposed to ‘security
action’. This term therefore will mainly be seen in the mappings involving EBIOS
now and CORAS in subsequent sections. There was no particular reason for this
and both concepts are regarded as synonymous based on previous definitions (for
example, in Appendix A).
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The final step before analysing the mappings achieved was mapping the
security knowledge (knowledge defined as, a set of meaningful case data) em-
bodied in EBIOS output to the SASaCS tool and its ERD. To facilitate this
mapping, a similar approach to that employed by Fenz et al. [57] was adopted.
This involved referencing a few real-life examples of case study data output from
EBIOS software, then describing how those actual data could be mapped to the
SASaCS tool’s ERD. Two examples are used in this research. Both highlight con-
cepts central to an EBIOS study. The first is presented below in Code Snippet
3, and this code covers EBIOS’ XML representation of a Menace.
<Menace ID="Menace.1050437920519" label="19 - EAVESDROPPING" selected="true" description=
"Type: Human. Deliberate cause: Someone connected to communication equipment/media or
located inside the transmission coverage boundaries of a communication can use equipment,
which may be very expensive, to listen to, save and analyze the information transmitted
(voice or data). ..." justification="" descriptionMenaceElement="" potentiel=
"AttackPotential.1070307963407">
<MenaceThemeList ID="MenaceThemeList.1244991940438">
<Theme id="Theme.1014431415703" comments="" />
</MenaceThemeList>
<SeverityScale ID="SeverityScale.1050985081072">
<MenaceSeverity ID="MenaceSeverity.1244928987097" criteria="Criteria.1014877221686"
severity="1" violation="true" />
</SeverityScale>
<MenaceCauseList ID="MenaceCauseList.1244991940438">
<MenaceCause id="MenaceCause.1011656568285" comments="" />
</MenaceCauseList>
<MenaceOrigineList ID="MenaceOrigineList.1244991940438">
<MenaceOrigine id="MenaceOrigine.1052902060343" comments="" />
</MenaceOrigineList>
</Menace>
Code Snippet 3: EBIOS representation of an eavesdropping menace
The XML excerpt describes EBIOS knowledge of an eavesdropping menace
faced by a system in an RA study. To map this knowledge, the basic mappings
from the previous step (outlined in the tables) were used. At the high level
therefore, a Menace in EBIOS was mapped to a Threat in the tool and ontology.
Considering the lower level, the selected attribute of the Menace XML element
was assessed first. This attribute defines whether or not a menace is selected from
the dataset of menaces and thus whether it applies to the current RA study. A
‘true’ value indicates that it was selected and thus the Menace should be mapped
(or specifically, transferred) to the tool’s database and ERD.
The label and description attributes of the menace present descriptive
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information about the ERD’s Threat concept and so are mapped to the fields
Threat.threat name and ProjectRisk.threat details respectively. To accommodate
the latter of these mappings, it was noted that there would need to be an EBIOS
Risk related to the Menace and it would need to have been mapped previously
(to a tool/ERD’s Risk and ProjectRisk record). This would allow the menace
description data to be added to the ERD ProjectRisk record. None of the justi-
fication, descriptionMenaceElement, or potentiel attributes had mappable fields
in the ERD.
The MenaceThemeList sub-element lists the EBIOS attack method themes
from which the Menace was deduced. The related Theme element (theme id
‘Theme.1014431415703’) in this case represents the ‘Compromise of information’
attack method. As the ERD did not maintain the overarching concept of attack
themes, however, mapping was not achieved.
The SeverityScale element allows for an exact mapping (apart from the
severity and violation attributes) because its focus, that is, Criteria, corresponds
to the SecurityAttribute table data in the tool/ERD. The SeverityScale element
allows for Security Criteria (such as availability, integrity and so on) that the
menace affects to be specified. In this example, the criteria affected is ‘Confi-
dentiality’, which is represented by the unique id ‘Criteria.1014877221686’. To
map this Menace knowledge to the tool, the SecurityAttribute and ThreatSe-
curityAttribute tables were used. SecurityAttribute and specifically SecurityAt-
tribute.attribute name store the types of security criteria (or attributes in the
tool), whereas the ThreatSecurityAttribute table and the database record created
provide the link between a Menace/Threat and the affected Criteria/SecurityAttribute.
The final two sub-elements, MenaceCauseList and MenaceOrigineList, list
the causes (MenaceCause) and origins (MenaceOrigine) of the threat respectively.
In the ERD, MenaceCause data maps to the Threat.threat type field of the current
eavesdropping menace database record. Generally this mapping was ideal as
the specific MenaceCause, ‘MenaceCause.1011656568285’, refers to a ‘Deliberate’
menace cause and therefore corresponds to the ERD’s ‘Intentional’ threat type
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option (which is shown in the ontology).
For the MenaceOrigine element within the MenaceOrigineList, a relation
was found in the Threat.agent id field. To enable this mapping the ThreatAgent
table was also required. This is because the menace’s origin, that is, ‘Human’ (in-
dicated by unique id ‘MenaceOrigine.1052902060343’), would first map to the re-
spective ThreatAgent database record (identified by ThreatAgent.agent type and
in this case ‘Human’ as well). Then the agent id would be copied to the eaves-
dropping record in the Threat table.
Figure 8.2 pulls together the mapping example and displays a screenshot of
the actual SASaCS tool database records (in their respective tables) that would
be created as a result of the mapping. In later stages this type of data would
then be exported to SADML when companies are ready to compare and reconcile
their security actions.
Figure 8.2: Mapped Menace data in the SASaCS database
The next knowledge mapping example was based on the EBIOS Security-
Objective element. The XML snippet in Code Snippet 4, describes the security
objective defined in the RA study. This objective was to treat the risk associated
with the menace identified in the prior example.
To start, a SecurityObjective in EBIOS corresponds to a RiskAction record
in the ERD. Analysing the XML element’s attributes, label which is the name of
a security objective, maps to RiskAction.risk action name in the ERD. Also, con-
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<SecurityObjective ID="SecurityObjective.1248768933881" label="Eavesdropping protection
objective" state="" baseID="" type="EBIOS.Text.SO.Type.TOE" content="The organization
must take measures to ensure there is no eavesdropping on data, persons, meetings, etc.
either passive or active." resistance="3" resistance_justification="" coverLevel=
"SecurityRequirementCover.1076860509716" upstream_justification=""
downstream_justification="">
<SecurityObjectiveCovers>
<SecurityObjectiveCover ID="SecurityObjectiveCover.1245667560533" reference=
"RiskScenario.1248601769338" type="Risk" />
</SecurityObjectiveCovers>
</SecurityObjective>
Code Snippet 4: EBIOS representation of a security objective
tent, defined as a description of the objective, maps to RiskAction.action remarks.
None of the other attributes allowed for a mapping because no related fields ex-
isted in the ERD.
The SecurityObjectiveCovers sub-element lists aspects (risks, constraints,
regulatory requirements and so on) addressed by the current security objective.
The type attribute of individual SecurityObjectiveCover elements mark the type of
aspect addressed. Here it is a Risk. In this example, a mapping was made between
the risk addressed (identified by unique id ‘RiskScenario.1248601769338’) and an
ERD database record in the ProjectRiskAction table. In detail, the associated
risk first needed to be available in the ProjectRisk table. Then, the risk id of that
risk and the risk action id of the current RiskAction (that is, SecurityObjective)
entry would be copied to create a linking record in the ProjectRiskAction table.
Lastly, and more at a general level, because the EBIOS SecurityObjective
element does not define a type (that is, whether it is geared towards risk mitiga-
tion, acceptance and so on) some manual intervention was required to complete
the mapping to the ERD RiskAction table and thus provide data for the respec-
tive record’s action type field. A screenshot of the actual records in their tables
within the SASaCS database is shown in Figure 8.3.
Figure 8.3: Mapped SecurityObjective data in the SASaCS database
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The next section reflects on the general mapping undertaken with EBIOS.
This includes the mapping examples above and the detailed mapping tables pre-
sented previously.
8.4 Discussing EBIOS Mapping
The principal aim of conducting the mapping process was to evaluate the com-
patibility of the SASaCS tool and embodied ontology with existing RM/RA ap-
proaches. Having completed the mapping of EBIOS, it can be seen that a majority
of the main concepts and elements could be mapped, both at ontology and ERD
levels. This has provided promising evidence to support the case for ontology
and ERD compatibility. Of equal interest however are the number of concepts
and element attributes that proved challenging to map. This is because these
might indicate shortcomings and thus areas for improvement of the tool and/or
ontology. Below, the primary difficulties incurred are discussed.
No consideration of assurance of security functions. Beyond defin-
ing security objectives and security functional requirements that implement them,
EBIOS uses security assurance requirements to provide assurance that functional
requirements adequately achieve the objectives they are to implement. While
both the tool and ontology include concepts mappable to the security objective
and security requirement, neither accommodates the security assurance concept.
For EBIOS mapping, this fact highlights a weakness in this research’s models
(specifically their ability to capture all security aspects) and hence affects com-
patibility.
From a general perspective, however, because the assurance concept was
not prevalent in the range of popular RM/RA methodologies examined in Chapter
5, it may not be a standard concept in this context—rather, a peculiarity of the
EBIOS technique. Nonetheless, assurance is a generally well-accepted security
facet therefore might need to be accommodated in the tool and ontology model.
Low-level differences between EBIOS’ SecurityObjective and the
8. Evaluating the Compatibility of the Tool and Ontology 198
tool’s RiskAction. At a high level, SecurityObjective and SecurityAction (RiskAc-
tion) are semantically similar and thus allowed for a seamless mapping of con-
cepts. When assessed in detail, however, as seen in the knowledge mapping
attempted, there are a few differences (related to attributes and elements) which
complicate the process. The most notable of these is presented.
The first difference was mentioned in the security objective example from
the previous section. This deals with the inability to identify an appropriate
action type (mitigation, transference, acceptance and so on) for the corresponding
RiskAction database record without manual intervention.
The next difference is centred around the fact that in EBIOS, a security ob-
jective can be conceived to address a range of aspects including risks, constraints,
regulatory requirements and security rules/policies. This is a novel point because
it exemplifies a direct relationship between a security objective and aspects that
are not risks. This relationship was not conceived previously and therefore is not
represented in the tool or ontology. To take an example, in the tool and ontology,
a security action/risk action is conceived with the prime aim of treating a risk.
Aspects such as those mentioned above including constraints, regulatory require-
ments and security rules/policies, are mainly viewed as constructs that influence
the risk’s treatment. This is as opposed to constructs which independently give
rise to security actions or risk actions.
The final difference to be discussed is EBIOS’ use of a coverLevel attribute
within the Security objective. This attribute describes the degree to which secu-
rity functional requirements cover their respective security objectives. In the tool
and ontology, a similar concept was applied in the relationship between Risk and
SecurityAction (RiskAction), however this was not mirrored in the RiskAction
to SecurityRequirement relationship. This decision was based on the assumption
that security requirements and other detailed treatment methods would naturally
fully cover a security action. In retrospect, this assumption may be somewhat
premature as the monitoring of a coverage level in EBIOS suggests that full cov-
erage may not always be attained. A review of this reality may therefore be
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warranted.
Only one security requirement or detailed treatment method for
a security action. EBIOS allows for the use of multiple security functional
requirements to implement a single security objective—in essence a one-to-many
relationship. Conversely, the tool only accommodates one security requirement or
detailed treatment method for each database RiskAction record—that is, one-to-
one. This difference in cardinality causes an obvious disparity during the mapping
process as there is an inability to link multiple detailed treatment methods (in
EBIOS, security functional requirements) to a single Security action (in EBIOS,
security objective). From a practical perspective, the one-to-many relationship
present in EBIOS should also be represented in the tool because such scenarios
are foreseeable in reality. Its exclusion highlights an oversight in design and
implementation.
With the main positives and difficulties incurred in the mapping of EBIOS
to the tool and ontology identified, the next section presents the mapping done
from CORAS to the tool and ontology.
8.5 Mapping CORAS to the Tool and
Ontology
The CORAS methodology for conducting security risk analysis was discussed
in Chapter 6. CORAS is the product of an EU research project targeted to-
wards creating a tool-supported methodology for model-based risk assessment of
security-critical systems [72]. To guide the mapping process in this section, the
technique used in mapping EBIOS (that is, Fenz et al. [57]) was employed again,
beginning with a knowledge base analysis of CORAS.
The CORAS method is accompanied by various conceptual models (see [46,
72]) which enabled quick identification and definition of its main concepts. These
included: assets and vulnerabilities which have standard definitions; an unwanted
incident which is an event that reduces the value of assets; a threat, defined as
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a potential cause of an unwanted incident, this encompassed the human, or non-
human cause; a risk, that is, the chance of occurrence of an unwanted incident;
risk value, which is the value of a risk as derived from the likelihood and con-
sequence of an unwanted incident; and lastly, treatment, which defines a means
that has the objective of reducing a risk’s assigned risk value. There are other
concepts such as context, asset value, security policy and security requirement.
These however were excluded as they were not common across CORAS models
nor were they all (except asset value) used explicitly in the CORAS software (and
thus its machine-readable output).
The mapping of concepts and relations from CORAS to the SASaCS
tool and ontology was the next step. As with the EBIOS analysis, two levels of
mapping were carried out. At the first level, the mapping was from the conceptual
CORAS model (specifically the diagram in den Braber et al. [46]) to the ontology.
This CORAS model was preferred instead of the XML elements from the machine-
readable CORAS software output because it allowed for a more meaningful high-
level mapping that still embodied the main concepts of the CORAS tool. The
mapping of concepts is presented in Figure 8.4—boxes with dashed and solid lines
represent CORAS and ontology concepts respectively. Specifics of the mapping
are presented later in the detailed tables.
One noteworthy aspect is the mapping of the CORAS model Threat con-
cept to both Threat Agent and Threat in the proposed ontology. This was done
because their definition of a Threat itself ([46]) covered both ontology concepts.
Unwanted Incident is another interesting concept as this and part of the meaning
captured in Threat can be mapped to the single Threat concept in the ontology.
More detail on these aspects is presented in the knowledge mapping and mapping
reflections sections.
At the second level of mapping, emphasis was on the lower-level. This
therefore included the CORAS XML elements and their corresponding fields in
the SASaCS tool’s ERD. After an analysis of CORAS software output, related
ERD fields were identified where possible. The description of elements, the re-
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Figure 8.4: Mapping CORAS concepts to proposed ontology
sulting mappings and any justifications are shown in Tables 8.7, 8.8, 8.9, 8.10
and 8.11.
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To conduct the mapping of security knowledge step, a scenario was
prepared in the CORAS software and then exported to its XML format. The
software’s Help section and a case study by Fu et al. [64] which used CORAS,
guided scenario preparation. The developed case produced practical examples
of CORAS software output and provided data to be used for mapping to the
SASaCS tool’s ERD. Default settings were used in the CORAS software and cus-
tomization of settings was kept at a minimum to maintain an objective mapping.
Two examples were chosen which reference crucial stages within an RM process.
These cover threat scenarios and risk identification and estimation. The mapping
commences with the threat scenario XML in Code Snippet 5.
<row>
<cell columnId="scenarioId">SNR-1</cell>
<cell columnId="assetId">StaffNetwork1</cell>
<cell columnId="reference">Sequence diagram 1 documentation</cell>
<cell columnId="threat">Malicious party</cell>
<cell columnId="vulnerability">Circulating information in clear text</cell>
<cell columnId="incident">Unauthorized disclosure of customer personal data</cell>
<cell columnId="scenario">Accessing and stealing of customers personal data</cell>
</row>
Code Snippet 5: CORAS representation of a threat scenario
Code Snippet 5 was taken from the CORAS Scenario Table and describes
various aspects pertaining to a single threat scenario. A threat scenario, or simply
scenario, is how a threat leads to an unwanted incident. At the high level, an
association has previously been made from data in this table (for example, threat
scenario and incident) to the ontology and ERD’s Threat concept. To conduct
the lower-level mapping, the first task was to ensure that a “malicious party”
threat cause (that is, the threat columnId in the code snippet) already existed
in the respective ERD table, which is the ThreatAgent table. If there was no
record, it needed to be created. The respective ERD agent id field data (for
that threat cause) was then used, in addition to the CORAS incident (short for
unwanted incident) and scenario data to create a new Threat database record in
the SASaCS tool.
To consider the mapping in greater detail, the threat cause’s agent id
was copied from the respective ThreatAgent record to the new Threat record’s
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Threat.agent id field. This sets up the database foreign key relationship. Also, the
incident data formed the main input to the same Threat record’s Threat.threat name
field. Data from the CORAS scenario element was appended to the record’s
threat name data to provide an additional description of the new ERD Threat
record. Appending this data however was not a panacea as it proved appropriate
only if an incident had one associated scenario. CORAS allows multiple threat
scenarios to culminate in one or more incidents; which could mean multiple rows
(<row>) in the Scenario Table with the same incident data but different scenario
data.
Regarding the Scenario Table’s assetId, reference and vulnerability ele-
ments, there was no mapping to the ERD’s Threat database record. The vulner-
ability element is pivotal in later stages however as it defines the related existing
vulnerability which, along with a threat, constitute data for an ERD Risk record.
This aspect would therefore be revisited when mapping risks. Figure 8.5 gives a
visual presentation of the mapped data as it is captured in the SASaCS database.
Figure 8.5: Mapped Scenario data in the SASaCS database
The second example of knowledge mapping uses the CORAS Consequence
and Frequency Table. This table defines risks, makes the link to associated un-
wanted incidents, and values each risk in terms of consequence (impact of an
unwanted incident on an asset in terms of loss of asset value) and frequency (the
probability for an unwanted incident to occur). The code follows in Code Snippet
6.
To map the risk defined in the <row> element in Code Snippet 6, the
ERD’s Risk and ProjectRisk tables were employed. After creating a new Risk
database record, the CORAS riskId element’s data were copied/mapped to the
ERD Risk.risk id field. For the CORAS row’s assetId, the respective asset’s
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<row>
<cell columnId="riskId">RSK-1</cell>
<cell columnId="assetId">Network1</cell>
<cell columnId="incident">Unauthorized disclosure of customer personal data</cell>
<cell columnId="consequenceValue">Moderate</cell>
<cell columnId="frequencyValue">Likely</cell>
<cell columnId="scenario"/>
</row>
Code Snippet 6: CORAS representation of a risk
unique identifier (asset id in the ERD Asset table) for ‘Network1’ was copied to
Risk.asset id field. A similar process was adopted for the incident element as
this would correspond to a record already in the ERD Threat table. The unique
identifier copied was threat id and it was copied to the Risk.threat id field. This
sets up the foreign key relationship between tables.
To complete the ERD Risk record, the incident’s respective vulnerability
from the Scenario Table was used. Once the incident’s vulnerability was found
(recall that in each row in the CORAS Scenario Table is an incident and a
respective vulnerability), the ERD’s Vulnerability table was searched for that
vulnerability’s name (on the Vulnerability.vulnerability name field). When the
database record was identified the vulnerability id field was copied/mapped to
the respective Risk record’s Risk.vulnerability id field.
The last task in mapping the security knowledge was transferring the con-
sequence and frequency data. Assuming that metrics (that is, allowed values such
as High or Moderate) for these factors were set to be the same in both CORAS
and the SASaCS tool (note that metrics can be added to the tool using Prioritiza-
tionScheme table), the ‘moderate’ consequence in CORAS mapped to ‘moderate’
value for the impact field in the tool’s RiskEstimate table. The ‘likely’ frequency
then mapped to the ‘likely’ value for the probability field in RiskEstimate.
For the mapping above to be conducted, a ProjectRisk database record
was required first. From the ERD as displayed in Appendix A, one can see
that ProjectRisk supplies the physical link between a Risk and a RiskEstimate.
Once this record was created and associated with the Risk under analysis, the
project risk id generated was copied to a new RiskEstimate record. The relevant
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impact and probability values were then copied to that new RiskEstimate record
also. As before, a screenshot is presented in Figure 8.6 to show the resulting
mappings in SASaCS.
Figure 8.6: Mapped Consequence and Frequency table data in SASaCS database
In keeping with the goal of this section, the mapping of the risks and risk
values above focus purely on the mapping of knowledge to the tool’s ERD. If
looking towards using the mapped information for comparison of security actions
later however, mapping companies must previously synchronize some of this infor-
mation. Synchronization would be required on elements such as risks and risk ids
to be used (recall that tool comparison is made largely based on common risks),
and also the metrics for risk valuation. The latter of these aspects ensures that
entities use similar valuation schemes and agree on the meanings of individual
metrics.
8.6 Discussing CORAS Mapping
The mappings of CORAS and EBIOS to the SASaCS tool and embodied ontology
provide another means of evaluating this research. In the CORAS mapping above,
a majority of the high- and low-level core concepts and elements allowed for a
translation across the different software tools. This might not be considered
surprising as the CORAS method was used to aid in the creation of the ontology
proposed. The reason for the similarity however was not thought to be due to
the exact concepts from CORAS simply being copied to create the ontology.
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Instead, this congruence was attributed to the very basic, standard RA concepts
emphasized in CORAS which are viewed as equally critical in any RM/RA-based
ontology. Generally, this mapping analysis therefore also supplied favourable
evidence towards supporting compatibility of the tool and ontology. Although a
good mapping was attained from CORAS, a few difficulties were incurred. The
most significant of these are presented.
Differences in Threat representation. In the tool and ontology, a
Threat concept defines an undesired event which has an adverse impact on an
asset. Within CORAS the notion of a threat might be understood in different
ways. In the mapping from the previous section, a tool/ontology’s Threat was
stretched over two CORAS elements. These included threat scenario (defined
as how the threat leads to or causes an unwanted incident) but primarily, the
unwanted incident concept (which is the actual event that may harm or reduce
the value of assets). Recall that in the CORAS Scenario Table mapping, these
two elements are concatenated to form ERD’s Threat.threat name.
However, as the definitions of Threat (in tool/ontology) and unwanted
incident (in CORAS) are largely the same, another way to do the mapping could
be to map these two concepts/fields and discard data in the CORAS threat
scenario element. The disadvantage of this would be losing data which provide
more descriptive information on what actions (or causes) constitute a threat to
an asset.
The current mapping choice for handling the threat scenario and un-
wanted incident elements (that is, appending them and then mapping to the
Threat.threat name) also has its shortcomings. These were discussed briefly in
the knowledge mapping example and deal with the fact that if there are multi-
ple threat scenarios that culminate in one unwanted incident (and all are listed
as separate rows in the CORAS Scenario Table), a straight forward mapping
would not be possible. In this case, the options would be to either (i) discard the
scenario data during mapping and only use the incident data (this was feasible
because the incident data are what link to a specific Risk in the Consequence and
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Frequency Table) or (ii) to append the scenario and incident data and view each
row in the Scenario Table as a separate ERD Threat. The latter of these options
would complicate matters further as it would introduce a many-(threats)-to-one
(risk) relation later in mapping that, at this moment, cannot be addressed by the
tool’s ERD.
In summary, the differences in threat representation between CORAS and
the tool and ontology have highlighted new perspectives which slightly complicate
mapping. Some of these however might easily be addressed through predefined
mapping rules set up by companies, users or SASaCS tool designers. Examples
of mapping rules for the incident/scenario versus threat could include only using
data from the incident element to map to ERD’s Threat record, or, each scenario
has a different incident (and thus a different Risk) therefore incident and scenario
data can be appended and then mapped to the ERD’s Threat record.
Grouping of risks. Within CORAS, a shortcut mechanism is supplied
that allows risks to be grouped into categories. These categories are used to allow
a group of risks to be estimated using a single risk value and then treated using
a single risk treatment. As stated in the tables in Section 8.5, such a grouping of
risks does not exist in the SASaCS tool’s ERD. To enable for mapping therefore,
risk categories needed to be broken down such that each risk is viewed individu-
ally. One interesting fact noted in the groupings was the facility to value/estimate
a group of risks. This functionality was not accommodated in the tool or ontology
but its use could be seen especially in cases where a set of related and minimal
risks were grouped for joint valuation.
In the proposed mapping process itself, a noteworthy caveat was identified
when extracting risks from within CORAS risk categories. This problem was
linked to the suggested mapping’s assumption that a risk category’s value would
be applied to each individual risk when the category was broken down. For
example, assuming a group of risks have level ‘High’, if they were to be considered
separately, each of their individual levels would also be ‘High’. This however may
not be the case as a system user (security professional or analyst) might have
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chosen to modify a risk category’s valuation level depending on the combined
consequence and frequency values of all the risks in the category. As a result of
this fact, some manual intervention may be necessary during mapping to confirm
each risk’s individual risk value when risk categories are being broken down.
Determining actual risk treatments. CORAS and the tool and on-
tology both acknowledge the need for risk treatment concepts. In the CORAS
software, users begin by listing all possible treatment options in the Treatment
Identification Table. Next, in the Treatment Evaluation Table, they evaluate all
the treatments and use priority values to rate them. The difficulty in mapping at
this point was because the SASaCS tool only accommodates actual treatments
which were chosen to address a risk. Therefore, the treatment evaluation process
documented in CORAS was taken to be complete with regards to the tool.
Another difficulty faced was the identification of the specific treatment
which would handle a risk. The CORAS software and its output maintained no
data fields or facility which clearly showed a chosen treatment. The treatment-
Priority element in the Treatment Evaluation Table was considered to aid in
mapping, however, because there was no predefined hierarchy of metrics (for ex-
ample High, Medium or Low) in the CORAS software, the possibilities of values
used by companies to rate their treatments was infinite and thus not mappable.
To allow for mapping therefore, a manual process was required where treatments
(from the Treatment Identification Table) to be mapped from CORAS to the tool
were identified by a user. The use of a manual means for mapping was not ideal
but was necessary as it was the only way to definitively identify a treatment to
be transferred.
At this stage, this chapter has presented evidence to support an adequate
mapping from the output (particularly the software’s machine-readable output)
from existing RM/RA approaches such as CORAS and EBIOS, to the SASaCS
tool and underlying ontology proposed in this research. Taken broadly, this there-
fore fulfils the evaluation objective defined in Section 8.2 and affirms a reasonable
level of tool and ontology compatibility. The next section reflects on the map-
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ping process and very briefly compares the mappings undertaken. The goal was to
identify any common weaknesses in the tool, situations in which mapping might
be easier or other peculiarities that might lead to specific uses or future updates
in the tool/ontology being necessary.
8.7 Reflecting on Mappings, the Tool and the
Ontology
Both EBIOS and CORAS proved useful and insightful methods which aided in
this research’s evaluation. Out of the two methods, EBIOS had the more com-
prehensive and detailed methodology and software, and it also had the most
unmapped concepts. Even though having a number of unmapped concepts was
not ideal (as it does not affirm compatibility), in retrospect, the reason for the
difficulties incurred might be linked to the nature of EBIOS. Recall that EBIOS
was developed under government direction (National Defense) and geared to-
wards government industries [42]. The method therefore might be geared to very
high security environments. This reality would account for the critical value and
detail placed on security and security assurance (for example, the various fields
for security data, coverage levels for risks and security objectives, and so on).
The CORAS technique offered a less detailed and more standard methodol-
ogy and software. The mapping difficulties present with CORAS were not serious
and hardly any main concepts differed across models (that is, from CORAS to
the tool/ontology). CORAS did not introduce any new profound concepts either.
Generally therefore, the differences were regarded as trivial and stylistic, and
ones which could be easily accommodated during mapping by occasional manual
intervention.
To briefly consider the methodology by Fenz et al. [57] used for the map-
ping, this supplied a tested technique from the literature to guide and add struc-
ture to the ontology mapping process. This technique was useful and easy to fol-
low, albeit partially targeted at formal ontologies as opposed to database schemas
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or diagrams.
In terms of identifying specific scenarios, industries or RM/RA methodol-
ogy types in which the proposed tool and ontology would prove more favourable
to be applied, none was evident from the mapping of these two methodologies.
It was clear however that basic risk concepts could be handled and therefore any
methodology utilizing standard RM/RA concepts should allow for an adequate
mapping.
Having discussed the high-level mappings and applicable usage scenarios,
reflection turned to the lower-level aspects. To begin, an assessment was done to
find any common weaknesses of the tool or ontology that were incurred during
mappings to both EBIOS and CORAS. If present, these might highlight areas
where further work or modifications in the tool/ontology were warranted. From
this assessment, however, no common weaknesses were discovered.
Looking to the future, the next step was to consider the capabilities of
each methodology and identify any aspects worth adopting to boost the com-
patibility of the SASaCS tool/ontology to these or any other RM/RA methods.
Other methods assessed in Chapter 6 were also briefly studied to determine if
there was any support for adopting novel EBIOS or CORAS aspects. From a
research perspective, these considerations look to learn from and react to the
general evaluation findings. Four aspects were chosen, three from EBIOS and
one from CORAS. The choices made were primarily because the aspects were
general enough to apply to any RM/RA method and also because they addressed
what were regarded as key shortcomings in the tool/ontology.
These aspects were as follows. (i) Allowing a Security action/Risk action
to directly address aspects other than Risks, for example, laws and regulations,
technical constraints and so on. The alternate term of ‘Security action’ would
therefore be explicitly preferred to ‘Risk action’ from now on, and its meaning
extended to ‘any way in which to address a risk, or a constraint to a organization
or system’. (ii) Adding the capability to have multiple Security requirements ad-
dress or cover one Security action—this is a necessity in real-world situations. (iii)
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Introducing a generic Constraint concept which encapsulates all constraints (such
as security budget and contractual obligations) that affect a risk’s treatment, or
all constraints that need to be addressed directly by a Security action (see point
(i)). (iv) Providing a facility to map and store risk treatment evaluation data.
Aspect (iv) above does not address a shortcoming as such but is suggested
because it could be beneficial when businesses using the tool are trying to recon-
cile Security actions. If this evaluation data could be mapped from an RM/RA
methodology, the SASaCS tool could use it to display alternate risk treatments
(along with risk reduction levels, treatment priorities and so on, if they exist)
which companies might wish to consider in making reconciliation decisions. All
four of the extensions suggested above would add greater flexibility to the tool and
ontology, and increase chances of compatibility with more RM/RA methodologies
and their software.
Factoring in the extensions, a first draft of an updated ontology is dis-
played in Figure 8.7. A draft of that ontology’s respective ERD is also shown
in Appendix A. As these are drafts, further tests will be needed to verify their
rigour, identify any accompanying problems and make any other necessary up-
dates. Readers should note that these new drafts do not replace current work as
a basis for forthcoming chapters. When appropriate however, at times they are
mentioned and debated.
One foreseen weakness of the updates suggested above is that as risks no
longer form the sole basis for Security actions, the tool’s current matching of risks
to compare actions will no longer be fully adequate. Possible options to be inves-
tigated for comparing Security actions based on non-risk components (primarily
these will be Constraints) are centered around the matching of constraint groups
or some other common constraint denominator, for example, comparing Security
actions based on the types of Constraint that they address. These Constraint
types could be laws or budget-related as seen in Figure 8.7, or more detailed
and thus focusing on data privacy, specific system types, or even organizational
limitations.
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Figure 8.7: Draft of the new ontology
The general incompatibilities and difficulties in mapping in previous sec-
tions do raise very interesting questions concerning how the tool and ontology
would handle other RM/RA methodologies. For example, there is the reality
that other methodologies will have varying concepts, approach risks in different
ways and so on. Any future mapping techniques to be developed therefore need
to more aptly appreciate this and provide some generic way for differences to be
included, allow for an extensible framework where support for new approaches
can be plugged in, or enable these concepts to be treated somehow externally to
the system. The reflections in this section supply a good start for further work.
8.8 Case Study
The last core section of this chapter rounds up the compatibility evaluation using a
full case study. In previous sections a very detailed discourse was presented. Now
the aim is to put that and other aspects of the Solution Model into a more real-
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world context. In addition to further supporting the feasibility of this research’s
proposals, this would enable for a more thorough evaluation of the Model’s pro-
posals as they progressed from the initial Central Risk Catalogue to final SASaCS
output. Readers are reminded that it is the original ontology and ERD that are
used (and not the new drafts mentioned at the end of the previous section).
In the interest of continuity, the scenario presented in Chapter 4 was used
as a basis for this section’s case. It therefore begins much like that chapter where
Buyer and Supplier are entering into a particular business situation. Unlike
that chapter, however, to be consistent with the aims of this section and chapter,
EBIOS and CORAS are used by entities for their RM purposes. Specifically, to
analyse risk and determine security actions, Buyer used EBIOS and its software,
whereas Supplier employed CORAS and its supporting tool. Finally, the types
of output (security actions/requirements, influential factors and so on) from each
RM method are taken to be generally consistent with those shown in Chapter 4.
For example, in this case, Buyer does have a security action (a requirement) for
a specific risk that is influenced by the risk’s (monetary) impact, the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act and a company security policy.
According to the Solution Model, regardless of the RM/RA method used,
the starting point of the scenario should be a common risks base or catalogue.
This point however is where one of the first difficulties surfaced. When the Model
was first conceived it was assumed that the transferring of common risk data to
RM/RA analyses would be done manually. During the completion of this study
however, such a process actually proved somewhat tedious. This is especially
in terms of accurate and consistent mapping of data from the common risks
catalogue to the RM/RA methods and software.
If there was a risk to the confidentiality of WS messages in the Risk Cat-
alogue system therefore, the problem was how that data and the related data on
vulnerabilities, threats and assets, could be quickly, accurately and consistently
entered into the RM/RA approaches and their software. Figure 8.8 depicts the
area of focus in the ‘Solution Model in action’ diagram from Section 5.4.
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Possibly the best solution to this problem resides in the automated map-
ping of data from the Central Risk Catalogue to the RM/RA method software, in
this case represented by EBIOS and CORAS tools (used by Buyer and Supplier
respectively). Two options were identified by which this could occur. First,
adding an export capability to the Central Risk Catalogue system, which could
output data on risks in the machine-readable formats of common RM/RA ap-
proach software. This is beneficial because it would be a central point where
numerous RM/RA software formats could be generated. Also, it could take ad-
vantage of the ‘Import’ and ‘Open File/Project’ functionalities which are standard
in a number of RM/RA software. For example, both CORAS and EBIOS tools
have these capabilities.
One caveat noticed when assessing the Risk Catalogue export capability
option is that unique identification numbers (IDs) for elements (for example,
Menace IDs in EBIOS or risk-analysis-result IDs in CORAS) generated by the
Central system might conflict with the same element IDs generated by the ac-
tual software at each company. There would therefore need to be some agreed
allotment of ID ranges for the Catalogue-based option to function properly.
The second alternative suggests a more decentralized implementation where
extensions could be added to the RM/RA software systems to enable them to
read in and process Risk Catalogue system data. This would avoid the problem
of conflicting IDs, but introduces the need to access, understand and edit various
software. For this case, EBIOS and CORAS are good candidates in this regard
as both are open source implementations (see [42] and [46] respectively).
Apart from the programming that would be necessary in both options,
there is the question of how to map Risk Catalogue system data to EBIOS and
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CORAS. This however can be largely addressed by reversing the mapping tables
in Section 8.3 and 8.5 because the SASaCS tool’s ERD is not dissimilar to that
of the Risk Catalogue system. Essentially, one would now be going from SASaCS
database records to EBIOS and CORAS software XML formats.
Having briefly digressed from the case study to discuss how transferring
data from the shared risks catalogue could be addressed, the focus resumes at
the RM/RA software stage (in Figure 8.8). This relates to the bottom two boxes.
After Supplier and Buyer have agreed the risks to be used, they conduct their
individual analyses. This generally encompasses the processes of risk estimation,
risk evaluation and treatments. Code Snippet 7 and Code Snippet 8 give an
initial idea of the risks data generated by each entity. This and most of the
following examples are based around the risk to the integrity and confidentiality
of Web services messages (thus, Buyer security requirement # 1) from Chapter 4.
Hereafter, this is referred to simply as Risk101. From the code snippets, one
can see exactly how different the representations of the same risk may be from
company to company. As before, the + sign in the code indicates that there is
additional data which is not displayed/expanded.
<Risk ID="RiskScenario.1252746098288" label="Risk101" menace="Menace.1050437920519"
description="The integrity and confidentiality of data in a Web services’ message
(in transit) is compromised" sof="AttackPotential.1070307963407" coverLevel=
"SecurityObjectiveCoverValue.1078561424090" ... >
+ <ScenarioPotentiality potentiality="Potentiality.1076645892186">
</Risk>
Code Snippet 7: EBIOS (Buyer) representation of the risk
<row>
<cell columnId="riskId">Risk101</cell>
<cell columnId="assetId">WSMessage</cell>
<cell columnId="incident">Eavesdropping and tampering with data in a Web services’
message (in transit)</cell>
<cell columnId="consequenceValue">Medium</cell>
<cell columnId="frequencyValue">Low</cell>
<cell columnId="scenario"/>
</row>
Code Snippet 8: CORAS (Supplier) representation of the risk
With the RM/RA methodologies at each business complete, the next step
was mapping the output data from Buyer and Supplier to the SASaCS tool.
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This process was covered in detail in Sections 8.3 to 8.7 and therefore is not
analysed in depth here. From a case study perspective however, one intriguing
additional observation was made—that is, although RM/RA methods did not
accommodate certain data expected by SASaCS, it did not mean that the data
were not present in companies’ considerations.
In the CORAS software output shown in Code Snippet 9 for example,
it is apparent that a limited security budget influenced Supplier’s treatment
strategy decision (see treatmentDescription columnId). Any automated mapping
to SASaCS therefore should ideally capture these data as a unique Risk Treatment
factor. This however was not possible because the machine-readable output of
CORAS does not distinctly define such aspects in its XML structure. Here it is
just in plain text.
<row>
<cell columnId="treatmentId">TRT101</cell>
<cell columnId="riskOrCategoryId">Risk101</cell>
<cell columnId="treatmentStrategy">Retain</cell>
<cell columnId="treatmentDescription">The unlikeliness of this risk and a limited
security budget are the reasons for risk acceptance</cell>
<cell columnId="treatmentReferences">Threat_Analysis09.doc</cell>
</row>
Code Snippet 9: CORAS representation of a risk treatment
A similar situation is present in Buyer’s EBIOS output regarding risk
estimation. In this case, Buyer has used EBIOS to prioritize risks, however,
because their technique is so elaborate it does not allow for a clear and reliable
automated mapping to the risk level concepts in SASaCS.
To tackle these mapping issues a few other techniques were assessed but
manual mapping proved to be the only dependable solution. This mapping in-
volved noting the type of data requested by SASaCS (such as influential security
policies or budgetary limitations) and using the tool’s data entry screens to man-
ually enter that data. This was easily done in this case through the creation of a
TreatmentFactor record in SASaCS and then linking that record to the respective
risk treatment, formally the RiskAction database record.
Regarding the manual risk estimation and prioritization mapping needed
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for EBIOS mapping, a level of subjectivity would be introduced as users seek to
map values in their analyses to the risk levels expected in SASaCS. To compen-
sate for this subjectivity, detailed justifications and descriptions of chosen risk
levels should be provided by parties. This information would be entered in the
respective RiskEstimate database record’s risk level remarks, probability remarks,
impact remarks and adequacy of controls remarks fields. Generally, at the end of
mapping, companies’ personnel should browse screens in the tool to ensure that
all the required information has been transferred.
The next step in the case study was encoding each business’ mapped data
(now in SASaCS’s database) to SADML documents. This process went without
error. In Code Snippet 10, an example of the security risk under examination
(Risk101) is presented. The marked-up risk data has the same basis across
documents due to the use of the shared risks base in the beginning. SADML
provides the common structure, tags, elements and attribute names. Different
companies may add varying comments or descriptions however. The specific code
in Snippet 10 is from Buyer.
<risk id="RISK101"><threats>
<threat>
<name>Eavesdropping and tampering with data in a Web services’ message (in transit)</name>
<threatAgent><agentName>Malicious party</agentName><comment /></threatAgent>
<comment />
</threat></threats><vulnerabilities>
<vulnerability>
<name>Circulating information in inappropriately secured formats</name>
<asset>
<dtype>property:data</dtype>
<assetName>web service message</assetName>
<comment>The data carried in the message is the key aspect</comment>
</asset>
<comment />
</vulnerability></vulnerabilities>
<riskComment>Violation of confidentiality using eavesdropping</riskComment>
...
</risk>
Code Snippet 10: SADML representation of the highlighted risk
The real difference in SADML documents across Buyer and Supplier is
visible when it comes to the treatment of Risk101. As noted in Chapter 4, Buyer
aims to mitigate this risk while Supplier accepts it. SADML Code Snippet 11
shows this and the respective treatment factors. On the left hand side is Buyer’s
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document and on the right, Supplier’s. The + sign indicates that there is
additional data which is not displayed here.
<mitigationAction> <acceptanceAction>
<name>Protect against eavesdropping <name>The unlikeliness of this risk and
on Web service messages being a limited security budget are the
transmitted between partners</name> reasons for risk acceptance</name>
<details>The organization must take <details>Threat_Analysis09.doc</details>
measures to ensure there is no <risks>
eavesdropping on data being + <risk id="RISK101">
transmitted between Web services </risks>
across business parties.</details> <lawAndRegulationRefs />
<risks> <contractualObligationRefs />
+ <risk id="RISK101"> <businessPolicyRefs />
</risks> <securityPolicyRefs>
+ <lawAndRegulationRefs> + <securityBudgetRefs>
<contractualObligationRefs /> + <riskActionImplementationDetailRefs />
<businessPolicyRefs /> </acceptanceAction>
+ <securityPolicyRefs>
<securityBudgetRefs />
+ <securityRequirementRefs>
</mitigationAction>
Code Snippet 11: SADML representations of companies’ risk treatment choices
When compared to the original output from EBIOS and CORAS, one can
appreciate the use of the standard format supplied by SADML. In this respect,
SADML provides a bridge between different RM/RA methods and their software
systems, that can then be used as a platform to compare high-level security
actions across enterprises. It is worth noting that the benefits possible with
SADML are largely due to its foundation in the well-researched ontology from
Chapter 6.
With all stages in the case process completed, Figure 8.9 displays the
output of the SASaCS comparison task presented to personnel at Buyer and
Supplier. Buyer and Supplier are used instead of Company1 and Company2,
and the screenshot is slightly modified to ease readability. This output covers the
same information included at the end of the Requirements phase in Chapter 4’s
scenario. The real benefit associated with this output is the automation of various
of the preceding steps taken to reach this point. These included (i) gathering
data from RM/RA approaches (such as EBIOS and CORAS), albeit in a semi-
automated fashion, (ii) allowing for influential factors in risk treatment to be
defined in the initial stages, and finally, (iii) matching the security actions and
requirements of companies based on risks.
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Figure 8.9: Buyer/Supplier Security Action Comparison output in Firefox
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The output in Figure 8.9 also aids in reconciling semantic differences across
RM/RA approaches as these issues are resolved by mapping rules earlier in the
process. Furthermore, personnel from companies can refer to the ontology and
the inclusive shared definitions/terminology at any point. This would be done to
attain a clear understanding on terms in the context of the interactions. As parties
come together therefore, they immediately can identify any conflicts in treatment
choices and have the main factors supporting those conflicting choices displayed.
This and the discussion above gives evidence to show that in many ways SASaCS
has brought interacting enterprises closer together. This therefore allows for an
easier transition between the Requirement Elicitation and Negotiation phases in
BOF4WSS.
The shortcomings of SASaCS identified in this section’s case study centred
around the manual effort needed at a few stages to complete data mapping.
This acted to limit some of the Solution Model’s automation goals. To critically
consider this point however, the level of automation available with a full system
(with actual mapping functionality coded) would significantly bridge the disparity
gaps and support a much easier negotiation on security actions between parties. A
small degree of manual intervention therefore, even though not preferred, might be
negligible. This is especially in business scenarios where there are large amounts of
risks or security actions to be deliberated, and thus saving time at any point would
result in substantial boosts in productivity. Considering all these aspects, this
work and the findings thus far are seen to go a long way to positively answering
the main research question posed in Section 5.2.3.
8.9 Summary
The focus of Chapter 8 was assessing the compatibility of the SASaCS tool and
the ontology which it embodied, with RM/RA methodologies used by businesses
today. As stated previously, a good level of compatibility was imperative given
the necessary interactions between the tool and these approaches expected within
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BOF4WSS. From the comparison and case study evaluation completed, it was
seen that a majority of the findings were in support of the tool/ontology compati-
bility. In some situations however, noteworthy shortcomings of the tool/ontology
were discovered and in these cases, updates were drafted to address them. Broadly
considered nonetheless, the tool and the Solution Model it implemented were seen
to aid in resolving a number of the transitional issues businesses face in coming
together for negotiations in the framework.
The following chapter covers the second stage of this research’s evaluation.
This stage provides an assessment of BOF4WSS and the Solution Model from
a third-party perspective using interviews with industry-based security profes-
sionals. The findings from this evaluation act to give further insight into the
applicability and strength of this research’s proposals.
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Chapter 9
Evaluating BOF4WSS and the
Solution Model
Interviewing may be defined simply as a conversation with a purpose. Specifically,
the purpose is to gather information. — Bruce L. Berg
9.1 Introduction
The second stage of the research’s evaluation process is presented in this chapter.
This stage involves an assessment of BOF4WSS and a second examination of the
Solution Model (and resulting tool) proposed to support phase transition. Noting
the limitations of a full evaluation (outlined in Section 1.3), the ideal option of a
real-life case study evaluation for both proposals was not available. This left two
alternate evaluation options.
The first option was the design and analysis of a virtual case study to see
how the proposals (BOF4WSS, the Model and tool) would perform in addressing
key issues. The second option relied on a third-party assessment of the proposals
by conducting interviews with industry-based security professionals. Considering
the critical feedback that could be gained from professionals in the field, the
latter option was chosen. This would enable objective and detailed data to be
gathered from knowledgeable persons in areas where proposals were ultimately
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to be applied.
Formally therefore, this evaluation’s aim was to utilize carefully structured
interviews with industry-based security professionals to gather useful feedback on
the proposals and their suitability for problems they target. This feedback could
then be analysed and conclusions drawn to assess key research areas/statements.
This chapter reports on that evaluation including the presentation of the research
methods followed and an in-depth discussion of the research’s findings.
9.2 Evaluation Method
To evaluate BOF4WSS and the Solution Model, a standard structure of research
was followed. This included the definition of areas of interest and then the collec-
tion and analysis of relevant data to assess these areas. Rigid hypotheses were not
preferred because this evaluation does not seek to thoroughly prove or disprove
formal theory. Instead, the aim is to establish whether the information gathered
supports the areas and proposals assessed, and if so, the degrees of support arising
from the data gathered.
There were two core areas to be investigated for support in this evalua-
tion, both related to original research aims and objectives in Chapter 1. The
first was to investigate whether the framework proposed was an applicable, prac-
tical proposal which would aid businesses in reaching requisite levels of enhanced
inter-organizational security and trust. The second was to examine if the Solu-
tion Model provided a viable process to greatly support transition between the
Requirements Elicitation and Negotiation phases of the proposed framework.
To study these areas, a qualitative research strategy was chosen in which
digitally-recorded, semi-structured interviews were employed. The interview data
gathering technique was preferred as it allowed for a detailed study into the
field and the gathering of descriptive, insightful data for analysis [130]. Semi-
structured interviews enhanced this process because they allowed for a mixture
of structure and flexibility in the questions asked. Therefore, in addition to asking
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planned questions which directly related to the areas above, other interesting and
associated observations could be explored.
To ensure the interview questions were clear and appropriate, pilots were
used to refine them initially. Also, in the interest of gaining the highest quality
feedback, interviewees were sent general documentation on the models at least a
week before the interview. This allowed them time to review the proposals and
gather their thoughts before the meeting.
As was mentioned, the target group for interviewees consisted of industry-
based security professionals. To narrow this further, purposive sampling [12]
(which is the use of special knowledge to select appropriate subjects) was ap-
plied. Within this general group therefore, individuals were selected that showed
a good experience (demonstrated by job roles, certifications, qualifications and
past project involvements) in the following pertinent fields: Web services tech-
nology, e-business and online business paradigms, security risk management, in-
formation assurance, security architectures and cross-enterprise interactions.
The interviewee selection process consisted of directly contacting persons
with demonstrated experience (identified from company Web sites and/or arti-
cles published) and using the principal researcher’s contacts within companies to
help identify other suitable professionals. This targeted technique was adopted
as opposed to more statistically random or quasi-random techniques to ensure
that persons selected had a good degree of requisite experience and specialized
knowledge.
Additionally, because the emphasis was on gathering in-depth information
rather than surface-level data from as many persons as possible, only five pro-
fessionals were interviewed. These professionals however had a total of 48 years
experience in the security field. This small sample size allowed for a manageable
yet very detailed amount of expert feedback to be gathered in the, on average,
two-hour long interviews. Small sample sizes, greater depth of information and
a focus on narrative data, are all key characteristics of purposive sampling [200].
Known limitations of this sampling technique however include possible bias in in-
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terviewee selection and lack of wide generalizability of findings [12]. As subjects
were selected based only on demonstrated experience and no knowledge of their
personal opinions, bias was not viewed as a serious limitation here. Furthermore,
wide and conclusive generalizations are not the goals of this evaluation but rather
to gain some insight into the use of and support for research proposals.
Therefore, although there are noteworthy limitations of purposive sam-
pling, the benefits possible with the technique were seen to outweigh the draw-
backs in this case. This is especially considering the resource and time constraints
on this doctoral project, and great amount of time taken even to set up inter-
views with the five subjects chosen. Common issues faced were the busyness
and hectic schedules of professionals, coupled with the need for companies’ legal
departments to be involved to consider and approve interviewees’ participation.
Finally, to encourage honest and detailed feedback, the interviewees were told
that their identities would be kept anonymous. This also avoided any further
legal complications with their employers.
The overall goal of the interview process therefore was to present BOF4WSS
and the Solution Model (particularly the core characteristics, possible areas of
contention and novel aspects), and gather real-life, expert opinions and in-depth
insights. This feedback would delve into the applicability (how suitable are the
models for the situations and problems they target, what might the response
from companies be, and so on) and strength (how well, if at all, are the problems
addressed by models, what are their benefits and shortcomings, and so on) of the
proposals based on security professionals’ experiences. This information would
then be used to aid in assessing the fulfilment of research aims in Chapter 1 and
lower-level research questions such as the main one defined in Section 5.2.3.
Having conducted the interviews, recordings were then transcribed. As the
focus was not towards a detailed linguistic or psychological analysis of data, pre-
cise transcripts (including pauses, meaningless repetitive interjections, digressions
and indications of mood) were not produced; this course of action was supported
by Rubin and Rubin [178]. Apart from this, the transcripts were accurate repre-
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sentations which documented interviewees’ feedback.
To analyse the data collected, the content analysis [12] data analysis tech-
nique was then applied. This provided a standard method to code, organize
and index the transcribed interviews. Furthermore, it allowed for easy data re-
trieval, pattern identification and review, and basic counting to note any relevant
quantitative observations [12]. A blend of deductive and inductive approaches to
identifying themes in the data was favoured. This enabled themes to be identified
which focused on investigating the predetermined areas for support (deductive)
but also common themes that arose from data that were not conceived before
(inductive).
With the research process outlined, the next section concentrates on the
presentation and analysis of the research findings. This research interweaves the
findings and analysis stages because it was felt that this would allow for a rich but
also concise discussion. Berg [12] supports the viability of this combined option
especially when compiling reports based on qualitative data. For reference, a list
of the prepared interview questions is presented in Appendix B.
9.3 Presentation and Analysis of Findings
9.3.1 BOF4WSS
The first area to be investigated centres around whether the framework proposed
is an applicable, practical proposal which would aid collaborating businesses in
achieving desired levels of enhanced inter-organizational security and trust. To
examine this, questions to interviewees concentrated on core principles and novel
aspects of the framework which specifically aimed at addressing the outstanding
research problems raised in Section 2.3.3. Four themes have been identified in
which to present and analyse the data gathered.
The themes consider (i) the framework’s emphasis on a highly collaborative
approach to inter-organizational security, particularly where WS is concerned, (ii)
the reality that BOF4WSS is detailed and at times prescriptive, (iii) the merit
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of the framework’s focus on higher layers (business-level for example) of security
in WS-based cross-enterprise interactions, and (iv) the use of the Interaction
Security Strategy (ISS) as a comprehensive security management structure, that
could also foster trust across partners.
Using interviewees’ feedback, the themes are assessed in terms of their use,
strength and application. After that analysis, an additional section is presented
with interviewees’ general comments on the framework, before briefly summariz-
ing the assessment thus far. In the presentation below, fictitious names are used
for interviewees. This respects their anonymity while also allowing for a more
vivid presentation of findings.
BOF4WSS and its highly collaborative approach
BOF4WSS emphasizes a highly collaborative approach to cross-enterprise secu-
rity. This high degree of collaboration (manifested in dedication to working to-
gether, a good degree of information sharing, various meetings, and other time and
investment commitments) was conceived specifically to address the shortcomings
stemming from the isolated and individualistic approaches to securing e-business
collaborations which use WS. Noting the amount of stress the framework places
on this topic, it was chosen as one of the areas to evaluate within the interviews.
The aim was to determine whether highly collaborative approaches such as the
framework, might provide more adequate solutions for WS-based e-business in-
teractions, as opposed to more individualistic approaches. The subsequent aim
would be to then identify how applicable and practical such approaches are.
In response to questions posed regarding high degrees of collaboration as
opposed to individual approaches to security, all professionals expressed that these
types of approaches were preferred and yielded better security solutions. Inter-
viewees indicated that solutions were likely to be more appropriate, skills and
knowledge could be pooled, and finally systems could be designed and integrated
more securely. This favourable opinion was upheld by professionals when ques-
tioned about BOF4WSS and its collaborative efforts towards security as well. An
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interesting point put forward by one professional was that collaboration (espe-
cially initial meetings and willingness to work together) enabled him to be able to
determine whether or not other companies were really committed to interactions
and security or not. Collaboration was therefore being used as a tool to learn
about potential partners and even their security postures before entering fully
into business interactions with them.
Considering collaboration in the context of WS and BOF4WSS, John, a
security professional of 10 years working for a leading international IT and con-
sultancy services company, noted that collaboration is essential and needed at all
levels (business, legal and technical agreements). Continuing the Lead Security
Architect said, “... particularly with Web services, it has great promise but it’s
only going to work with that sort of collaboration”. This view points to the
importance of an increased amount of collaboration, even within the technology-
driven WS world. Detailed feedback from other interviewees supported the im-
portance of collaboration between companies in achieving inter-organizational
security. Existing case study data (see Todd et al. [206]) also emphasizes the
benefits of collaboration.
Even though supporters of collaboration, two professionals warned that it
was important for businesses to maintain some degree of individuality (in terms
of self-defense capabilities), or at least some safety net features (contract- or
technical-based) within collaborations. These would protect individual companies
if their partners inadvertently or intentionally became rogue. This point acts
as a reminder that collaborative security approaches should not only focus on
protecting the group of entities, but also protecting individual enterprises from
the risks of being in the collaboration (Baker et al. [6] analyse and document
some of these risks).
Having looked at the use of highly collaborative approaches in building
cross-enterprise security solutions, the next step was to assess the application and
practicality of such approaches and the framework in particular. From the feed-
back received, two opposing views were apparent. Three professionals regarded
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high degrees of collaboration across companies as difficult to attain, whereas the
others saw it as “quite practical” and not “too big a barrier”. The main propo-
nent for the former perspective was Mark, the Principal of Information Assurance
in a global telecommunications and consultancy firm.
Drawing upon his 20 years in the security field, Mark stressed that collab-
oration was beneficial to have, but very difficult to attain. Additionally, making
persons communicate, work together and readily share information (which are
key activities in a collaborative process such as BOF4WSS) were not easy tasks.
Prime reasons cited centred around the likely problems incurred when meshing
teams from different companies with possibly different perspectives, processes,
systems and organizational cultures. These issues are supported by literature
in [7, 71].
Interestingly, John also showed an appreciation for the collaboration diffi-
culties mentioned above but did not view them as too much of a barrier. Instead
he noted, “yes it is intensive and costly to some extent and I think that’s the only
way to be really successful”. In spite of these difficulties therefore, in his opinion,
these approaches were not only practical but a necessity for success with security.
Literature could be seen to support this ‘security success via collaboration’ per-
spective but primarily in closely knit business partnerships such as the extended
enterprise (see Dynes et al. [49]).
Considering BOF4WSS in more detail, additional notable difficulties were
identified by subjects relating to complexities in stakeholder arrangement and
management (getting the right people together at the right time from across
companies) and cross-border collaboration issues (in essence, normal collabo-
ration issues exacerbated by ranges of cultures and perspectives) if/when the
framework was applied internationally.
Speaking objectively, the aspects mentioned were somewhat overlooked by
BOF4WSS due to the assumption that shared business aims, and goals for secu-
rity would drive and support collaboration. When this assumption was put to
subjects, some respondents agreed that shared aims would help. However, they
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also expressed that there would need to be strong, mutually understood benefits
for all companies, degrees of fairness (“Nobody wants to be the weak partner”,
Mark stated) and executive sponsorship from businesses. High-value projects and
situations where there was positive history (and existing trust) between compa-
nies were also cited as scenarios in which high degrees of collaboration would be
more practical. All of these driving factors would have implications for BOF4WSS
and indicate situations in which it might be best used.
In summary, there was some consensus that the high degree of collabora-
tion advocated by BOF4WSS would lead to a more adequate security solution
for cross-enterprise interactions. According to the data however, its applicabil-
ity may be limited (or at least, best suited) to business scenarios where either
there is a strong commitment to businesses goals (and security is seen as an en-
abler to those), a substantial degree of executive sponsorship, they are high-value
projects (amount stood to be gained or loss, motivated need to do whatever nec-
essary to get job done), or there is existing trust between companies. The first
two of these were previously mentioned in Section 3.12 as criteria for businesses
adopting BOF4WSS. Conversely, the need for positive history and some degree
of existing trust between companies was not envisaged before as a prerequisite to
adoption. This was a significant finding because it suggested that even though
the framework was aimed at building trust across partners, it might be more
practical if some interaction history or degree of trust already existed.
Detailed and at times prescriptive framework
In seeking to create a comprehensive security-focused methodology (which sup-
ported companies from the planning to maintenance of cross-enterprise interac-
tions using WS), a central objective of BOF4WSS was to provide detailed and
occasionally prescriptive guidance. This guidance included the activities that
might and should be conducted, possible ways in which they could be conducted,
and their pertinence to attaining desired levels of layered security within the
foreseen cross-enterprise interactions. With appreciation of the detailed level of
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guidance and the possibility that it might not be well received by companies, it
was chosen for assessment in the interviews. The objective was to ascertain its
usefulness and applicability in aiding the creation of a security solution.
From an analysis of the data, it was seen that a majority of professionals
found the detail in BOF4WSS of benefit to companies, and felt that enterprises
would and should be open to it. One benefit referenced focused on the fact
that detail would force people to consider all the factors and give structured
ways—especially for inexperienced persons—to solve security problems. Another
benefit seen in the framework was the visibility and ability to audit that it would
bring to all aspects of the cross-enterprise scenario. According to Matthew, head
of Information Security, Risk Management and Business Continuity at a UK
educational institution, “An audit department would absolutely love this”. This
was stated because he felt that the framework would define a structure that audit
departments, even though not security specialist, could use to track and monitor
projects.
The main warning placed on the framework by professionals was that it
should be wary of being detailed and prescriptive to the extent that companies
were not allowed to adapt parts to the nature/culture of their enterprises. This
could relate to tools, specific techniques or constituent methodologies. As is seen
from Chapter 3 however, the framework appreciates these issues and either pro-
vides a set of options (such as a listing of risk management methods to determine
security needs) or relies on industry standards and best practices (including use
of ISO/IEC 27000 for security, or UML for modelling).
From the findings above therefore, it can be concluded that the detail
provided by BOF4WSS should be useful to businesses and more of an advantage
than a hindrance. This would not only apply to persons and businesses that lack
experience in dealing with WS security issues within an e-business context, but
also to entities seeking to have a framework to maintain structure, consistency
and visibility throughout the complete process.
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Appreciation of higher layers of security in cross-enterprise
interactions
Another main aim of BOF4WSS is to emphasize holistic security solutions. Holism
is used to refer to an encompassing approach that considers technologies, poli-
cies, processes, methodologies, standards and best practices for security. This aim
particularly attempts to combat the overly reliant focus on technical mechanisms
for security discussed in Section 2.3.3. The purpose of this theme therefore is to
evaluate that aim and its merit in the context of cross-enterprise WS interactions.
Commenting on the data gathered, all interviewees displayed an apprecia-
tion of high levels of security and echoed the sentiment that technical approaches
alone were insufficient. This finding therefore supported the framework’s charter
and literature in Singhal et al. [189] which highlighted the need for the higher
layer of security with WS.
Speaking on this topic, John remarked that the challenge found in business
today was achieving this higher level of engagement in projects, especially busi-
ness ownership, and business and ICT alignment. Technology-level integration
was not a problem but rather getting the engagement, involvement and buy-in for
projects at the business levels. Lack of these higher level aspects, he noted, were
the reasons many projects failed or stalled. Considering this challenge in terms of
BOF4WSS, there is a focus on the higher layer, however no special mechanisms
of encouragement to achieve it are provided. In the framework design it was
envisaged that there would be a top-down drive for projects and therefore efforts
were concentrated on supplying guidance for the necessary processes.
An additional concern lodged by two professionals was that even though
the higher layer of security was important, the translation and implementation
of these higher aspects to lower levels were equally important and not to be
neglected. Paul, a Senior Security Researcher at global British-based IT company,
warned that various things get lost in translation and imperfect implementations.
This can be to some extent supported by difficulties highlighted in [182, 198].
Furthermore, Paul stated that, “you cannot solve problems at the highest level,
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that’s the thing, you do have to come down to the lowest level”. As a result of
these factors, he highlighted that it was key that security go through the entire
process. Paul also stressed that the framework should maintain a balance between
higher and lower layers of security and not overly emphasise either. This was an
accepted perspective in BOF4WSS as it aims for holistic security.
The next question to interviewees centred on trust and whether the higher
layer (and the activities therein such as jointly defining policies, agreeing on pro-
cess for security, meetings and so on) in BOF4WSS might lead to increased trust
across entities and their personnel. In response to this, a majority of profession-
als agreed on the likelihood of increased trust resulting. Common rationales pre-
sented linked to time spent together and commitment towards security that, once
present, would be demonstrated to partners. Both of these lead to relationship
building, which then may lead to trust. Todd et al. [206] is one documented real-
world scenario where high-level activities such as joint risk assessments, “proved
to be the foundation upon which mutual trust between the security communities
... has been built” [206] (p.50).
Mark was the least enthusiastic about the higher layer naturally achieving
trust as he felt that trust was a very complex and difficult thing to attain—a
view supported by Van Slyke and Be´langer [212]. This he attributed to human
factors and the difficulty in predicting human behaviour. Aside from this however,
respondents’ feedback supported the possibility of increased trust across business
partners.
Use of the Interaction Security Strategy (ISS)
The Interaction Security Strategy (ISS) is one of the more novel parts of BOF4WSS,
in that it seeks to create and apply a cross-enterprise management structure not
found to be used in practice. The first question to interviewees therefore was to
gather their opinion on this strategy in terms of security and trust. Another point
of interest was how the strategy compared to existing approaches, particularly
contracts, as these seemed to be the main agreements structure used today by
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companies.
The feedback gathered indicated that a majority of security professionals
felt that the ISS was a valid and useful approach for cross-enterprise security and
trust. Only Luke, a Senior Security Researcher with 4 years experience, disagreed
as he was not sure about ISS positioning in the framework’s process flow, or the
level of security present in the ISS; he regarded it as too detailed.
One intriguing finding was that even though legal contracts formed the
main agreements mechanism across companies, they were reported to cover se-
curity only very generally. For example, if in the UK or EU, they might only
very briefly reference the Data Protection Act. Drawing on his 10 years experi-
ence, Matthew highlighted that contracts are not likely to cover security policies,
continuity planning, or even ISO/IEC 27000 best practices. He emphasized that
it was therefore important to strive for an extra layer of security (similar to the
ISS) to be put in place. Generally supporting this point, a 2010 survey [166] has
highlighted that roughly 40% of large business respondents do not ensure that
their contracts with third party providers include security provisions. This is a
telling aspect in terms of contracts and their lack of focus on security.
Additional advantages of the ISS identified by some interviewees linked to
the flexibility it would allow and the pragmatic, actionable structure it provided
over contracts. Contracts were seen to be very specific, hard to follow and often
expressed in legal jargon. The key stipulation made by subjects was that the ISS
was always in line with the contracts. This, they stated, would ensure synergy in
agreements. In general therefore, professionals’ feedback above is seen to support
the ISS as a key tool in creating and instilling a cross-enterprise security solution.
This would enhance the practical security provided today and support agreements
in contracts.
The second question related to the ISS concentrated on its use as a mecha-
nism to foster trust across businesses. Trust was hoped to be achieved by making
security approaches (pertaining to the scenario) more predictable and transpar-
ent (these being two key attributes of trust [40, 212, 181]). From the resulting
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interview data, a consensus was apparent as professionals all regarded the ISS as
likely to foster trust. Reasons supplied included the clear guidance to businesses,
and the ownership and understanding it supplied personnel with, considering that
they aided in its creation. Both of these aspects link with intended goals of the
ISS noted in Chapter 3. John’s support for the ISS in this regard was motivated
by its charter towards a joint security posture, something that he felt was more
conducive to trust, rather than the “us and them” mentality he saw in some
businesses today. This opinion can be related to collaboration in general and the
reality that some parties might not be willing to collaborate to this extent.
The other salient view on the ISS and trust was held by Mark. He expressed
the point that,“[the ISS] probably fosters trust in that it takes away distrust ...
What you’d certainly find is that one of the major hurdles is getting over the
distrust, doesn’t mean that you’ve actually got trust once you’ve got over that”.
This view, albeit a solitary one in the context of respondents, draws attention to
the precarious nature of trust and possible difficulty in gaining it across persons
and enterprises. In general however, the ISS is seen to positively aid in this
venture and provide a structure that could enhance currently used mechanisms.
General thoughts on the framework
With the framework’s core principles and novel aspects assessed, the next three
paragraphs highlight other noteworthy feedback (based on consensus, ideas re-
lated to research literature, or simply practicality) given by interviewees.
One view that arose with respect to creating security frameworks and
methodologies generally was the inherent difficulty they faced in balancing com-
plexity and being comprehensive, while also making them useful and consumable
by businesses. John aptly summarizes this opinion in his remark, “getting the
balance right is so important where it’s rigorous enough to add value and to make
sense, make the process more structured, and at the right level but not so verbose
that it’s not useful”. He further stated that even though the real proof would be
in the adoption of BOF4WSS, to him, it looked okay and seemed “light enough
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... to be useful”.
Another intriguing point which surfaced was that BOF4WSS did not ap-
pear to be specially suited to medium-to-high security or trust industries or busi-
ness scenarios. Instead, interviewees felt that it was generic and according to
Matthew, “would be good across the board”. This perspective was of interest
because the framework was originally targeted at businesses and scenarios that
emphasize trust and medium-to-high levels of security (see Section 3.12). These
cases were chosen as they were seen to justify the significant effort and resources
needed to adopt BOF4WSS. Based on the data collected however, the framework
might have wider scenario applications, subject to limitations from other findings.
The final significant point relates to framework applicability again but
more from a higher perspective. In considering the application of BOF4WSS
to scenarios, Paul expressed that asymmetries (whether due to size or bargain-
ing power) in the market might limit the framework’s use. This was because
asymmetries lead to some enterprises looking to individually develop solutions to
service as many generic customers as possible. This was as opposed to focusing on
one-to-one collaborations and individual partner requirements (as emphasized in
the framework). Although this was a notion only mentioned by one professional,
the collaborative nature of BOF4WSS might suggest that it is better suited for
symmetric-type interactions. These are interactions where each party has an
influence and party-to-party negotiations, design and development is expected.
Summarizing framework analysis
Having presented and analysed the main findings related to the framework, below
these are briefly summarized and used to investigate the degree of support for
the core area defined at the beginning of Section 9.3.1.
The first theme investigated the high degree of collaboration desired by
the framework. Based on that analysis, collaboration was seen to lead to more
adequate and thus enhanced solutions as compared to those possible with in-
dividual or isolated approaches to security. Additionally, it was also concluded
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that BOF4WSS (and to some extent, highly collaborative approaches in gen-
eral) may be better suited to certain business situations and scenarios because of
their nature (see the collaboration theme discussion for details). These findings
strongly support the area being investigated but limit the target scenarios of the
framework.
Considering the level of detail provided by BOF4WSS, a majority of inter-
viewers saw this as a benefit to companies which would and should be welcomed.
This was assuming that it allowed some degree of flexibility, which it can be said
that BOF4WSS does (through the provision of various tool/technique options).
Cited benefits of the framework included forcing companies to consider all the
factors, aiding inexperienced persons (in what is arguably still a relatively im-
mature field in terms of WS use for supporting complex business processes), and
creating a level of visibility and ability to audit for cross-enterprise development
and subsequent interactions. These aspects can all be seen to enhance current
security approaches and therefore provide good support for the area studied.
Reflecting on the appreciation for higher layers of security in the context
of WS in e-business, data showed a consensus in their merit and value within the
overall security approach and solution. The main concern identified at this stage
related to getting the necessary level of engagement, at what is essentially the
business layer within companies. This is a problem not covered by the framework
as it was assumed the necessary top-down drive for projects already existed. This
top-down drive would be present in the applicable scenarios suited for BOF4WSS,
highlighted in the sections above.
On the topic of trust, a majority of positive interviewee feedback acted
to further support the framework’s appreciation of and concentration on this
higher layer. To recap, this layer involved getting companies together to interact,
collaborate, and discuss and plan interactions security. Generally, these findings
are therefore considered to provide a noteworthy degree of support for the area
being investigated, both in terms of security and trust.
The ISS is in many ways a specialization of the higher layer security ap-
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proach covered above, and interviewees also saw it as a useful approach in terms
of cross-enterprise security. Its importance was accentuated particularly because
there seemed to be no standard overarching management or guidance structure
for businesses which pertained to security. Contracts were referenced, but it is
known that these documents do not contain detail on security nor do they place
it in an actionable language and context. Furthermore, findings indicated that
trust between companies was likely to be fostered by the ISS. Interviewees linked
this to the transparency and clear guidance for companies, and ownership and
understanding implied as companies would have aided in the creation of the ISS.
In terms of the area for support, the novelty in the ISS was seen to add to current
approaches both in terms of security, and possibly also regarding trust.
Based on the preceding paragraphs and sections, it can be concluded that
in the context of this evaluation there is significant support for the framework.
This support is with respect to providing an applicable and practical approach
to enable businesses to reach requisite levels of enhanced cross-enterprise security
and trust. This therefore relates to the fulfilment of the second research aim in
Chapter 1. Critically speaking, the majority of support for the use and viability
of the framework relates to business scenarios where there is either a strong com-
mitment to businesses goals, a great degree of executive sponsorship, they are
high-value projects (and this value drives the need to do whatever necessary to
complete the task properly), there is history and existing trust between compa-
nies, or there is symmetry in business interactions. Based on these characteristics
and predefined target scenarios for the framework as defined in Chapter 3, specific
candidate companies that should benefit most from BOF4WSS adoption would
be the following.
– Large companies with smaller units (or subsidiaries) seeking to streamline
online interactions using WS between these smaller units — As part of the
same company, executive sponsorship and strong commitment from parent
units would be a strong driver for smaller units to collaborate and bring
interactions to fruition. These units would be focused towards symmetric
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collaboration therefore there would be the need for both parties to engage in
context-specific negotiations, design, customization and development. Also,
assuming history between these units (given that it is the same company)
there will already be a foundation of trust that can be exploited and built on.
– Partners in an extended enterprise setting, for example e-supply chains —
Research in extended enterprises aided in the construction of this framework
and a number of the criteria listed above meshes with needs in these types
of business networks. As trust is already a key prerequisite in extended en-
terprises [40], if a group of businesses in such a network desired to switch
from proprietary integration formats to WS for cross-enterprise interactions,
BOF4WSS would be very useful. The long-term nature of these networks and
strong commitment towards a shared goal and mutual benefits also support
the framework’s use. Furthermore, because these businesses tend to already
be collaborators at the strategic and business level, collaborations in security
using BOF4WSS would be a natural next step to protect inter-organizational
interactions and individual enterprises. Symmetric interaction would also ap-
ply.
– Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) seeking to build long-term part-
nerships — This relates in particular to small and medium-sized companies
with past history, a strong commitment to partnerships, sustained symmetric
interactions, and the desire to achieve shared business goals realized using
WS. BOF4WSS would be of great applicability to these type of companies for
two reasons. First, because there might be a lack of expertise and experience,
the framework’s detailed guidance would be very useful. Second, as there are
fewer stakeholders, stakeholder arrangement and management should be less
of a problem. To justify the time and resources necessary by BOF4WSS, long-
term alliances are likely to be the most practical scenarios. In such situations
companies can see their investment yielding returns in the long-term.
The next section presents the findings and analysis conducted regarding
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the Solution Model.
9.3.2 The Solution Model
In this section, the second core area is examined to determine whether the find-
ings support it, and if so, to what extent. This involves an investigation into
whether the Solution Model provides a viable process to support transition be-
tween the Requirements Elicitation and Negotiation phases of the proposed frame-
work. Similar to the evaluation of BOF4WSS above, questions to interviewees
assessed novel characteristics and core precepts of the Solution Model.
For the presentation and analysis of data, four themes have been cho-
sen. These are (i) opinions on transition problems highlighted, (ii) the premise
that risks drive security actions and requirements, (iii) the likelihood of business
partners sharing detailed information on common risks and their intended treat-
ments; and (iv) the ultimate perceived use of the Model and tool. Data within
these themes is analysed with respect to its application and scope.
Opinions on transition problems highlighted
The charter of the Solution Model was to address the transition problems that
companies were likely to encounter in moving from the Requirements Elicita-
tion to Negotiation phases in the framework. These problems were identified
based on an informed scenario and relevant research literature. Considering their
importance as a driving factor for the Model however, this theme assesses the
issues again with the goal of determining exactly how serious they might be from
professionals’ perspectives.
Commenting on the feedback received, all but one security professional—
namely, Luke—agreed with the transition issues highlighted. In response, Luke
said he was unsure whether security would be considered at what he considered,
an early stage in negotiations. In cases where there was agreement, professionals
concurred with all of the transitional problems (such as semantics issues, diffi-
culties understanding motivation for actions, and the arduous task of comparing
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and negotiating actions) and substantiated their opinions by drawing on past
experiences.
In terms of semantics issues during phase transition, John stressed the
importance of spending time initially agreeing on terminology in projects, as
words in the security domain were often misused. Paul and Matthew were two
of the main proponents supporting the reality of disparity in formats of security
actions and requirements. Relating to this, Matthew stated, “there are companies
that might have a basic statement, they might have a graphical representation,
they might have a few bits and pieces and in my experience actually getting those
to marry together initially, is one of the hurdles you do have to get over”. These
aspects can be compared to the security mayhem discussed by Tiller [205].
One of the most interesting findings in the data related to the motivation
behind security actions and requirements. On this topic, John noted that in ad-
dition to partners not supplying (or supplying little) motivational information
initially, if they were asked to justify actions at a subsequent stage, they did not
always have good reasons to support their security actions. He explained that
in some situations where a predefined set of security actions (such as reused ac-
tion lists or generic security checklists) were provided by companies, the original
meaning might have be lost or the security landscape might have changed since
their creation. Therefore in addition to the problems associated with businesses
not communicating the motivation behind security actions, the reality exists that
companies themselves might not be clear about reasons for their actions. This
adds an extra level of complexity and discussions as companies meet in the Ne-
gotiations phase.
Another noteworthy observation from the data was that personnel involved
in cross-enterprise negotiations may not always have a security background—they
may be business-oriented persons for example. Matthew felt that some personnel
have basic knowledge of security aspects but because they lacked core knowledge
and experience in security, this tended to prolong the negotiations process. This is
important because it highlights that even though it may be desirable for security
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experts to be involved in negotiation, that might not always be the case. This
lack of involvement however can affect the negotiations process negatively.
The findings presented and analysed in the previous paragraphs all help
to support the reality of the problems faced as companies transition between
BOF4WSS phases (or any general cross-enterprise negotiations task really). Mark’s
statement in response to the question about transition problems sums it up aptly
as he expressed, “Oh, I’ve seen that, and you’re exactly right, that is the way
it happens, it takes months, possibly years in some circumstances”. This quote
captures the seriousness of the transition problems highlighted in this research.
Risks drive security actions and requirements
To ease difficulties in the initial matching and comparison of security actions and
requirements across enterprises, the Solution Model proposed the use of a shared
risks catalogue. A common risks base would be key to allowing for automated
matching using a tool. Central to this proposal was the idea that risks are the
core drivers for security actions. This notion was supported by literature surveyed
in Chapter 6 and thus embodied in the resulting ontology. With appreciation of
the importance of this notion to the Model and resulting software tool (SASaCS),
it was chosen for assessment in the interviews.
Reporting on the data gathered, a majority of professionals supported
the ‘risk-driven’ notion. Feedback ranged from, “it always stems from risks and
understanding risks, risk management, risk evaluation, it really drives everything
to be honest” to “driving security, a risk-based approach is something I firmly
believe in”. Cost factors were also mentioned by one interviewee but these still
related to underlying risks and their mitigation cost/benefit savings. Interviewee
feedback therefore can be seen to give support to findings in Chapter 6.
While accepting the role of risks as a driver for security, one interviewee
expressed that a number of companies do not actually operate on a risk basis.
Unfortunately, no examples were given as to what companies might do instead
to define their actions. This reality is nonetheless a thought-provoking one in
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terms of the Solution Model because even though it is not ideal (interviewees
and research from Chapter 6 point to a risk-based approach being best), if it is
widespread it might limit the adoption of the Model and tool.
The last important finding related to the communications benefit likely to
result in using risks as a base for security-related discussions. Interviewee feedback
identified that in using a risks base, security professionals and business persons
(involved in negotiations) alike could understand what was at stake (impact to
organization and so on). From this research’s perspective, this is beneficial for
two reasons. Firstly, if business-level personnel do engage in security negotiations
(as alluded to in the theme above), using a language they will understand would
give them the necessary insight into the process. Secondly, business persons are
typically the budget holders (John and Mark stress this fact) therefore again, they
have to understand the need for security for funds to be released to implement
security actions.
Likelihood of sharing detailed information on risks and risks’
treatments
The Solution Model and BOF4WSS require that business partners share a great
amount of information on common risks faced, factors (including laws, organiza-
tional policies and so on) that influence/motivate security actions, and security
actions themselves (whether they are geared towards risk mitigation or other-
wise). With appreciation of the possible inherent difficulties accompanying this
task (such as companies not wanting to share this information), the evaluation
theme focuses on how realistic an expectation this is.
The conclusions from the data analysis in this theme were less clear and
even in cases where professionals felt that information sharing was realistic, they
still placed a number of conditions on sharing. For example, some stated that
once the data requested were at a relatively high level and did not go into specific
vulnerabilities or impacts to the organization, it would be feasible. This was
an intriguing finding because the structure of the risks catalogue and data in
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SASaCS does to some extent ask companies to define specific vulnerabilities that
constitute a risk. This might therefore require the catalogue structure to be
modified slightly to show less detail, or finding scenarios where parties were likely
to be open and the structure could be accepted as is.
Supporting the opposite view, the feedback did observe that in some sit-
uations, companies might refuse to give much information to partners and cite
confidentiality reasons. Overall however they were two prerequisites identified
that would increase the likelihood of information sharing. These were, trust and
an existing relationship between companies. Mark states, “a lot of companies,
particularly in private sector are unlikely to do that unless you’ve got that trust”.
This shows a significance of existing relationships and trust to the Solution Model,
similar to that necessary for the framework.
The ultimate use of the Model and tool
The SASaCS tool is a software implementation of the Solution Model. As such,
it aims to streamline a number of tedious, repetitive and long-winded tasks, and
thus significantly ease transition between the two framework phases. This directly
relates to attaining an answer for the research question presented in Section 5.2.3.
The evaluation of the Model, largely by way of the tool, was therefore imperative
in these interviews. To conduct this evaluation, the tool prototype was demon-
strated to interviewees and then questions were asked. Below, the feedback and
analysis results are presented.
In response to questions regarding the tool’s usefulness in supporting phase
transition, interviewees felt that it was a very useful approach and system. John
stated, “I think it would be really useful. Having seen it, I think the penny
has dropped for me, I think this could be very powerful, very useful. I think
this would help a lot”. Furthermore he expressed, “And it would accelerate the
adoption of technology solutions and this framework”. John made this statement
because he felt that in business today, collaborations are somewhat technology-
focused and what inhibits projects is the discussion and agreement difficulties
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arising from the business and legal sides. The tool, to him, was seen to help these
sides by considering security at a higher level, communicable to people at this
layer (business or legal professionals for example).
Mark was another professional who strongly supported the tool’s useful-
ness. He commented, “a tool that helps bring that [core negotiation aspects]
directly onto the table, it makes that time together far more productive”. Such
opinions as those mentioned here and above, give evidence to support the in-
creased productivity achievable by using the tool (and the underlying Solution
Model proposed). Matthew reinforces these point as he states, “I can think of
projects that it probably would have shaved off months, in terms of the initial
stages of that project, had they thought to do this earlier on”.
When questioned about whether they (interviewees) would use the tool in
such a negotiations scenario, a majority of subjects said that they would consider
it—increased productivity being cited as the prime factor. Proponents also stated
that the novel benefit with the Model and tool was that they laid out compa-
nies’ security positions in a clear and direct format, and forced them to agree or
disagree on positions/postures. Regarding the automated identification of con-
flicting security actions for risks, John stated, “you almost know straight away
that the collaboration is not going to work unless someone changes their posture
or they agree to something”. The tool can therefore save time for companies in
this regard (a feasibility level) also.
From a usability perspective, generally positive feedback was recorded.
Perceived benefits related to good accessibility due to the use of a browser-based
report format and the ease at which security actions from companies could be
compared. Shortcomings mentioned included the need for increased flexibility in
tool output (such as additional buttons and more options on screen). These are
accepted as areas for improvement in moving from a prototype to construct a full
version of SASaCS.
Even though interviewees affirmed the tool’s usefulness in significantly sup-
porting the phase transition, some noteworthy shortcomings were identified. Cri-
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tiquing the higher level data present in the tool, Luke states, “it seems useful
with the caveat that it might hide stuff away from the decision makers”. To rem-
edy this, he suggests a drill-down functionality to allow more detail to be seen on
treatments or risks. This feature would be used by security professionals involved
in negotiations, whereas business-oriented decision makers might be happy with
the current higher level information. This is a useful suggestion but if imple-
mented it would have to be optional. This is because, as was identified in the
previous discussion theme, all companies might not be willing to share detailed
information. Trust, to some extent, again becomes a factor.
Another observation mentioned was the dependence of the tool on the
quality of the input data. “It is the input data’s quality that is going to impact
on the influence [of the tool]”, Luke stresses. Matthew also supported this fact.
This is obviously an issue, however little can be done beyond giving guides and
on screen tooltips to companies and users. It is assumed that companies would
appreciate the productivity benefits when quality data is provided and therefore
use the Model and tool as suggested. Inadequate provision of information by some
partners in a collaboration might even act as an indicator to other companies as
to how serious partners are regarding collaboration and collaboration security.
Summarizing Solution Model analysis
In the following paragraphs, the findings presented and analysed above are sum-
marized in a theme-by-theme fashion. The conclusions drawn are then used to
determine the degree of support for the core area defined at the beginning of
Section 9.3.2.
The first theme of analysis related to determining the severity of the transi-
tion problems that motivated the Solution Model’s design. From the data, it was
clear that a majority of professionals appreciated the problems (largely drawing
on their own experiences) and viewed them as quite serious issues within projects.
Additional issues were even mentioned relating to companies themselves not be-
ing clear on the exact motivation for security actions and inexperienced personnel
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being involved in negotiations. Considering these points in light of the area un-
der analysis, they can therefore be seen to support the seriousness of transition
problems, especially relating to the great deal of time consumed and lack of pro-
ductivity.
The Solution Model operates on the premise that security risks drive se-
curity actions and security requirements. The validity of this premise therefore
directly affects the viability of the Model and resulting system/tool. Based on
the data, most professionals supported this premise and viewed it as the best way
forward. Furthermore, it was seen to have additional uses because the notion of
a risk was viewed as a key communications tool that could give business persons
the necessary insight into security. One contrary viewpoint to risks as a driver
was that a number of companies actually do not operate on this basis. Without
any clear indication of a standard, well-justified process to identify actions how-
ever, little could be done to address this issue. With respect to supporting the
viability of the Solution Model therefore, the data was seen to strongly support
a risks base to security actions.
For the Solution Model to work companies are required to share detailed
information on risks related to the scenario, influential factors in risk treatment
and defined security actions. On assessing the likelihood of that occurring, the
analysis conclusions were not definitive. Some professionals regarded it as real-
istic, whilst others did not. Possibly the most noteworthy finding here was that
trust and an existing relationship were cited as factors that might increase the
likelihood of this information being shared. This is an acceptable prerequisite
as it largely fits in with the updated target scenarios of BOF4WSS outlined at
the end of Section 9.3.1. Assuming an atmosphere with trust and an existing
relationship therefore, the interview findings can be seen to support an enhanced
level of information sharing and thus to some extent, the viability of the Model.
In investigating the Solution Model by way of the tool, the most significant
question would have to be centred around the ultimate strength of the process
and tool itself. In response to this question, professionals gave very positive feed-
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back and affirmed the usefulness of the tool in significantly easing cross-enterprise
security negotiations. The Model and tool were especially seen to accelerate adop-
tion of technology solutions and increase productivity by reducing time spent in
negotiations. Additionally, one professional saw it as beneficial to the overarching
framework such that it would accelerate the framework’s adoption. This formed
a salient point because it suggested that research into support systems (such as
the Solution Model and tool) could positively impact the adoption of BOF4WSS.
Another important advantage is the fact that by requesting information on
motivational/influential factors before companies meet, entities will have to find
clear justifications to support their security actions. This directly helps to address
the issues related to incomplete information and weakly justified motivational
factors identified in the transition problems theme. Reflecting on the analysis
area therefore, the findings and conclusions from this theme strongly support the
viability of the Model in supporting phase transition. There might be some slight
improvements that can be made (including drill down functionality, modifying
structure of risks data in the catalogue and SASaCS) but these were not seen to
seriously affect the use of the tool or viability of the Model.
In summary, the findings gathered provided a solid degree of support for
the viability of the Solution Model in greatly aiding the transition between Re-
quirements Elicitation and Negotiation phases of BOF4WSS. Trust and exist-
ing relationships between parties also played an important role, however this is
acceptable as it coincides with the updated target scenarios of the framework.
Generally therefore these findings positively answer the research question stated
in Section 5.2.3.
Lastly, as this section represents the second evaluation of the Solution
Model and tool (the first was the compatibility assessment), the findings and
conclusions of the two evaluations were compared for any points of interest. One
important observation was found. This was based on the fact that constraints
(laws, obligations, policies and so on) were seen as an additional driver of se-
curity actions in Section 8.7, whereas in this chapter security professionals only
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mentioned risks. Although this leads to no clear conclusion, because the Model
and tool by nature should be comprehensive, they should arguably accommodate
both cases. Critically speaking therefore, the viability of the Model and tool can
be regarded as negatively affected because currently they only use a risks base
(and thus will only automate handling of risk-based security actions). Possible
ways that constraints could be included in automated handling were previously
discussed in Section 8.7.
Even though the negative feedback mentioned above harms viability, the
strong support for the risks base and the tool which was supplied by industry-
based professionals was felt to outweigh this aspect. Future work towards auto-
mated handling of constraints will be pursued only to ensure that the Solution
Model and tool are as comprehensive as possible. This would allow them to
handle a greater number of situations in which they are required to support
cross-enterprise negotiations.
9.4 Summary
This chapter hosted the second stage of this research’s evaluation, and applied an
interview-based analysis to assess BOF4WSS and the Solution Model and its tool.
Findings were seen to support the framework and Solution Model as useful, viable
and practical approaches in addressing the issues they target. There were however
some limitations, particularly related to applicable scenarios for the framework
and contentions regarding security actions and their core driving factors. These
were important but were not viewed as factors that seriously undermined this
research project’s proposals.
The next chapter builds on the Solution Model and briefly explores a novel
addition to further extend it. It is worth noting that the emphasis in Chapter 10
is not on defining an evaluated approach but on exploring the approach’s use and
considering some of the intriguing research issues which arise. These issues and
the approach challenge current research thinking and also flow into future work.
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Chapter 10
Exploring the Automated
Reconciliation of Security
Actions
The analysis of the way people make decisions (prescriptive theories) or the way
people ought to make decisions (normative theories) is perhaps as old as the
recorded history of mankind. — Evangelos Triantaphyllou
10.1 Introduction
Having completed the research’s evaluation in the preceding two chapters, this
chapter takes the opportunity to build on the favourable results attained and
briefly explore an advancement of one of the research proposals, namely the So-
lution Model. The new area of interest specifically pertains to progressing the
Model (and resulting tool) from just producing information reports to automati-
cally reconciling conflicting security actions across businesses.
In detail therefore, the chapter’s aim is to explore whether the Solution
Model and SASaCS tool could be further enhanced to enable them to reconcile
conflicting actions from companies. Instead of collating data and outputting
information reports to companies’ decision makers, the actual task of reconciling
security actions would thus be moved from businesses’ personnel to SASaCS.
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The benefits of automated reconciliation particularly relate to the time
saved by businesses in negotiations and the overall increased productivity that
results. There are however some obvious reservations surrounding this type of
approach. Of these, probably the most intriguing area stems from the question
of, how a representative system-based reconciliation could be conducted that
would lead to credible decisions. As this is a key foundational part of the new
enhancement, this question has been selected as the focus for this chapter. The
novelty of this work is twofold. Firstly, there is the attempt itself to automatically
reconcile conflicting business-level security actions/decisions. Secondly, there is
the process adopted to enable this task. This process is different in that it tries
to include a number of decision factors not usually incorporated in a formal or
numerical sense.
To aid in answering the aforementioned question, the core of the chapter
begins with an analysis of how decisions—and particularly the security action rec-
onciliation decision—could be formally (that is, mathematically and numerically)
modelled. Formal modelling was necessary as it would allow for straightforward
system/software processing. With the decision model defined and justified, a
simple example is presented to demonstrate its application in conducting a rec-
onciliation decision between three interacting companies.
Following the example, there is a detailed discussion of some of the main
issues which arose in modelling and overall limitations of the decision model. As
this is primarily an exploratory chapter, it is these issues and limitations which
are of greatest interest. These are referenced again in terms of future work in the
final chapter. Lastly, some first impressions on the decision model itself and its
aims are presented and assessed. These impressions were gathered from security
professionals as part of the general interview process presented in Chapter 9.
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10.2 Decision Modelling
When interacting e-businesses come together at the Negotiations phase within
BOF4WSS, they are likely to have a number of security actions that conflict
with each other. The classic example is where one company wants to mitigate
a particular shared risk while its partners in the scenario want to accept it.
The question therefore is, how should companies go forward. In the preceding
chapters of this thesis this problem has been studied in detail and a support model
(Solution Model) and tool (SASaCS) were defined. The aims at that earlier stage
were centred around getting all the required information before companies meet,
structuring that information appropriately, and consequently using a system to
output an informative report to aid a set of companies identify key discussion
areas and make decisions.
Chapter 10 explores the progression of those aims into whether enhance-
ments to the Model and tool might be able to support automated (system-based)
decision making. This is with the understanding that some additional informa-
tion to facilitate this process would be necessary from personnel. Having a system
that could automatically reconcile conflicting security actions across companies
would expedite phase transition for entities even more.
To allow for the system-based reconciliation of conflicting actions, this
chapter investigates the formalization of the manual decision making process ex-
emplified by companies’ personnel in Section 4.3.2. Based on the informed guid-
ance used in constructing the scenario, this is believed to be similar to typical
processes used by real-world companies. To recap the case data, the decision
making activity for businesses in the Negotiations phase consists of three core
steps. In the first step, companies outline the factors supporting their security
actions. Next, parties implicitly weigh and generally combine the importance
and influence of those factors as they relate to the security action decision (this
is similar to building an argument in support of the decision). Finally, analysts
and security professionals compare security actions and their justifications (typi-
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cally the strength of supporting factors and generally ‘the argument’) with other
companies’ respective decisions to reconcile conflicting actions.
In this chapter’s context, formalization refers to defining the process using
a mathematical model in which decision aspects are quantified. The real benefit of
this activity is that it allows data to be processed by software (which implements
the Model) at later stages. This software is what would handle the automated
reconciliation.
Before continuing, a point worth stressing is that it is security actions
of conflicting types (where for example, one company wants to transfer a risk
whereas another wants to accept it) that are the focus of this work. This area
was chosen because it was felt to be the first significant negotiations aspect that
companies discuss before moving to consider specific, lower-level treatments (such
as security requirements). It is however also accepted that conflicts across com-
panies are possible even when their action types are the same. For example,
three interacting companies may agree to mitigate a risk but have very different
and possibly even contradictory ways of achieving this. Helping and supporting
businesses with this problem is also an interesting area but not one of current
emphasis in this research.
Lastly, considering the additional time and effort required from companies’
personnel to facilitate the reconciliation process described next, it is unlikely that
automated reconciliation will be suitable for application to all security action
decisions. More details on this point will be given later.
To assist in formalizing the security action decision process, the research
field of decision making and specifically Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM)
was referenced. Apart from the obvious correlation, this field was seen to be ap-
propriate for this work from numerous perspectives. These included provision of
structured methods to design mathematical decision models, a well-established
literature base and finally a process that appreciates decisions with multiple in-
clusive factors/criteria. Furthermore, MCDM models are recognized techniques
to support decision making and guide decision makers towards identifying a pre-
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ferred course of action [11, 207], a goal of this chapter. There are however a few
limitations in the application of MCDM to this research and these are discussed
at the end of the section.
Returning to decision modelling and the application of decision making
techniques involving numeric analysis, Triantaphyllou [207] identifies three es-
sential steps. These are (i) determining relevant criteria (these are defined as
the means used to judge an alternative) and alternatives (that is, final decision
choices), (ii) attaching numeric values to the relative importance of criteria and
to the impacts of the alternatives (also known as performance) on these criteria,
and (iii) processing the numerical values to determine the ranking (preferences)
of alternatives. Belton and Stewart [11] substantiate these steps but also supple-
ment them by emphasizing the additional advantage of using numeric analysis
to complement and challenge intuition. This thereby increases understanding of
the problem and the final decisions made. Next, the three steps listed are used
to define a proposed security action decision model.
The first task was determining the decision criteria and alternatives. For
this step, the findings from the completed Security Action Analysis and Ontol-
ogy Design components of the Solution Model were crucial. As presented in
Chapter 6, when making a decision on a security action, salient motivational fac-
tors include Laws and Regulations, Contractual Obligations, Business Policies,
Security Policies, Security Budgets (particularly very limited budgets) and the
related Risk’s Severity Level. In terms of the decision model therefore, these six
factors can be seen to constitute the decision criteria. Using a similar process
and with appreciation of the higher level focus (on action types) of this work, the
alternatives identified were Mitigation, Acceptance, Transference and Avoidance
security action decisions. These four generic alternatives are also consistent with
initial assumptions on security action types in previous sections.
Having defined model aspects, the next step (according to [207]) was at-
taching numerical measurements. These would be used for calculations and final
ranking of security action alternatives. First to be assessed were the criteria val-
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ues. In MCDM, criteria values are typically used to represent relative weights
of importance. For each criterion therefore, a value between 0 and 1 is stated
that symbolizes the relative importance of the criterion to the decision maker.
Relative means that values also relate to other criteria values stated such that
their total sums to 1 (see Triantaphyllou [207] for further detail).
The determination of criteria weights can be done in a few ways, but one
of the most commonly used time-tested techniques is based on pairwise compar-
ison. This technique was proposed by Saaty [179] and extensive discussions on
it are available in [179, 180, 207]. At a very basic level, this approach focuses on
getting decision makers to compare pairs of criteria according to importance and
rank them on a defined scale. Normalization methods are then applied to derive
relative weight values for each criterion. Standard questions in the technique are
therefore, comparing criterion X with criterion Y , whether X is absolutely more
important than Y , whether X is moderately more important than Y , whether X
is equally important to Y , whether X is moderately less important than Y , and
so on.
In terms of this research’s security action decision model, there are two
options to determine criteria weights. The first option consists of each companies’
decision makers using the pairwise comparison technique and entering the values
themselves. Saaty in [180] supplies a comprehensive manual example, but such
functionality could be built into any proposed software/system. This option has
the benefit of directly drawing upon decision makers’ perspectives and thereby
possibly being a more representative model. Also, each company would have
their own weights. The second option also involves pairwise comparison but
looks at the provision of standard or default weight values for companies’ use,
which are based on the principal researcher’s knowledge and consulted literature.
This bypasses the need for additional work by companies (in conducting pairwise
comparisons) by relying on a generic weighting which could be held constant
across parties.
As these options each have their benefits, both are expected to be included
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in the model (and resulting software) at some stage. This would allow for flexi-
bility in that, if businesses are more concentrated on understanding and having
a representative model, they could use a pairwise comparison system feature.
However, if they are primarily interested in speeding up the process and using
common weights across parties, the second option’s feature could be chosen.
To give further insight into the pairwise comparison technique, it was used
by this research to determine the standard weights for the six criteria presented
above. Considering the substantial detail present in this method however, and the
fact that the final weights are of more importance and novelty to this research,
the process was included in Appendix C. Drawing on the findings in that ap-
pendix, the respective criteria weights are, Laws and Regulations (LR) at 0.409,
Contractual Obligations (CO) at 0.285, Business Policies (BP) at 0.111, Security
Policies (SP) at 0.116, Security Budgets (SB) at 0.053 and the related Risk’s
Severity Level (RL) at 0.026. The consistency ratio of 0.0982 (also discussed in
Appendix C) indicates a good consistency of the comparison data entered and
choices made (according to Saaty [179]).
Briefly commenting on the weights produced, one can see the great deal
of importance associated with Laws and Regulations as they contribute just over
40%. Contractual Obligations are also key considerations with roughly 30%. A
Risk’s Severity Level or a limited Security Budget, however, only contribute rel-
ative weights of 2.6% and 5.3% respectively to a security decision. This was an
interesting finding because even though Security Budget and Risk Level were cru-
cial factors when looked at individually (if relying on absolute instead of relative
weights for example), when compared to other criteria, they were often seen as
notably less important.
Similar to the Risk Level and Budget values, the Business Policies and Se-
curity Policies of companies only gained small relative values, 11.1% and 11.6%
respectively. This was noteworthy from the perspective that even though policies
dictate a business’ mission and operations, legal structures such as laws, regu-
lations or contractual obligations are always paramount. Objectively speaking
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however, these weights do not claim or profess to be perfect. Different decision
makers may arrive at different weights and these are likely to all be valid given
they are justified and maintain a good consistency ratio. The reality that differ-
ent weights will lead to different final decisions/outcomes is also accepted. The
advantage of subjectivity in that case is that the final decision will reflect the
opinions of the decision makers who defined the weights and therefore would be
more catered to their context.
Progressing from attaching numeric values to criteria, the next step was
quantifying the impact (hereafter, performance) of the alternatives on the criteria.
This sought to define how companies’ felt about criteria as they pertained to a
specific security action decision made. To allow for a more appropriate analysis
and emphasis on criteria influence, there was a slight variation from the norm
at this stage. Therefore, instead of the usual aim of determining how well an
alternative fulfils criteria, the objective was determining how much an alternative
was motivated or influenced by criteria. This change was not noted to have any
negative side effects on modelling.
Unlike criteria weights, performance values are entirely supplied by busi-
nesses’ decision makers near to decision time. There were two choices apparent
in the literature ([207]) for entities to decide performance values. These were,
pairwise comparison in terms of criteria (which leads to relative values) or allow-
ing decision makers to specify absolute values. In the interest of not prolonging
or further complicating the decision/transition phase for companies, the latter
option was chosen. The Weighted Sum Model (WSM) [207] is an example of a
commonly used method that employs absolute values. For this research absolute
values in the range of 0 to 10 were allowed for entry by companies to define the
extent to which an alternative was motivated by a criterion type.
To ease usability for companies’ personnel, a Likert scale [162] would be
provided (in the model and resulting software) listing five items, each with cor-
responding representative absolute values. These are: 1. Very Important (score
of 10.0), 2. Important (score of 7.5), 3. Moderately Important (score of 5.0), 4.
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Of Little Importance (score of 2.5) and 5. Unimportant (score of 0). In terms
of a decision therefore, they would be applied as follows: “The Sarbanes-Oxley
Act (the criterion) was Very Important (the performance) in making the Security
action decision to mitigate a risk (the selected alternative)”. Another example of
the use of this scale and the values is shown in forthcoming paragraphs.
The last step in Triantaphyllou [207] focuses on processing the numerical
values to determine the ranking of each alternative. For this task, the WSM
method of processing numerical data was used. Other methods were consid-
ered but proved either to be too complicated or to require too much information
from decision makers for this research’s context. The Analytic Hierarchy Process
(AHP) [179, 180] is a good example of a popular technique that was debated but
later rejected because of its heavy emphasis on pairwise comparisons to determine
all input values (both criteria weights and performance values). That emphasis
would require a level of user input that would most certainly not streamline frame-
work phase transition. The formula for WSM (sourced from [207]) is presented
below. This pulls together all of the aspects and values defined previously.
A∗WSM−score = max
i
n∑
j=1
aijwj, for i = 1, 2, 3, ..., m. (10.1)
where A∗WSM−score is the WSM score of the theoretically best supported alterna-
tive, n is the number of decision criteria, aij is the actual performance value of
the i-th alternative in terms of the j-th criterion, and wj is the weight of impor-
tance of the j-th criterion. This formula can stand as the formal model to define
the security action decision process, the A∗WSM−score score capturing which com-
pany’s security action is best supported (has maximum value) and thus might be
preferred. Below is a simple example using the proposals thus far.
10.3 A Situation Example
Suppose the situation from Section 4.3.2 where there are two businesses with
conflicting security actions for a risk; Buyer vying to mitigate and Supplier to
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accept. Additionally, assume a third company named Distributor that wants to
insure against the risk and thereby transfer it to an insurance company. Its choice
was motivated by the fact that their security policy states it must be handled, but
a limited budget prohibits that at this time. Distributor has also cited a law
that requires those types of risks to be addressed, but it allows for risk handling
through insurance. Regarding performance values suppose that companies have
individually defined the following.
For Buyer’s mitigation-based security action:
– The fact that such threats were evaluated and their possible impact on inter-
actions would be very costly. Also, there is a medium risk likelihood as Buyer
has been the victim of targeted attacks in the past. — Therefore, Important
was selected to indicate that the Risk Severity Level criterion was Important
in making the decision to mitigate the risk.
– Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 (a US federal law) requires that companies
should be able to confirm that only authorized users have access to sensitive
information and systems. — Therefore, Very Important was selected.
– Buyer’s security policy strongly advocates the protection of the integrity and
confidentiality of all potentially sensitive communications. — Therefore, Im-
portant was selected.
For Supplier’s acceptance-based security action:
– There is very limited security funding. — Therefore, Very Important was
selected.
– Deemed possibly unlikely that this risk would materialize as existing transport-
level measures are thought to provide adequate security. — Therefore, Very
Important was selected.
For Distributor’s transference-based security action:
– The security policy of Distributor states that security risks to confidential-
ity of company data classified as Private, must be handled. — Therefore,
Important was selected.
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– Cutbacks in the company have lead to a limited security budget at this point
— Therefore, Very Important was selected.
– A law exists that emphasized that risk should be handled. The law permits
that handling via insurance is an allowable alternative — Therefore, Impor-
tant was selected.
The following decision matrix puts the data above, criteria weights and
respective numeric performance values into context.
Criteria
LR CO BP SP SB RL
Alternatives (0.409 0.285 0.111 0.116 0.053 0.026 )
Mitigation (by Buyer) 10 0 0 7.5 0 7.5
Acceptance (by Supplier) 0 0 0 0 10 10
Transference (by Distributor) 7.5 0 0 7.5 10 0
To apply the WSM formula, the scores for the three alternatives are:
Mitigation = 10× 0.409 + 7.5× 0.116 + 7.5× 0.026 = 5.155
Acceptance = 10× 0.053 + 10× 0.026 = 0.79
Transference = 7.5× 0.409 + 7.5× 0.116 + 10× 0.053 = 4.4675
Therefore the best supported alternative (in the maximization case) is
Mitigation, Buyer’s choice. The SOX Act (a law) supporting their decision being
a key factor due to the large weight assigned to Laws and Regulations.
This example presents a simple application of the decision model defined.
From that illustration, it is apparent that the model works on the basis that
the action with the ‘strongest’ support is preferred. This seeks to be similar to
the manual negotiations process where the best justified or supported action is
chosen. The next section continues discussion of the proposed model and presents
its most notable limitations.
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10.4 Discussion and Limitations
One of the greatest novelties about the newly proposed model is that it tries to
formally accommodate a number of previously under-represented factors in the
decision process. This advances existing literature and approaches where primar-
ily, only risks and risk levels were scored and valued. Whilst it is understood that
risks allow the easiest formal and numeric (especially monetary, in terms of loss
potential) definition, the various other factors in a security action decision process
should also be considered. This research attempts to provide a logical start to the
high-level inclusion of such factors. Having discussed the proposed reconciliation
model in detail in previous sections, its main limitations are now outlined. These
discuss known practical limits in the decision model, but additionally areas that
surround the further formalization of crucial decision factors.
To begin, one of the main limitations in the model is in its actual appli-
cation. Ideally, companies will enter weight and/or performance values into the
model (or a software tool embodying the model) at the same time they input
risks and security action data. Apart from being convenient, this is particularly
beneficial because the motivation data and decision model values will be fresh
in decision makers’ minds. Here also is the implicit assumption that companies’
personnel will enter accurate values and not attempt to deceive the system to
have their security actions chosen. The real limitation at this point therefore is
that for the model to work, reconciliation-related data will need to be provided
for all security action decisions. This is likely to lead to quite a long process
for companies which will only pay off in situations where there are actually con-
flicts in matched security action decisions. Furthermore, spending all of that time
somewhat contradicts this research’s goal of easing phase transition. Arguably,
companies could use the time and effort here to engage in the existing manual
negotiations process.
Two possible solutions which attempt to minimize this problem have been
identified. The first solution advocates that companies run the Comparison sys-
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tem feature initially to determine conflicting security actions. Once these have
been identified, companies should then enter reconciliation-related data for risks
only related to those actions. A Reconciliation system feature (based on the
model in this chapter) could then be applied on this smaller subset of actions to
supply possible decision choices.
The next solution tries to be preemptive and thus relies on businesses
initially selecting a set of risks (this could be done at the risk exchange stage
in Figure 5.2 in Chapter 5) they want specially considered. Reasons for this
might include perceived or likely difficulty in arriving at a common treatment
decision across companies, or a desire for in-depth assessment of risks and the
understanding of the resulting treatment/action. Once this smaller set of risks is
selected, only security actions based on these risks would be passed through the
Reconciliation system feature.
Unfortunately, neither option listed is ideal. This is because the former
relies on decision makers remembering motivation and influences from an RM
method applied days or weeks before, while the latter option does not guaran-
tee that risks with actual conflicting actions will be emphasized. At this point,
however, the former option is preferred as it focuses more on conflicting actions
and their reconciliation, a core goal of this work. To aid in the value definition
process, it is hoped that personnel will be able to use listed supporting factors
(criteria) to remind them of possible motivation and influence (performance) val-
ues. Whilst option one is preferred, the latter option is not totally discarded as
it has benefits in facilitating understanding of risks and security action decisions
across companies. Application of this option might be followed up as a future
system feature.
The other general limitation of the decision model is that it does not ac-
count for multiple factors/criteria of the same type. For example, if a company
has four laws supporting a security action decision instead of one, the model
should reflect this, potentially by a greater weighting or performance value. A
greater influence or ‘argument’ would be the likely behaviour in real-world ne-
10. Exploring the Automated Reconciliation of Security Actions 268
gotiations. Currently however, the decision model does not. Possible solution
options to accommodate this include having extra parameters for each additional
factor, or building such aspects into the performance Likert scale; for example,
only allowing Very Important to be selected if three or more factors/criteria of
the same type support a security action decision.
Another interesting aspect and possible restriction on the model is that it
regards decision alternatives in an isolated manner. For example, assume there
are ten companies in a scenario, nine desire to transfer a risk, but one company
opts to mitigate it. Furthermore assume that the mitigation company has the
maximum calculated value (that is, A∗WSM−score). According to the model, all
companies should adopt this decision. Even though this occurrence is a possibility,
in the real-world it is probable that majority vote might triumph.
One way to tackle the isolation issue might be to sum decision values from
companies with the same security action type. Then, compare these totals and
choose the action with the maximum value. Provided the nine businesses above
had a summed total greater than the total of the one, their action type would be
selected. Albeit accommodating, there is one small caveat to even this technique
however. This lies in the reality that the majority vote might always prevail even
in situations where it might not be best. Future work would therefore have to
investigate, monitor and balance this closely.
The penultimate limitation relates to the complexities of the security action
decision process and the interrelation between its components not addressed by
the model. An example of this is a situation where a company has a single action
that addresses ten security risks. Arguably this action should receive an increased
weighting or performance value simply because of the fact that it covers so many
risks. Currently however, the model does not allow for this.
The problem in the model therefore is that it focuses on security actions on
a risk-by-risk basis and not more generally as it is likely to be considered in the real
world. There is also the argument that the specific risk or specific risk’s severity
level plays a part, instead of just noting the generic Risk Severity Level criterion.
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Thus, possibly in situations where a risk has a severity level of ‘High’, this should
be given a slightly greater (or lower, depending on the context) weighting than
where a severity level of ‘Low’ supports a company’s security action decision.
Additionally and more from an interrelation perspective, the model does
not support links across factors, risks or treatments, nor is it retrospective. Con-
cerning the last point, the model can suggest that companies mitigate a risk
instead of accept it, but it does not look at the impact that decision might have
on other risks or factors. For example, such a decision might mean that there is
less money to spend on mitigating another risk, therefore that other risk may now
need to be avoided or accepted. These are complex issues not addressed by the
model but which represent real-life negotiations and discussions. Further com-
prehensive work is needed in this area to see how these aspects can be captured
and to what extent.
The last debatable aspect of the model relates to decision makers. In
MCDM techniques, there is typically a single, or group of decision makers con-
centrating on a specific decision. If it is a group, they first need to agree on
input values (typically through consensus or voting) then enter them into the ap-
proach. The approach processes these values and selects a preferred alternative
based on maximum scores. The same decision makers therefore provide all the
input values.
In this research’s model however, each company goes through the decision
making process individually and then at the end supplies their security action
summation score (formally,
∑n
j=1 aijwj) to the system. This score is then com-
pared with other companies’ decision scores regarding the same risk and the
maximum is chosen as the preferred or best supported alternative. Therefore,
different decision makers supply input values. Although the use of separate de-
cision makers seems like a useful and valid application of the MCDM technique,
no literature could be found which also applies it. Further work therefore should
encompass the evaluation of this particular application and its ultimate viability.
To briefly summarize this automated reconciliation section, there is still a
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great deal of work to be done in creating a highly representative, formal decision
model. This chapter provided a well-grounded start to that process by identifying
a basic model which included a number of previously under-represented decision
factors. Even though these factors are difficult to value and accommodate, they
form key parts of the decision process and should be duly represented.
In looking towards automated reconciliation therefore, the biggest chal-
lenge will be in identifying the minimum level of data input and time commit-
ments necessary, which leads to the greatest, most useful security action recon-
ciliation results. After all, the focus is easing phase transition and not compli-
cating or prolonging it further. There must also be an appreciation however that
sometimes, automated reconciliation will simply not be possible or feasible. For
example, take the situation where two or three companies have mandatory laws
that support conflicting security actions. Or, consider the case where companies
have very high scores or very close total scores. Boundaries will be needed in the
system to flag situations and inconsistencies like these so that they could then be
discussed by personnel. Output point (ii) in Figure 5.2 from Chapter 5 could be
used as a channel for this.
Finally, as identified previously, there is additional scope beyond recon-
ciliation for aiding understanding of security action decisions. Weighting and
performance data provides a rich source of information which explicitly defines
companies’ perspectives. This information could be used to support complex or
detailed negotiations processes, as opposed to streamlining phase transition.
10.5 First Impressions on the Decision Model
The automated reconciliation of security actions was explored for three main
reasons. Firstly, the favourable feedback on the current SASaCS tool, next was
the additional time likely to be saved by businesses in negotiations and finally,
the overall increased productivity that could possibly result. The last two of
these points were especially relevant noting the importance placed on time and
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productivity by interviewees in Section 9.3.2. This is an interesting proposal from
a research perspective, but because this tool is aimed at industry use, gaining
some real-world feedback even at this early stage would be very useful. This
would help to put the proposed enhancements of the tool into a practical context
and give a first impression regarding feasibility.
To attain real-world feedback on the decision model enhancement, ques-
tions on the model and its aims were therefore posed to security professionals
during the interviews mentioned in Chapter 9. Questions were included in the
Solution Model section and can be seen in question 6 in Appendix B. Below a
brief analysis is conducted on the feedback gathered. This analysis is in line with
the assessment and discussions in the previous chapter.
At a general level, security professionals regarded the notion and process
of automated reconciliation as ‘interesting’, but expressed that a great deal of
analysis and proofing would be required. John, a security professional of 10
years working for a leading international IT and consultancy services company,
summed up interviewees’ views in his statement, “it’s an interesting idea, but
the exact nature of the formula or the risk factors, how that would work, I think
I’d want to see more examples, to prove to me that it works and makes sense”.
Finally he added, “but I think it’s an interesting idea worth exploring”. This
and similar views from most professionals are taken to support the feasibility of
future investigations towards automation.
There was a single view not in support of full automation. This came
from Mark, the most experienced security professional amongst interviewees. He
strongly felt that the goal should be towards automation to aid in decision making
and complementing understanding—not therefore, in providing definitive answers
for security. Mark stated, “I’m not a firm believer in, you press the button for
risk assessments and you get the answer out”. This opinion was likely due to
Mark’s view that risk assessments and some aspects of security were an art and
not a science, therefore human aspects still need to be present. This was a salient
point to this work, because it acted as a gentle reminder of the continued need
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for some human presence even in this level of the negotiation process.
Lastly, professionals agreed with the notion of degrees of importance of fac-
tors/criteria (such as Laws or Policies) in terms of a security action decision. For
example, a relevant law may influence the treatment of a risk more than a related
security policy. Interviewees’ agreement therefore acted to directly support the
performance or impact values (represented on the Likert scale) discussed earlier
in this chapter.
In summary, a majority of interviewees viewed the proposal as interesting,
but noted that it required a great deal of analysis and proofing. The main oppos-
ing perspective referenced the need for humans to actually make the reconciliation
decisions (instead of a tool). This opinion was linked to the perception that risk
assessments and aspects of security are more of an art (therefore somewhat sub-
jective and mutable) than a science (strictly defined). Although this is a valid
perspective, taking into account the positive feedback from other professionals,
future work is likely to concentrate further on automation. Even if tool-based
reconciliation is not used for definitive solutions to security action conflicts, a
tool that could present an initial solution that then would need to be ratified
by a human, would streamline negotiations even more than the Solution Model
allows now.
10.6 Summary
The aim of Chapter 10 was to explore whether the Solution Model and SASaCS
tool could be further enhanced to enable them to reconcile conflicting decisions
across interacting businesses. To achieve that goal, an attempt was made at
formally modelling the security action decision process which companies engaged
in. For support of the formal modelling activity, the field of multi-criteria decision
making was referenced. This was done both to guide modelling and with the aim
of creating a more appropriate, grounded formula. Once this was completed and
a model defined, a simple example was presented to illustrate model application.
10. Exploring the Automated Reconciliation of Security Actions 273
Next, the model was discussed and its limitations highlighted. Even though
the model itself is viewed as a novel proposal which challenges current research
thinking, its limitations are slightly more important here. This is because they
identify key issues for this (especially in terms of future work) and other research
which attempts to formally define such a decision process. Lastly, the chapter
presented feedback from industry-based security professionals. Generally, profes-
sionals showed interest in the model, however they noted that much more testing
and analysis would need to be done. This supports feasibility of the ideas and
thus the need for future research in this area.
Chapter 11 concludes this thesis and presents the main research contri-
butions. Having discussed these aspects, the possible areas for future work are
outlined. These cover topics that this doctoral project was unable to address
due to resource and time constraints, but also new research ideas resulting from
lessons learnt and current developments in the field.
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Chapter 11
Conclusions and Future Work
Information security is, in the terms of the cliche, a journey, not a destination.
— Alan Calder and Steve Watkins
11.1 Introduction
A key goal of this thesis was the investigation of the e-business Web services
security field, and the subsequent proposal and assessment of a novel solution
approach to enhance existing security and trust. Having achieved this goal in
previous chapters, this chapter ends this thesis by presenting project conclusions,
main contributions to the research discipline and ideas for future work.
11.2 Conclusions and Discussion
In concluding any research project, one of the most important aspects is assessing
the achievement of original research aims and objectives. As defined in Chapter 1,
this project aimed to:
– Consider security in a business context and, with regard to its various compo-
nents (policies, processes, technologies and so on), to develop a joint approach
in which collaborating e-businesses could achieve an enhanced and a more
comprehensive security solution for their Web services interactions; and
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– Evaluate the suitability and strength of this approach’s proposals in aiding
businesses to reach the requisite levels of enhanced inter-organizational secu-
rity and trust.
Commenting on the work completed, both of these aims were successfully
accomplished through the fulfilment of their respective research objectives as
listed in Section 1.2. To recap, the project commenced with the first objective
and its examination of the e-business and WS security fields (Chapter 2). Hav-
ing identified gaps in existing research relating to an overly reliant emphasis on
technology for security and approaches to e-business security that were too indi-
vidualistic, the next objective led to the development of BOF4WSS to address
these issues (Chapters 3 and 4). The advantage of BOF4WSS was found in its
provision of a joint approach in which collaborating e-businesses could achieve an
enhanced and more comprehensive WS security solution.
The scope of the project was then reduced by the next objective to the
more manageable research problem of supporting businesses’ use of BOF4WSS. In
particular, the problem area of interest centred on the transitional issues faced as
companies moved between the Requirements Elicitation and Negotiation phases
(Chapter 5). To address these challenges, the following two research objectives
aimed towards the proposal and development of a detailed solution approach and
prototype tool. These steps resulted in the Solution Model (Chapters 5 and 6)
and SASaCS tool (Chapter 7)—two of the main contributions of this research.
The next goal focused on the evaluation of the Model and tool. Specifically,
this objective resulting in an assessment of their compatibility with existing tech-
niques (Chapter 8) and their ultimate usefulness (examined using interviews with
security professionals) in supporting phase transition (Chapter 9). BOF4WSS
was also assessed using the interview technique to gather expert feedback on its
suitability and strength (Chapter 9). Fulfilment of the final research objective
defined in Section 1.2 came through the critical analysis of the data gathered
above. This allowed conclusions to be made regarding adequacy of the Solution
Model and tool in supporting the framework, and viability of BOF4WSS and its
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activities in enhancing inter-organizational security and trust (Chapters 8 and 9).
Summarizing the results attained in both evaluation chapters (that is,
Chapters 8 and 9), there was a noteworthy degree of evidence to support the suit-
ability and strength of this thesis’ proposals (those proposals being, BOF4WSS,
the Model and its tool). This evidence was found in the detailed specialist feed-
back from industry-based security professionals and the technical-level findings
from the evaluation of the Model and tool’s compatibility with existing ap-
proaches. The favourable results of this evaluation directly support the first
research project aim and its goal of creating an enhanced security approach.
Briefly considering the research question in Section 5.2.3 which guided
the Solution Model’s creation, the evaluation findings show that the framework’s
phase transition process can be automated to a large extent. This automation is
such that by use of the Model and tool, the transition process could be expedited
and productivity for companies significantly increased.
Reflecting on interviewees’ feedback in detail, they viewed various compo-
nents of BOF4WSS (such as collaborative security, level of detail and the ISS)
as beneficial and very likely to enhance current security and trust approaches.
Feedback on the tool created to support the framework was also very encour-
aging. The main advantage which surfaced was its use in significantly easing
security negotiations across companies and aiding productivity at a crucial and
normally lengthy stage. One of the most salient points arising from that ex-
pert feedback was that the Model and tool were seen to provide a much needed
bridge between business and technology, thereby accelerating the creation and
adoption of technology solutions. This also meant that the Model and tool could
accelerate the adoption of BOF4WSS itself by easing its application to business
scenarios. These were positive and noteworthy findings originating from security
professionals working within very related areas in industry.
It is worth noting that in both evaluation chapters, some negative results
were apparent. For example, the compatibility evaluation showed flaws in the
Model and tool because they did not provide fully adequate mappings. Addition-
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ally, the theory that risks were the sole basis for security actions was strongly
challenged by the EBIOS method. Even though these were notable concerns,
as discussed previously they were not seen to significantly refute this research’s
proposals.
Before moving on to outline research contributions, there are a few impor-
tant aspects to be stressed largely pertaining to the framework. The first aspect
is in relation to interview results. This is to emphasize the point that BOF4WSS
is likely to be best suited to certain situations and scenarios. Particularly, this
includes business scenarios where there is strong commitment to businesses goals,
a great degree of executive sponsorship, they are high-value projects (and this
value drives the need to do whatever necessary to complete the task properly),
there is history and existing trust between companies, or there is symmetry in
business interactions. In situations where these aspects are absent, companies
could still realize the enhanced security and trust possible with BOF4WSS. It is
expected however that in these cases the framework might prove more difficult
to apply and more effort will be needed to attain the maximum benefits.
The next two aspects embody limitations of the framework and were iden-
tified in project reflections. The first relates to the longevity of BOF4WSS and
the perspective that it risks being outdated quickly. This is because BOF4WSS
is arguably not as abstract as a framework/methodology should be. Therefore,
even though identifying standards, laws, tools and technologies is beneficial as it
gives e-businesses detailed guidance and insight into online WS interactions, it
ties the framework too closely with current practices.
The risk of being outdated is a valid concern and the only solution to it
that is in line with the original aim of the framework is to update BOF4WSS
periodically. This would allow updates in relevant laws, tools and so on, and also
enable any structural changes to be made based on field tests and adopting com-
panies’ feedback. Updating frameworks (and even more abstract frameworks)
is an accepted reality as is exemplified in the various versions of the industry
accepted model, TOGAF [202]—currently up to version 9. Furthermore, consid-
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ering the volatility of the online security field, the updating of all security-focused
models is imperative.
The second limitation results from the framework’s basis on the Waterfall
Model (WM). Even though this model is believed to be the most suitable (for
reasons identified in Section 3.2), there are reservations about the time taken for
overall project completion, and flexibility and turnaround time within individual
phases. One possible way to address these issues is to incorporate quicker and
more flexible development techniques within specific phases of the framework.
Additional benefits with more flexible techniques might also be attainable
in the areas of project risk management (common with iterative methods) and
purpose-built support tools (apparent in methods such as rational unified pro-
cess). Hines et al. [80] provide a good start for this with regards to integrating
agile methods in the WM. Such techniques will need to be evaluated in depth
before being included in BOF4WSS to ensure that structure and benefits of the
WM to large or critical system projects are not affected.
Having briefly reviewed the achievement of research aims and discussed
results, the one noteworthy weakness in the investigation is mentioned. This
weakness was introduced originally as a limitation in Chapter 1 and relates to
the reliance on methods other than a thorough case study to evaluate BOF4WSS’
proposals. Even though limitations precluded the use of this technique and
interview-based assessment was very useful, a case study analysis still remains
the ideal form of evaluation. That analysis has the benefit of allowing a real-life
probe into BOF4WSS’ use and application to an actual scenario. This would
facilitate a comprehensive assessment of its acceptance by companies and their
personnel. Furthermore, it would enable a thorough evaluation of the frame-
work’s suitability and strength in enhancing the cross-enterprise security solution
proposed.
Overall, this project’s investigation to provide an enhanced and more com-
prehensive security solution for collaborating e-businesses yielded positive results
and research progress. This is both in terms of achieving the research aims and
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objectives, and outlining proposals which could be favourably evaluated. The
application of these proposals to real-world business scenarios is therefore seen
to supply numerous advantages for companies regarding their security and also
to some extent in fostering cross-enterprise trust. The next section continues
the discussion on proposals as these also constitute the core novel aspects of this
project.
11.3 Research Contributions
There are three main contributions of this research. The first contribution is the
business-oriented framework for enhancing Web services security for e-business or
BOF4WSS. This framework was developed particularly to address the outstand-
ing need for a comprehensive, multilayered security approach for collaborating
e-businesses that use WS. As was shown in Chapter 2, there currently exist a
number of security advances such as [26, 74, 75, 187, 189, 194, 211, 217, 231].
The problem with these techniques however is that they are either too isolated
(concentrating only on one business’ view to security), or too technology-focused
(only considering what technical mechanisms or standards are needed) to prop-
erly address the security and trust issues which WS introduces for collaborative
e-business.
The prime novelty of BOF4WSS is the emphasis on providing an expanded
formalization of a development methodology that stresses security and trust. This
would accommodate multiple autonomous businesses working together. To ad-
dress the outstanding issues from Chapter 2, BOF4WSS aims at considering the
full nature of WS and its security implications within e-business, appreciating the
real-time inter-organizational security issue now faced by interacting e-businesses,
and finally promoting the use of a collaborative approach to provide enhanced
levels of security and trust. In line with these aspects, the framework is fur-
thermore initially targeted towards a special set of companies and interactions as
discussed in Section 3.12.
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As the conclusions from the previous section stated, the framework pro-
posed was seen to achieve its aims. Critically speaking however, BOF4WSS was
noted to be suited to a particular set of scenarios and situations—these were an
update to those intended in Section 3.12. This reality is not seen as a negative,
but rather a positive as it acted to provide a clearer target scope for framework
use where its benefits should be better realized. The overall positive evaluation
results gained reinforce this approach as a contribution to research and specifi-
cally, the e-business and WS security discipline. The results additionally help to
highlight the need for higher-level, more comprehensive approaches to security
and trust within the WS’ e-business environment.
The next contribution is the Solution Model and its respective implementa-
tion (SASaCS). This model was created to ease the difficulties typically incurred
by collaborating businesses as they met to discuss and negotiate on their joint se-
curity needs for a scenario. These aspects were largely considered within the con-
text of BOF4WSS, however there might be wider applications as cross-enterprise
negotiations between companies is a common-day activity. Future work might
consider these other applications.
To address the security negotiation difficulties, the Model had three novel
components. First, an ontology which provided a common understanding of the
security needs domain to tackle semantic issues across companies. This model
was the outcome of a detailed assessment of the existing security field and key
security standards. The next component was a shared risks catalogue to enable
security needs and actions across companies to be automatically matched and
easily compared. Then finally, there was a purpose-built XML-based language
which defined a common template/format. This would express security actions
(and related factors) and also guide companies via a data entry screen interface
on the security information they should prepare as they come together. Other
possible applications of the language independent of this research include, using
it as a document exchange format for business-level security information or for
storage of risk management data from various RM techniques. Each of the com-
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ponents above was novel in itself considering the lack of approaches to solve the
specific problems (see Section 5.2.2) they targeted.
In terms of the evaluation, the Model and tool’s use were assessed both
at technical (Chapter 8) and interview-based (Chapter 9) levels. The favourable
results received acted to cement proposals as noteworthy contributions to the
research field and practical security advancements.
The last contribution encompasses the decision model which was aimed at
automated reconciliation of security actions. This model and the limitations high-
lighted are important developments to the research field for two reasons. First,
they provide initial steps towards a means to automatically reconcile conflict-
ing, business-level security actions. This is critical in terms of the possibility for
significantly increased productivity for businesses. Secondly, the decision model
seeks to include various decision factors/criteria not usually incorporated within
models in a formal or numeric sense. For example, seeking to numerically define
influences of laws or strengths of security decision arguments.
As Chapter 10 was mainly exploratory, no evaluation was conducted. A
few model limitations were however retrospectively identified. These add to the
contribution itself by defining areas of contention that will need to be investigated
further to progress the model and similar decision approaches in the security field.
11.4 Future Work
There are various interesting avenues for future research. In this section the most
relevant are discussed. The first of these avenues looks towards improving this
work and overcoming key research limitations faced.
The evaluation of BOF4WSS is one of the prime, initial areas for better-
ment. This is in terms of providing a more thorough evaluation of the frame-
work’s use and strength in enhancing inter-organizational security and trust. Fu-
ture work would therefore include enlisting a set of entities willing to apply the
framework to their WS-based business scenario. A scenario with 3–5 parties is
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envisaged to allow for a sufficient and manageable amount of feedback for a de-
tailed case study analysis of BOF4WSS. Furthermore, this analysis would enable
future updates to the framework’s proposals to be made based on new evalu-
ation findings. It is hoped that as a result of the industry contacts (security
professionals) made by the principal researcher during this project, along with
the peer-reviewed publications covering the framework, there would be an in-
creased chance of finding willing companies. During the case study evaluation,
the Solution Model and SASaCS tool could also be applied. This would allow for
another, more practical evaluation of these aspects to give additional feedback on
their suitability, usage and strength in supporting collaborating parties.
The second area to improve current work would be considering agile meth-
ods (which are light-weight, quick and flexible) of development again. In Sec-
tion 3.2 these were assessed but were regarded as inappropriate for a number
of key reasons. Noting reservations about the time taken for overall project
completion, and flexibility and turnaround time within individual phases within
BOF4WSS however, the incorporation of agile methods might be imperative.
Section 11.2 adds to this by presenting some advantages of these techniques.
Future work would therefore aim to determine in which phases agile meth-
ods might be properly applied, what are the best agile techniques to apply, and
how useful is their application; this is specially within the context of the frame-
work. It is expected that these methods will be more suited to areas such as
Requirements Elicitation, Analysis/Architectural, Systems Design, and Develop-
ment and Testing. This is because these methods tend to be very practical and
hands-on. There is also very likely to be overlap, with one method covering nu-
merous phases. The implications of this to the structure of the framework will
need to be studied.
The final area for improvement relates to the Solution Model and address-
ing the problems identified in this project’s evaluation. Proposed changes were
presented in Section 8.7. These included widening the definition of the term ‘Se-
curity action’ and using Conflict types to combat the reality that risks alone do
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not form the basis for Security actions. Questions going forward would therefore
seek to investigate whether proposed changes in the Model and its implementa-
tion (SASaCS) are sufficient to tackle the problems. Special emphasis will also
be placed on finding a common Security actions basis that encompasses risks and
constraints. If this could be found, automatically matching all Security actions
across disparate businesses would again be a feasible goal.
Progressing from the improvements that could be probed, there are a few
natural extensions to this research for further work. The most innovative aspect is
the automated reconciliation of conflicting security actions. The work to be done
here would specifically focus on addressing the limitations and areas of contention
identified in Section 10.4. For example, finding ways to account for multiple fac-
tors/criteria of the same type and appreciating the interrelation between decision
model’s components. Some suggested solutions were already discussed in that
section. Once these issues are tackled, the model could be evaluated in an actual
business scenario. The case study analysis expected in future work would supply
a prime area where data from companies could be gathered for this assessment.
Other areas of interest for extensions include investigating where else sys-
tem support might be appropriate for BOF4WSS and looking at how the frame-
work might be updated. For the former aspect, the case study would aid signif-
icantly as it would highlight areas of difficulty and/or problematic phases where
system support might be useful. This will be an intriguing endeavour when
combined with the agile approaches to be considered for incorporation in the
framework.
Returning to the latter area regarding framework updates, work would
focus on one of BOF4WSS’ limitations discussed in Section 11.2. The main
problem there was the reality that the framework risks becoming outdated. As
mentioned in that section however, the only way to address this issue is for future
work to look into updating the framework periodically. Below the discussion
continues by looking into open questions to the research community posed by
this research and its results and conclusions.
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The largely positive conclusions reached by this thesis serve as an indicator
that more work needs to be done in these areas by the research community. Be-
yond the identified benefits, the evaluated framework shows that there is motiva-
tion for higher level and more comprehensive approaches to inter-organizational
security and trust. As businesses look more towards WS to streamline cross-
enterprise interactions, there will need to be more specialized approaches con-
centrated on holistic security. These could encompass specialized WS security
risk management techniques and collaborative security approaches. Researchers
might also seek to define approaches that have wider applicability than the sit-
uations targeted by BOF4WSS. Conversely, there is also the possibility of new
work focusing, like BOF4WSS, on specific types of scenarios. For example, small
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), particular industries (such as financial) or
companies who require very high degrees of security and business-level trust.
As the Solution Model and SASaCS tool cover a very specialized target
area, there are not many open questions for general research. One possibility
however is the analysis of the use of very formal techniques such as OWL to
define the ontology instead of the XML-based implementation in SADML. In
this project, OWL was seen as surplus to requirements but its reasoning and
logic capabilities might warrant its reconsideration especially if they could feed
into another automated decision model. This leads to the other open question
which focuses on the investigation of different approaches to creating a security
actions decision model. This research outlines one method, but other techniques
either based around OWL, or the use of techniques other than the Weighted Sum
Model (which uses absolute values for criteria) could be assessed. These would
all aid in the advancement of the research field.
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Appendix A
SASaCS Tool
A.1 Introduction
This appendix briefly presents some of the implementation specifics of the SASaCS
tool. Section A.2 displays screenshots of the user-friendly output report from the
tool’s comparison features. The following sections depict the database Entity
Relationship Diagram (ERD) which was developed to support the SASaCS tool,
and provide a description of the database tables. As the ERD is based on the
ontology (from Chapter 6), common concepts can be taken to have similar mean-
ings. In some cases however, ERD-level concepts have been modified slightly to
better suit the low-level database implementation. Section A.4 presents a draft
of an updated ERD which accommodates the shortcomings in the original design
from Chapter 7.
A.2 Prototype Screenshots
The figures in this section supplement those provided in the main thesis to high-
light the detailed output possible with SASaCS. Figure A.1 is a screenshot show-
ing the data on a particular risk, namely LR1, which companies had decided
to treat differently. As the tool is using the detailed output setting, the out-
put (shown in the diagram) also displays the varying reasons which influenced
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each company’s individual security action decision. One of the prime benefits
of the tool in this regard is its ability to immediately identify differences in risk
treatment, and the likely reasons for these differences. This is also done in a
user-friendly, colour-coded and unambiguous report format.
Figure A.2 enhances the comparison output by allowing companies to view
the security action that addresses a particular risk from another perspective, that
is, side-by-side with the other companies’. This enables security professionals and
analysts to quickly visualize all the risks being addressed by a security action/risk
action, along with various other relevant factors.
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Figure A.1: SASaCS Security Action Comparison detailed output screenshot
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Figure A.2: SASaCS Security Action Comparison detailed output screenshot (2)
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A.3 Entity Relationship Diagram
Asset: Defines the main assets
AssetSecurityAttribute: Allows the security attributes of an asset to be de-
fined
ActionTreatmentFactor: Defines treatment factors (for example, laws, busi-
ness policies and so on) that influence a security action/risk treatment choice
Project: Projects are defined for each RM/RA undertaking or scenario
ProjectRisk: Defines a risk that has been selected for use in a particular project
ProjectRiskAction: Defines the risks which a security action/risk treatment
choice addresses. It also defines the level of coverage provided by the action
PrioritizationScheme: Allows the creation of metrics (such as High, Medium
or Low) for each project that would be used to value risks and rate probability,
impact and adequacy of controls
Risk: Same definition as the ontology
RiskAction: This is taken to be the same as security action in the ontol-
ogy. Readers should view security action, risk treatment choice and risk action
(RiskAction) as the same
RiskEstimate: Defines the value of a risk, the probability and impact of it oc-
curring, and the effectiveness of current controls in preventing that risk
SecurityAttribute: Same definition as the ontology
Threat: Same definition as the ontology
ThreatAgent: Same definition as the ontology
ThreatSecurityAttribute: Allows the security attributes which a threat af-
fects to be defined
TreatmentFactor: Defines the elements that affect the treatment of a risk
TreatmentFactorType: Lists the generic types of treatment factors
Vulnerability: Same definition as the ontology
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A.4 New Draft Entity Relationship Diagram
This section presents the draft of a new ERD to support the SASaCS tool. It
accommodates updates suggested after the evaluation conducted in Chapter 8.
The new or modified tables are described below.
Constraint: Defines limitations faced by the organization. These limitations
can influence the treatment of a risk or give rise to a Security action themselves
ConstraintSecurityAction: Defines the constraints addressed by a Security
action. It also defines the level of coverage provided by the Security action
ConstraintType: Lists the generic types of constraints
ProjectRiskSecurityAction: Defines the risks which a Security action ad-
dresses. It also defines the level of coverage provided by the Security action
SecurityDetail: Defines measures used to implement Security actions. Mitiga-
tion Security actions are reflected in security requirement fields whereas trans-
ference, avoidance and acceptance Security actions are reflected in the generic
security detail field
SecurityAction: Defines any way in which to address a risk, or a constraint to
a organization or system. This concept is an extension of the previous ERD’s
SecurityAction
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Appendix B
Evaluation Interview Questions
B.1 Introduction and Interview Format
Appendix B was conceived to give further detail on the interview process used
in this research project’s evaluation stages. To start, this section outlines the
interview format. The next section presents the list of predefined questions posed
to interviewees.
In all cases, interviewees were sent preparatory documentation on BOF4WSS
and the Solution Model and the problems they sought to address. This docu-
mentation was sent at least a week prior to the interview. Interviews were held
at the workplace of the interviewee, in closed-door meeting rooms.
B.2 Question Sheet
SECTION 1: Questions related to the interviewee:
1. Could you give me a brief overview of your experience and background in
security?
2. In any of your experiences, have you worked in any joint development or
collaborative projects involving other companies?
3. Have you worked in any projects where security actions and requirements
needed to be negotiated and agreed between all companies involved?
B. Evaluation Interview Questions 294
SECTION 2: Questions related to the evaluation of BOF4WSS:
1. Briefly introduce framework and its scope to the interviewee. Check if there
are any questions.
2. Explain to the interviewee that, the framework argues that individual ap-
proaches to security across interacting enterprises are insufficient. It therefore
advocates a highly collaborative approach where lots of information is shared,
and time spent, towards companies jointly developing wholly secure interac-
tions. Then ask the following questions:
(a) What is your opinion on individual versus collaborative approaches to
interactions security?
(b) What are your general thoughts on the collaborative approach proposed?
(c) How practical is it to expect such a high degree of collaboration (including
sharing of information, attending meetings) across companies? Do you
see any difficulties?
(d) Can you think of any types of business scenarios, or types of companies
or industries in which such a collaborative approach to security might be
necessary or applicable?
3. Explain to the interviewee that, the framework is structured such that it pro-
vides detailed guidance on what companies should consider and at what points
during planning and development. Give examples based on the activities of the
Requirements Elicitation and Negotiation phases of BOF4WSS for example.
Then ask the following questions:
(a) Do you think that companies would be open to adopt a methodology
that offered such detailed, and at times, prescriptive guidance?
(b) Could adopting such a methodology be more a benefit or limitation to
companies?
4. Explain to the interviewee that, the framework notes that particularly with
scenarios where technologies such as Web services are used to support e-
business interactions, industry and companies neglect the overarching high,
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or business-level security (policies, processes, etc.) that should encapsulate
and guide holistic security and secure interactions. Then ask the following
questions:
(a) Is there merit in focusing on these higher levels of security, or might
technology-level integration alone be enough in these scenarios? Why?
(b) Do you think that the time spent on this higher layer might be worth it,
in respect to increased level of security or trust across businesses? If so,
why? Or, why not?
5. Explain to the interviewee that, the Interaction Security Strategy (ISS) is a
less rigid management structure that defines high-level cross-enterprise secu-
rity directives to guide interactions, inclusive of relevant decisions internal to
collaborating entities. Directives could include security strategies, policies,
procedures and best practices. The ISS is used in addition to the security
actions/requirements defined in legal contracts. Then ask the following ques-
tions:
(a) Any questions on the ISS?
(b) As compared to using only legal contracts, can you see any benefits in
terms of security or trust, to this cross-enterprise strategy?
(c) Are there any types of business scenarios, or types of companies or in-
dustries, that you think the ISS might be more applicable to?
(d) Explain to the interviewee that, the ISS is jointly developed by compa-
nies and defines a security structure for all companies intended to make
security approaches (regarding joint interactions) predictable and trans-
parent. Could these factors foster trust between business partners?
SECTION 3: Questions related to the evaluation of the Solution Model for
stage transition:
1. Briefly introduce the problems the Solution Model is intending to address.
Then ask the following questions:
(a) Any questions on this?
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(b) Do you agree or disagree with the problems highlighted?
(c) Do you have any insights or past experience with the surrounding problem
scenario to support or refute them as problems?
2. Explain to the interviewee that, to facilitate a matching of security actions
across businesses, a common base is one possible solution. In the Solution
Model, the common base used was a risks catalogue. This catalogue was
shared by companies and from it, companies would select relevant risks to
be factored in to their individual risk assessments. Then ask the following
questions:
(a) Do you see any issues with companies using a common risks base in that
regard?
(b) Explain to the interviewee that, in this proposal, there is the assumption
that security actions and requirements always originate from some under-
lying risk. Risks therefore always drive security actions and requirements.
Do you agree or disagree with this assumption?
3. Explain to the interviewee that, the Solution Model, and by large BOF4WSS,
requires that businesses share a great amount of data on common risks faced,
factors which influence risk treatment, security actions (even non-mitigation
needs) with partners they are intending to collaborate with. This is the data
that is matched and compared by the Solution Model’s implemented tool.
Then ask the following question:
(a) Do you think that companies in real-world situations are likely to share
this level of information with their partners?
4. Give the interviewee a demonstration of the tool and some of its main features
(data entry, settings and comparison options, data output). Then ask the
following questions:
(a) How useful might be the tool and the output provided, in supporting the
comparison and negotiation of security actions in business collaboration
scenarios?
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(b) Are there any advantages or disadvantages noted?
(c) Would you, as a security professional, use such a tool to aid in supporting
the comparison and negotiation of security actions if given the option?
5. With regards to the tool’s output report;
(a) How user-friendly is the output report provided? Is it in a good, easy to
use and understand format?
(b) Do you have any suggestions to make the output more usable?
6. Explain to the interviewee that, the idea of automated reconciliation of con-
flicting security needs is being explored. One approach is to have companies
add a degree of influence weighting or percentage value to each influential
factor, then once these are totalled for a particular security actions, use the
totalled value to compare across companies. Give the detailed example that
was prepared. Then ask the following questions:
(a) What do you think about the idea of degrees of importance of factors on
a decided security action?
(b) What are your thoughts on determining the strength of a security action
in this way?
(c) Do you think this would work?
(d) What are your thoughts on this approach?
Thank interviewee for their time and assistance.
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Appendix C
Applying the Pairwise
Comparison-based Technique
C.1 Introduction
This appendix presents the application of the pairwise comparison-based tech-
nique proposed within Saaty [179, 180] to determine the weights of a specified
set of decision criteria. These criteria are Laws and Regulations (LR), Contrac-
tual Obligations (CO), Business Policies (BP), Security Policies (SP), Security
Budgets (SB) and the related Risk’s Severity Level (RL). Since it is the use of
the technique which is the focus, great detail is not given on the supporting
mathematics. Readers however are encouraged to reference [179, 180] for proofs,
theorems and in-depth discussions.
C.2 Determining Criteria Weights
As mentioned in Chapter 10, at a basic level the pairwise comparison technique
gets decision makers to compare pairs of criteria according to importance and
rank them on a defined scale. Saaty [179] then applies normalization methods
to derive relative weight values for each criterion. One of the first key aspects
therefore is the defined importance scale. This is shown in Table C.1.
C. Applying the Pairwise Comparison-based Technique 299
Intensity of importance Definition Explanation
1 Equal importance Two activities contribute
equally to the objective
3 Weak importance of one
over another
Experience and judge-
ment slightly favour one
activity over another
5 Essential or strong impor-
tance
Experience and judge-
ment strongly favour one
activity over another
7 Demonstrated importance An activity is strongly
favoured and its dom-
inance demonstrated in
practice
9 Absolute importance The evidence favouring
one activity over another
is of the highest possible
order of affirmation
2, 4, 6, 8 Intermediate values be-
tween two adjacent judge-
ments
When compromise is
needed
Reciprocals of above nonzero If activity i has one of
the above nonzero num-
bers assigned to it when
compared with activity j,
then j has the reciprocal
value when compared with
i.
Table C.1: Scale of relative importances (according to [179, 207])
The main purpose of the scale is to enable decision makers to indicate and
abstractly quantify the extent to which one element (in this case, a criterion) is
more or less important than another element (again, a criterion). Based on the
table Definition and Explanation cell descriptions therefore, a respective numeric
value would be chosen by decision makers. Once identified, the values are put
into a pairwise comparison matrix. Formally, the list of available values are 9, 8,
7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 1
2
, 1
3
, 1
4
, 1
5
, 1
6
, 1
7
, 1
8
, 1
9
. The last nine values are the reciprocals of
the former nine (according to the definition in the last row of Table C.1).
Following the pairwise comparison process and using the principal re-
searcher’s knowledge, the matrix below was created for the security action decision
criteria. This process only needs to be completed once to lead to the weightings
for each of the criteria. Weights would then apply to all security action decisions.
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LR CO BP SP SB RL
LR 1 2 5 5 7 9
CO 1
2
1 4 4 6 8
BP 1
5
1
4
1 1 4 5
SP 1
5
1
4
1 1 4 6
SB 1
7
1
6
1
4
1
4
1 4
RL 1
9
1
8
1
5
1
6
1
4
1
To explain the choices behind some of the data in the matrix, the Laws and
Regulations (LR) criterion is now considered. Reading the matrix row-to-column,
the importance of LR was first compared to LR; this would be the first pair. As
these are the same criterion, they are naturally of equal importance. Therefore,
the value of 1 (from the scale) is input to the matrix where the LR row and
LR column meets. Next, LR was compared to CO (thus, looking at where the
row LR and column CO meet). Here, the value of 2 was chosen because it was
felt that Laws and Regulations are slightly more important than Contractual
Obligations (which are defined as agreements a company is previously legally
binded to). This was based on the opinion that even though both are legally
binding, Laws and Regulations define the mandatory rules of a country for all
entities operating in that country to follow. Furthermore, it is more likely that a
situation will be found where Contractual Obligations are drafted that appreciate
a Law or Regulation, rather than a Law or Regulation being drafted that considers
a company’s Obligations.
In the comparison of LR to BP and LR to SP the value of 5 was selected.
Even though an entity’s Business Policy (BP) and Security Policy (SP) are of
great importance, when these are compared to Laws and Regulations, it was felt
that the latter criterion had greater importance in a decision. Apart from the
reality that these policies are likely to be in line with (and in someways therefore,
subordinate to) Laws and Regulations, there is the fact that not fulfilling a Law
or Regulation will have a much greater impact than not fulfilling a policy.
The next pair is LR and SB and for this, the value of 7 indicating demon-
strated importance, was chosen. Although a limited Security Budget (SB) is a
serious restriction on a company’s security posture, for all the reasons mentioned
C. Applying the Pairwise Comparison-based Technique 301
above, Laws and Regulations still demand greater emphasis. A higher value was
chosen as compared to CO, BP and SP particularly because surveys [210] have
highlighted that companies are still spending too meagre amounts of their overall
budgets on IT security. Therefore, as opposed to having truly limited funds in
the business which then carries over to security spending, companies might be
deliberately allocating the bare minimum or less to spending on security. Likely
reasons for this are perceived importance or benefits, or visible return on invest-
ments.
The last criteria pair for comparison in the row is LR and RL. For this
pair a value of 9 was chosen. Such a high importance level was selected because
regardless of a Risk’s Severity Level, a Law or Regulation would dictate its treat-
ment. Furthermore, considering the other criteria, the Severity Level is usually
assessed in terms of these. For example, a Risk’s Severity Level is only as im-
portant to a decision as a company’s Security Policy defines. A policy therefore
could state that all risks of type X are to be accepted. Therefore even if there
is a risk of type X that has a high Risk Severity Level, that risk would still be
accepted. Aspects such as this lead to the selection of absolute importance of LR
over RL.
The comparison process presented above was completed for the other rows
to achieve the values from 1–9 shown in the matrix. A value of 1–9 in a cell (row,
column intersection) indicates that a row element was equally or more important
than a column element. Once these were identified, their reciprocals (which
theoretically show lesser importance) were produced and included as stipulated
by the scale in Table C.1. As an example, consider the LR and SB pairwise
comparison result of 7 above. The respective step is to locate the cell (row
and column intersection) which represents the reverse comparison and place the
reciprocal value in that cell. As the reverse comparison cell would be SB (the
row) and LR (the column), 1
7
was input there. Such a procedure was used to
input all other reciprocal values.
With the matrix completed, the next task mentioned in Saaty [179] is the
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computation of a vector of priorities from the matrix; these priorities are also
known as the relative criteria weights. To do this, Saaty suggests dividing the
elements of each column by the sum of that column (therefore, normalize the
column), and then adding the elements in each resulting row and divide this sum
by the number of elements in the row. This, he notes, is a process of averaging
over the normalized columns. Applying that process to the matrix above, the
following results. The last column displays the priority vector.
LR CO BP SP SB RL Priority
LR 0.464 0.527 0.437 0.438 0.315 0.273 0.409
CO 0.232 0.264 0.349 0.350 0.270 0.242 0.285
BP 0.093 0.066 0.087 0.088 0.180 0.152 0.111
SP 0.093 0.066 0.087 0.088 0.180 0.182 0.116
SB 0.066 0.044 0.022 0.022 0.045 0.121 0.053
RL 0.052 0.033 0.017 0.015 0.011 0.030 0.026∑
= 1
To discuss this process and explain the values above, the row LR and
column RL intersection is used; here the value resulting is 0.273. According to
Saaty [179], the first task is dividing the element by the sum of the column. This
therefore gives the calculation below. (Note that the values used are from the
first matrix.)
9÷ (9 + 8 + 5 + 6 + 4 + 1) = 0.273
Having made this calculation for all the cell values, the resulting row values
are averaged. Taking the first row in the matrix above, the following calculation
would be conducted. This gives the weight of importance of LR, that is, Laws
and Regulations on the security action decision.
Priority/Weight = (0.464 + 0.527 + 0.437 + 0.438 + 0.315 + 0.273)÷ 6 = 0.409
Lastly, considering the subjectivity behind this pairwise comparison-based
process, Saaty [179] also defined the Consistency Index (CI) and Consistency Ra-
tio (CR). These calculated values are used to measure and test the consistency
of the data entered by decision makers into the pairwise comparison matrix (that
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is, the first matrix in this appendix). Saaty notes that when the CI is close
to zero and CR is equal to or less than 0.10, this is an indication of a good
and acceptable consistency. In cases where CR yields a value greater than 0.10
however, a re-examination of the decision maker’s pairwise judgements is recom-
mended. Readers are directed to [179, 207] for detailed discourse on CI, CR and
the mathematical reasoning supporting them.
To calculate the CI, the formula (λmax − n)/(n − 1) is used, where n is
the number of criteria, and λmax is the value produced by adding the columns of
the first matrix and then multiplying the resulting vector by the priority vector
in the second matrix [207]. With the vector from the addition of columns in the
first matrix being roughly (2.154, 3.792, 11.45, 11.417, 22.25, 33) therefore, λmax
has a value of 6.609. This leads to,
CI =
(λmax − n)
(n− 1) =
(6.609− 6)
6− 1 = 0.1218
A value of 0.1218 is a fair indicator of consistency, however to confirm,
the CR is considered. To calculate this, CI is divided by a Random Consistency
Index (RCI). This index represents an average random consistency index derived
from randomly generated reciprocal matrices [179, 207]. For matrices with size
n = 6 the value 1.24 is defined as the RCI (see [179, 207]). Therefore,
CR =
CI
RCI
=
0.1218
1.24
= 0.0982 < 0.10
As the CR value is less than 0.10, this indicates that there is an acceptable
consistency of the original matrix judgements and data. This finding acts to add
some degree of reliability and credibility to the pairwise comparisons done above,
and ultimately, the weightings proposed here.
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